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Succeeding or Failing to Reform: A Comparative Political Economic Analysis of Anti-Corruption Reforms in Selected Sub-Sahara African Countries

For the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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**SUCCEEDING OR FAILING TO REFORM: A COMPARATIVE POLITICAL
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORMS IN SELECTED
SUB-SAHARA AFRICAN COUNTRIES**

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Faculty

of

Purdue University

by

Godfrey Kariuki Wachira

In Partial Fulfillment of the

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of

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TO MY MOTHER, MRS MILKAH WACHIRA, WITH LOVE AND GRADTTITUDE

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CBK	Central Bank of Kenya
CCI	Control of Corruption Index
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
CHRAJ	Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice
CJA	Committee for Joint Action
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
D.I	Discursive Institutionalism
DCEC	Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
EFCC	Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
GACC	Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition
GNA	Ghana News Agency
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KACA	Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority
KACC	Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KNAO	Kenya National Audit Office
KNHCR	Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
MMD	Movement for Multi-Party Democracy
NARC	National Alliance Rainbow Coalition
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NPP	National People's Party
PEA	Political Economic Analysis
RoK	Republic of Kenya
SFO	Serious Fraud Office
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
T.I.	Transparency International
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

ABSTRACT

Wachira, Godfrey K. Ph.D., Purdue University, August 2012. Succeeding or Failing To Reform: A Comparative Political Economic Analysis of Anti-Corruption Reforms In Selected Sub-Sahara African Countries. Major Professor: Dr. Dwayne Woods

The fact that donor-initiated anti-corruption reforms have had varied outcomes in African countries suggests it is an important and puzzling issue worth explaining. This phenomenon has increasingly received attention particularly from scholars adopting the neopatrimonialism paradigm. The neopatrimonialism literature, however, is blinded by its deterministic conceptions, and due to elite bias tends to overlook the critical link of citizens' cognitive ideas. My research contributes to the anti-corruption reforms literature by developing an explanatory model from the premises of the Political Economic Analysis perspective that addresses this oversight. I propose an explanatory model that assumes that political actors take into consideration the political economic environment, including what citizens think (as lower order information) as they attend to anti-corruption reforms in their countries. Exploring the impact of selected African countries' political economic structures on reform outcomes, the study provides suggestive evidence that points to the pivotal role of citizens, through their cognitive ideas, by influencing how structural features impact corruption control (micro-level) and also as an influential contextual feature (macro-level).

Since this study is an attempt at model building, the empirical results ideally serve as a basis for further elaboration and development of the model.

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

It is the day after a World Bank/IMF joint conference on attaining sustainable economic development in Sub-Sahara Africa. In one of the conference panels, scholars of African politics, international development practitioners, and policy analysts assembled to evaluate anti-corruption reforms instituted by World Bank and IMF in Sub-Sahara Africa. This is all imaginary. The participants were asked to offer their views and explanations about the success or failure of the reforms. This question is not imaginary. This is a legitimate question being commonly asked within international development circles.

During the anti-corruption panel discussions, there was a predisposition to emphasize why anti-corruption reforms have failed to reduce corruption. In fact, most participants in the panel were pessimistic about prospects of reducing corruption in the region. The reasoning was simple: the reforms do not pose a challenge to ‘neopatrimonial’ rule that dominates governance in Sub-Sahara African countries. The participants accused African elites of a litany of failures, some of which- such as implementing reforms only to appease donors- do not raise hope that combating corruption is indeed nigh. To the participants, an interminable tale of continued corruption and broken promises to reduce corruption has dismantled any credibility that corruption can be

reduced or African politicians have any political will to implement reforms. They arrived at a damning verdict: anti-corruption reforms are not likely to succeed. The conference is still fantasy, but the mood in the room is not. It reflects the dominant discourse on anti-corruption reforms in Sub-Saharan African countries.

Contrary to the conclusion in the room, sub-Saharan Africa, a region well known as a place of ravaging corruption, is actually a region of great variety. “In Africa, Tanzania, Liberia, Rwanda, Ghana, and Sierra Leone all made progress on corruption over the past decade while Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, and Eritrea retreated” (World Bank 2007). Hanson (2009) also notes that countries such as Rwanda, Tanzania, and Ghana have made substantial progress on reducing corruption while countries like Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa have only made meager progress. Table 1.1 shows Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) scores (indicating levels of corruption) in 18 African countries in 2005 and 2010.

I want to state right away, since it is relevant to my inquiry, that I take an optimistic view about the prospects of reducing corruption levels in Sub-Saharan Africa. In a sense, success is in the eye of the beholder depending for example on short-term focus or a longer-range perspective. In my view, pessimistic analysts are simply guilty of failing to recognize the reform process as an ongoing social process.¹ They focus on ‘success’ or ‘failure’, rather than ‘succeeding’ or ‘failing’ based on overly high standards of ‘zero corruption’ that even western societies do not achieve. What they overlook is that the relatively successful fight against corruption in many western societies was a long

¹ Even if framed in neopatrimonial terms, I believe the shift from a society dominated by informal relations to formal institutions is an ongoing social process.

running struggle that took many years to accomplish but still not resolved (Anechiaricio 1994; see also Glaeser and Goldin 2006, and Theobold 1994).

Table 1: Levels of Corruption in Selected African Countries

Country	2005	2010
Benin	2.9	2.8
Botswana	5.9	5.8
Cape Verde	N/A	5.1
Ghana	3.5	4.1
Kenya	2.1	2.1
Lesotho	3.4	3.5
Madagascar	2.8	2.6
Malawi	2.8	3.4
Mali	2.9	2.7
Mozambique	2.8	2.7
Namibia	4.3	4.4
Nigeria	1.9	2.4
Senegal	3.2	2.9
South Africa	4.5	4.5
Tanzania	2.9	2.7
Uganda	2.5	2.5
Zambia	2.6	3.0

Note: The index ranges from 0 (very corrupt) to 10 (very clean).

Combating corruption is neither straightforward nor easy, but it is not impossible. Even though implementation has been slower than hoped for and less than ideal, it is an ongoing process. Instead of unreasonably expecting quick fixes, we should be looking for signs of long-term progress. Such a view embraces incremental change, which I think is important because such changes potentially pave the way for greater change over time. After all some African countries have achieved progress and managed to reduce the level of corruption in their societies.

While some countries have made some progress and not other countries, due to the influence of the donor community who leverage their vast resources to sway the policy process in the region, sub-Saharan African governments implement distinctively similar anti-corruption reforms.² As such, donor-initiated reforms not only dominate reform efforts but also are the backbone in the fight against corruption in sub-Saharan African countries. If the donor community induces sub-Saharan African governments to implement similar reforms, the pertinent question then becomes, ‘why despite implementing similar anti-corruption reforms have sub-Saharan African countries witnessed varied anti-corruption outcomes?’ (For convenience purposes, in the rest of the study I use Africa to refer to sub-Saharan Africa).

When scholars explain anti-corruption reform outcomes in African countries, more often than not the emphasis is on how neopatrimonial features of African polities conspire actively to prevent implementation of anti-corruption reforms from reducing

² I use donor community as a convenient shorthand for international institutions and western governments who provide financial aid to the debt-ridden African governments. It includes Western governments, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and other international development agencies. In the study, the term donor community refers to IMF and World Bank, unless stated otherwise.

corruption. Framing the issue as ‘why reforms fail’, conventional explanations emphasize rational, cultural, institutional, and structural constraints on reducing corruption. Yet, despite extensive research, few insights have evolved on why some countries are making progress while other countries are lagging behind. As Armond (2007) insightfully notes, our knowledge about what generates positive changes, about the kinds of variations among countries with ‘neopatrimonial’ structures is still patchy. To be clear I am not arguing that these explanations are ‘bad’ or ‘wrong’ but rather that they are limited.

What these explanations overlook is the fact that political actors in these ‘neopatrimonial states’ are nested in political economic environments that both constrain and enable them to implement and enforce anti-corruption reforms. How people define and give meaning to the political economic environment can make the difference between succeeding and failing in reducing corruption. As I will argue, through interactive rationality political actors take into consideration implications of the political economic environment in their countries (as lower order information) in their decision-making process regarding anti-corruption reforms. And this environment includes an ideational context and the subjective reality about the environment in people’s minds.

This study therefore strives to develop an explanatory that improves on existing explanations about anti-corruption reform outcomes in Africa by focusing on the role of cognitive ideas (ideas that tell us ‘what is’ and ‘what to do’) as a significant determinant of anti-corruption reform outcomes. Individuals, based on their cognitive process and experiences, respond to the world around them with all its complexities resulting in knowledge that transcends one’s culturally accepted forms of knowledge. This knowledge manifests in a relatively unique concatenation of interests, beliefs, values,

worldviews, and tendencies that crystallize as ideas (defined as mental events that entail thought (Yee 1996, 69). The system of ideas to which one adheres slowly becomes a cognitive frame through which he/she interprets reality in a specific direction (Surel 2000) and provides a valuation of the existing and ideal polity. This cognitive frame and valuation, in turn, provide the political ‘logics’ that partly determine responses to anti-corruption activities. Always contested and ultimately never settled, ideas shape activities within the political arena (Stone 2002).

The result is that people- through their ideas- are at the very center of how the underlying interests and incentives (micro- level) interrelate with institutional and structural factors (macro-level factors) to affect institutional reforms and drive change in the short, medium, and long term. There is an objective reality created by the political and economic conditions and institutional framework, but its actual impact on reform outcomes partly depends on the subjective reality created by political actors. Thus epistemologically, this study does not engage in an objective versus subjective debate but rather accommodates both views to explain anti-corruption reform outcomes in African countries.

The study therefore builds on the argument that divergent anti-corruption reform outcomes depend on how political actors’ ideas relate with the conditions they live in, and institutional features that collectively shape their incentives, demands, activities, and strategies regarding anti-corruption in their country. This I propose explains African countries’ responses to donor-initiated anti-corruption reforms that for the last 15 years the international development community has insisted are fundamental to economic

progress in developing countries and whose success or failure is a concern within the community.

1.2 Problem: Reducing Corruption

An international crusade against corruption in developing nations emerged in the mid-1990s to become influential in the policy process in Africa. In a speech to the World Bank/International Monetary Fund Annual Meetings in 1996, then World Bank President James Wolfensohn spoke of the ‘cancer of corruption’ and its threat to development and democracy. In 1997, The World Development Report *The State in a Changing World* issued by World Bank addressed the issue of governance and laid out the Bank’s plans to help client governments fight corruption. Taking cue, other international financial institutions, Western governments, international non-governmental organizations like Transparency International, and the academic, and policy communities increasingly identified corruption as the premier threat to economic development, democracy, and stability among poor nations around the world.³

If anything, corruption is considered such a colossal problem that it is routinely singled out as the bane of nearly all (if not all) political and economic problems in developing nations. For instance, according to a 1997 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Report *Corruption and Good Governance* corruption has detrimental effects by distorting economic development through rewarding the dishonest

³ In late 1970s to early 1980s, the failure of African nations to attain economic development was blamed on the economic structures within the countries. The state-led development model was deemed a failure; to be replaced by a liberal economic model through the World Bank and IMF initiated structural adjustment programs (SAPs). By mid 1990s, with the failure of SAPs to render expected results of economic growth and development, the bulk of the blame for Africa’s economic problems had to be revised. The nature of politics and the state became the new target as more attention was paid to the political character of African states.

rather than the competent. The report continues to state that corruption also impedes effective service delivery, reduces economic growth, and discourages foreign direct investment. In addition, according to the report, corruption also decreases and diverts government revenues, rewards the already wealthy, leads to misallocation of scarce resources, and contributes to unequal distribution of wealth and opportunities. In sum, corruption contributes to high levels of poverty and, consequently, reducing poverty and wealth disparities are the fundamental justifications for fighting corruption (Commission for Africa 2005; Policy Forum 1997; USAID 2003; World Bank 2006).

African countries in particular, with their persistent economic woes and political instability, are at the receiving end of the global crusade against corruption. Although the seriousness of corruption varies across African countries, the consensual view is that the region suffers a major problem with endemic and systemic corruption (meaning corruption permeates all levels of society) and is the rule rather than exception to the rule. For example Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index Report 2010, indicates that corruption is not a serious issue in three countries only (Botswana, Cape Verde, and Mauritius). Corruption is rampant in thirty out of forty-seven countries, and a serious challenge in fourteen countries.⁴ African governments are said to be tainted by scandals in patronage hiring and favors, contract fraud, funds embezzlement, stashing development funds abroad, bribery, extortion, and money laundering. As Lawal (2007, 4) bluntly puts it, "without doubt corruption has permeated the African society and anyone

⁴ Corruption is not only an African problem it exists throughout the world. Corruption levels in sub-Saharan Africa are somewhat similar to other regions like Latin America. In Americas, according to Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index 2010, corruption is rampant in eleven countries (for example Haiti, Venezuela, Ecuador among others) and a serious problem in another eleven countries (for example Jamaica, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico).

who can say that corruption in Africa has not yet become alarming is either a fool, a crook, or else does not live in the continent”.

The crusade against corruption did not stop at condemning corrupt practices. As evidence of links between corruption and underdevelopment was brought to the attention of policymakers, the urgency ‘to do something’ about corruption was translated into a proliferation of anticorruption policies and programs in the region modeled as ‘good governance’.⁵ Subsequently, implementation of anti-corruption reforms became the main conditionality for foreign aid to the poor governments in the region. Often donor agencies carry out anti-corruption projects in collaboration with World Bank and IMF who are typically the initiators of reforms in aid-recipient countries. Indeed, demands of the World Bank and IMF serve as the backbone of anti-corruption policies adopted in African countries since the mid-1990s. In this regard, the study focuses on World Bank and IMF-initiated anti-corruption reforms in Africa.

Many in the global anti-corruption movement including academics, policy analysts, and practitioners agree that successful anti-corruption reforms require extensive political and economic institutional reforms. In addition, experts agree on the institutional reforms deemed important components of successful reform. Building on an institutional logic that favors neoliberal principles like limited government and market economy, experts within the donor community promote a multi-pronged strategy that consists of institutional restraints, political accountability, civil society participation, competitive

⁵ It is debatable whether donors are motivated by the desire to assist poor nations. Some scholars argue that with little to show for decades of foreign aid, first world governments and development agencies use corruption as an excuse to appease their taxpaying public. In addition, corruption only became a development concern in post-Cold War period when the strategic value of many developing nations diminished with the demise of Soviet Union.

private sector, and public sector management (see Chapter 2). Through increases in funding for anti-corruption reforms and the number of anti-corruption conditionalities tied to development assistance, the donor community supports programs designed to sustain this strategy.

This strategy is widely expected to instigate a process of extensive reduction in the levels of corruption in Sub-Sahara African countries. Yet despite consensus on what is wrong, what needs to be done, and investing resources into ‘getting it done’, the results are not heartwarming. After one and a half decades of fighting corruption in Africa, practitioners in the donor community have come to a general agreement that reform efforts have not yielded the desired results though some countries have a better record of reducing corruption levels than other countries (Hanson 2009; World Bank 2008; Transparency International 2009). A growing literature has sought to explain the observed reform outcomes, and “a large number of researchers now agree that the overall failure of anti-corruption reforms is by and large the result of an implementation problem” (Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2010, 3).

1.3 Explaining Anti-corruption Reform Outcomes

Explaining divergent anti-corruption reform outcomes requires that we identify factors that not only constrain but also enable the implementation of the anti-corruption reforms. However, in addressing the issue of anti-corruption outcomes in African countries, though different scholars give different factors priority, they espouse strikingly similar explanations that highlight an inbuilt inertia of corrupt systems. The basic explanation is the same: the identified factors sustain a political ‘logic’ that shapes political behavior not conducive for successful implementation of the donor-initiated

reforms. Therefore be it deeply rooted rational, institutional, cultural, or structural factors, all serve to constraint anti-corruption efforts. At the core of these explanations is an underlying conception of African political systems as essentially neopatrimonial.

Thus, implicitly or explicitly these explanations find common ground in tapping insights from the problematic neopatrimonialism paradigm. This paradigm, as I will argue in the study, leads to deterministic conceptions about politics, and the policy process in African countries because it limits political behavior to pursuit of material self-interests at any cost. Consequently, the literature presents a static view of politics and institutions in Africa by explaining anti-corruption reform process as either elites purposely undermining the reforms or formal, informal, and normative institutions are too entrenched to be amended with little input from citizens and little prospects for change.

For example, rational interest-based explanations pursue a principal-agent understanding of corruption to suggest that leaders in African countries do not fulfill their obligation as principals to control agents' corrupt activities because they have a vested interest to protect a corrupt status quo and oppose more reform-oriented interests (Haarhuis and Torenvlied 2006; see also Mbaku 1996, 2003, and Tangri and Mwenda 2006). According to these explanations, leaders undermine reforms by investing insufficient resources on the reforms (Batty 2003), not fostering development of strong institutions (Fombad 2002), curtailing activities of the media and civil society (Abdulai 2009), and utilizing anti-corruption platform to selectively target their political opponents (Kpundeh 2004). Subsequently, these explanations conceptualize any formal steps to reduce corruption as facades in which leaders only implement anti-corruption reforms to

appease donors (Kpundeh 2004; see also Medard 2002; van Walle 2004). This, in turn, signals a leadership problem in African countries.

What these explanations tell us is that not only is there a tight grip on the reform process from the top, but also anti-corruption reforms depend on the willingness and personal idiosyncrasies of leaders to enable the reforms. Indeed, most studies point to leaders' willingness and strong commitment to resolve the problem of corruption and frequently cite lack of political will as the reason for reform failures (for example African Development Bank report 2004; Gyimah-Boadi 2002; Hall 2009; Lawal 2007; U.S. General Accounting Office 2004; USAID 2006; Williams 2009). This line of thought implicitly assumes a linear relationship between willingness on one hand, and political action and good leadership on the other hand. That is, the more a leader has political will the more likely the leader will succeed in the fight against corruption, and is a good leader. However, we can only know the effects of political will post hoc (see Brinkerhoff 2000; Lori et al 2010) because it is not visible separate from some sort action (Hammergren 1998; Williams 2004).⁶

Hence, short of good leaders or political will reforms are unlikely to result in successful outcomes. What is not clear though is how self-interested leaders develop political will to fight corruption. Yet we know that some countries are doing better than other countries. So, unless these countries have by implication 'better' leaders, much remains to be explained as to why some societies and not others are trending towards lower levels of corruption. Therefore, while standard ideas of rationality are important for

⁶ Yet though frequently used, it is surprising that political will has not been subject to much critical analysis. Political will is a highly ambiguous term, which makes it a useful rhetoric term, but due to lack of conceptual clarity, it is not as useful as an analytical tool (Andrews 2004).

understanding the self-perpetuating logic of corruption, they are ill equipped to explain when and how reform takes place (Hopkin 2002; Kjaer 2004).

By limiting political action to interests and willingness, these explanations overlook environmental factors that potentially influence political actors' anti-corruption activities. These explanations tend to overlook the impact of broader societal pressures that may limit the willingness of African leaders to control corruption (Shah and Schacter 2004). For instance, Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell (2010) argue that in countries marked by systemic corruption, 'principled principals- principals willing to fight corruption- are very few. This is because in such countries people expect others to behave corruptly and therefore are unwilling to be left out of the corruption game by serving as principals. They argue that corruption should be understood as a collective action problem rather than principal-agent problem. Hence, political will may be influential, but for the purposes of analyzing reform outcomes, we are better off understanding why leaders behave the way they do rather than a post hoc focus on the presence or absence of political will.

Institutional and cultural explanations mimic this interest-based view, though these explanations understand interests as socially bound. For example, institutional explanations reason that formal institutions, especially illiberal democratic institutions and the nature of executive power distribution in African countries, strongly determine political actors' behavior and incentives that constrain anti-corruption (Alence 2004; Kpundeh 2004; Robinson 2007; Shaxson, Neves, and Pacheco 2008; Szeftel 2000; van Walle 2004). These explanations tend to focus on how clientelistic political systems foster a political 'logic' that favors pursuit of particularistic politics that promote the

vested interests responsible for reform failures. Worse still, this constraining institutional setup is said to be so entrenched that it is not amendable to donor-initiated anti-corruption reforms (for example Khan 2006, see also Medard 2002, Szeftel 2000).

Though this view highlights the importance of institutions and identifies influential factors, it emphasizes structure over agency and tells us little about reform initiatives that succeed within the institutional arrangements. Identifying this weakness, some recent studies have sought to explain why change is possible in 'neopatrimonial states'. However, like the basic conception of rational interest explanations, these studies focus on idiosyncratic skills of particular individuals (for example Lawson 2009). Again, in my view, what this line of thinking ignores is alternative political 'logics' that potentially enable the reforms even within a constraining institutional environment.

Cultural explanations focus on how a deeply rooted political culture shapes consensus on the rules of the game that constrain anti-corruption. According to this view, it is not that corruption is culturally determined but that corruption is rooted in a particularistic political culture (Hasty, 2005; de Maria 2005a; de Sardan, 1999).⁷ In Africa, according to this view, deeply rooted beliefs about the proper order of exchange in society give meaning to an insidious political culture, which promotes a political 'logic' that casts personalistic tendencies as a way of life and breeds corruption (Hasty 2005).

This insidious political culture in turn ensures that political actors pursue vested interests to sustain corrupt activities and do not take local ownership of the anti-corruption reforms. For instance, according to Lough (2008, 540) "foreign-initiated

⁷ Particularistic political culture means a culture in which individuals have social duties and obligations towards their community.

reforms-even when conditioned on promises of financial rewards- are not likely to generate a reform programme in a country in which there is no domestic constituency for reform.” The solution, according to the cultural view, is to connect anti-corruption reforms to broader understandings and existing societal practices through education and information (Lough 2008), frame anti-corruption message in ways that intersect with local notions of anti-corruption (Hasty 2005), and incorporate indigenous ways of managing local wrongdoing (De Maria 2005).

However, these explanations envision Africans as ‘too embedded’ in this particularistic political culture leaving little room for explaining variation in normative dispositions that support a less corruption tolerating system. Political culture does influence policy outcomes but culture is dynamic and constantly rediscovering itself. New always grows out of old ways, in continuity with the past but also contested in the present as people engage with new realities in the society. For instance, political culturalists need to pay attention to how ‘westernized notions of corruption and anti-corruption’ reflected in the reforms are translated from the international to national and local contexts (Harrison 2006). That is, how Africans engage in a cognitive process that enables acceptance of foreign-initiated reforms.

Another set of explanations contend that some structural features are culpable for reform failures by sustaining a constraining environment. These explanations view corruption as a socio-economic problem, and therefore argue that the persistence of inequalities (Githongo 2005; Osoba 1996; Uslander 2007), poverty (Ochonu 2008; see also Szeftel 2000), and low levels of economic development (Khan 2005, 2006) undermine the reforms. These explanations too mainly focus on how these structural features

promote a political 'logic' that undermines anti-corruption reform outcomes. Some studies though also emphasize governments' limited resources and weak state capacity to implement reforms (African Development Bank 2004; Grindle 2004; Khan 2005, 2006).

For instance, Khan (2005) argues that lack of critical developmental governance capacity- low productivity and weak state capacity to foster economic development- hinder anti-corruption reforms. In another study, Khan (2006, 13) points out, "in effect, the World Bank is asking countries with very poor governance capacities to achieve new governance capacities (good governance) that no poor country had historically achieved." Hence, while the objective of reducing corruption is clear, the plurality of approaches underway to fight corruption, according to Grindle (2004), make the path to achieving this objective uncertain and render reforms ineffective.

However, as I will argue, structural features can both constrain and enable anti-corruption reform efforts depending on how political actors interpret the political economy. Hence, for example, limited state capabilities certainly influence policy implementation, but the fact that poorer African nations like Rwanda have made significant progress in fighting corruption suggest that the effects of structural limitations are not limited to lack of capacity. Nevertheless, by focusing on structural factors, this perspective provides a good basis for explaining divergent anti-corruption reforms. For instance, in a case study of five African countries, Doig, Watt, and Williams (2005) illustrate how success of anti-corruption agencies among African countries depends on the political institutional environment in which they are placed.

Overall, the literature implies a cultural consensus on the rules of the game, tight grip of political and policy events from the top and institutional constraints form a

powerful obstacle to the implementation of anti-corruption reforms resulting in reform failures. In addition, the literature views political behavior as either bound by self-interest, or institutional or cultural bound. However, we can reasonably argue that there is a simultaneous relationship between institutional constraints and political actors' actions. In other words, people enable institutions as much as institutions constrain people's actions.

In this case, to address limitations in the literature we need to adopt a theoretical position that lies somewhere between individualistic incentives of behavior and socially bound behavior. Ideas accomplish this criterion because "shared meanings motivate people to action and meld individual striving into collective action. Ideas are at the center of all political conflict" (Stone 2002, 11). Yet, in the study of African politics, ideas have been objects of limited scholarly attention. Moreover, the few studies that include a role for ideas tend to focus on how deeply engrained societal ideas facilitate corruption (for example, Hasty 2005; Timamy 2005) and attention to cognitive ideas at the individual level is conspicuously absent.⁸

Despite the noted concerns, the existing literature undoubtedly explores significant factors, at both the micro and macro levels, that influence anti-corruption reform outcomes. A more comprehensive explanation of anti-corruption reform outcomes in African countries must therefore take into account influential factors at both levels.

⁸ Hollyer and Wantchekon (2011) who study the impact of bureaucrats' ideological dispositions on anti-corruption are the only exception. Though their study looks at developing countries in general, they include Rwanda as one of their case studies.

1.4 Moving Forward: Developing an Explanatory Model

This study seeks to advance the literature by developing an explanatory model, though one that needs further elaboration and development, that can better explain variation in anti-corruption reform outcomes among African countries. The proposed model addresses the identified weaknesses in the literature while incorporating insights from the literature by taking into consideration the premises of two perspectives, namely Political Economic Analysis and Discursive Institutionalism. First, the study utilizes insights from Political Economic Analysis (PEA) as the analytical framework to bring together influential factors into a single explanatory model. Second, Discursive Institutionalism (D.I) - because of its focus on ideas- provides the theory of institutional changes and action used in the study.

Political Economic Analysis (PEA)

For the proposed explanatory model, PEA provides the analytical framework because it considers institutional reform process as a multilevel phenomenon in which micro and macro factors interrelate in complex ways that lead to divergent outcomes (Chene 2009, ADB 2004). PEA aims to describe in a robust evidence-based way the underlying factors that shape incentives for economic, social, and political change and understand the enabling environment for governance and institutional reforms (Booth et al 2005; Chene 2009; Dahl-Ostergaard et al 2005). While no single conceptual framework exists for PEA, many scholars agree on the centrality of three tenets. First, PEA scholars emphasize the need to understand a country's political economy in order to account for how change occurs in a given context. Second, they assume that a combination of political, economic, cultural, and institutional factors shapes the policy

environment. Third, political economic analysts explore how the link between political factors, economic conditions, and institutions shapes incentives for change in a political system.

The framework underlying this study is the same. The study considers the political economy as the basis for explaining anti-corruption reform outcomes and includes the identified influential factors as part of the political economy within which political actors take concrete action or not against corruption. The study brings together influential factors identified in the literature into a single model using organizing concepts.⁹ Consequently, the study proposes a two-level explanatory model that includes individual and country-level factors to explain divergent anti-corruption reform outcomes. PEA, though, lacks a theoretical foundation to explain political action. For this reason, unfortunately, despite their promise of a fresh alternative understanding of governance in developing countries PEA studies end up using neopatrimonialism in their explanatory models (for example Booth et al. 2005). Thus, this study partly aims at providing the perspective with an alternative theoretical basis. To include a theory of political action and institutional reforms the study adopts insights from discursive institutionalism.

Discursive Institutionalism

In political science, studying the role of ideas to explain institutional changes and stability emerged to challenge the ‘new institutionalisms’: historical, rational choice and

⁹ The goal of integrating influential factors requires us to organize the literature in terms of organizing principles and provide a logical and causal relation between the organizing principles and the phenomena under investigation (Most and Starr 1989). According to Most and Starr, organizing principles/concepts are concepts that allow us to organize “what we know around some sort of theoretical structure” (p 20). The concepts relate identified factors to each other in ways that allow us to identify distinctive groups of interrelated factors that in turn provide a theoretical structure that forms the basis for an integrative model.

sociological.¹⁰ Critics of the ‘new institutionalisms’ contend that these perspectives place too much emphasis on order and stability (Lieberman 2002), subordinate agency to structure (Schmidt 2008), adopt a static and deterministic nature of institutions (Blyth 1997, 2002), and rely on empirically unsubstantiated microfoundations (Weyland 2008). For these critics, including ideas as explanatory variables helps overcome these shortcomings.

Ideational studies moved beyond merely supplementing the institutionalisms to stand as a perspective on its own right (Blyth 2002; Schmidt 2008). Schmidt (2008) argues that the turn to ideas and discourse constitutes a fourth new institutionalism, which she christens ‘discursive institutionalism’. According to Schmidt, D.I undermines the basic premises of the new institutionalisms by taking a dynamic view of institutional change that does not privilege structure (institutions) above agency (actors). At its core, D.I emphasizes a simultaneous relationship between political actors and institutions in which “action in institutions is shaped by the process in which agents create and maintain institutions by using ideas” (Schmidt 2008). Ideas are assumed to exist independently of political actors and carry the rationale for institutionalizing practices thereby reducing political action to ideas.

D.I scholars therefore seek to understand how ideas exert a causal influence on institutional change or stability, including how ideas are discursively constructed and translated into institutional features. Discourse, according to Schmidt, is not only the

¹⁰ The ‘new institutionalisms’ pay attention to equilibrium conditions and how these conditions are maintained. Rational choice posits rational actors with fixed preferences who maximize these preferences through strategic behavior. Historical institutionalism on the other hand assumes that established policies and formal institutions constrain paths of policy development while Sociological institutionalism takes cultural norms as a given to evaluate how norms constrain political action.

means of constructing meanings in a given institutional context, but also a set of meanings and carriers of ideas. D.I scholars therefore don't take ideas as a given, but rather view meanings and ideas as open to challenge meaning that political actors have more autonomy to restructure institutions.

Broadly, ideas influence institutional reforms through various mechanisms including expectations (Legro 2000), basis of collective action (Stone 2002), persuasiveness (Yee 1996), and cognitive frame through which reality is interpreted in a specific way (Jacobsen 1995; Surel 2000). Other scholars pay attention to both the substantive content and the interactive process involved in policy discourse (for example Schmidt 2006, 2008), while others focus on the interrelationship between ideas, interests, and institutions to account for institutional changes (Campbell 1998, 2002; Lowndes 2005).

This study partly draws on discursive institutionalism: I adopt a dynamic view of institutional change (and stability), and take substantive content of ideas seriously. First, with regard to substantive content of ideas, the study identifies a politico-economic idea as critical to explaining anti-corruption reform outcomes. A politico-economic idea as used in this study is “a paradigm or worldview (sum collection of ideologies, assumptions, and goals) that includes the control of human behavior and the role of governmental institutions” (Anechiaricio 1994). It is a combination of different cognitive and normative idea types to include background and policy specific ideas about the relationship between the state, markets, and economy. It essentially frames how individuals understand what the government should do and leaders behave.

Second, anti-corruption reforms can be analyzed with a focus on legitimation grounded on political actors' valuation of their ideal society. Individuals' ideas may

resonate with long standing or newly emerging values to create a cognitive framework through which they interpret and assess the existing society by linking their perceptions of reality with their cognitive ideas about ideal society. In addition, individuals' thoughts about the ideal society collectively form informal belief structures that they use to respond to structural conditions and institutional constraints, and influence strategies to maintain or transform institutions that actualize their construct of the ideal society. Hence, there are multiple relevant political 'logics' within and across African countries as expressed through people's politico-economic ideas.

Since the proposed explanatory model emphasizes a critical role of ideas, to explain why some countries are doing better than others despite implementing similar reforms, the study seeks to answer the following question 'do politico-economic ideas among the public influence anticorruption reform outcomes in Africa, and if so, how?'

1.5 Research Design and Overview

Clarke and Primo (2007) provide a helpful overview of the role of theoretical models and their connection with empirical testing in political science. They criticize political scientists for overemphasizing the use of models to generate testable predictions for subsequent data analysis (or what they call hypothetico-deductivism). They suggest that models make other contributions to understanding the political world including producing generalizations that spur further modeling efforts. Models, they argue, are a 'map' (useful representation) of the reality being considered and what matters is whether the 'map' reflects reality and not whether true or false.

Hence, according to Clarke and Primo, models -which in their review are not limited to formal mathematical models- should be assessed for usefulness and not just for

accuracy of their predictions. “What is important is for a substantive researcher to specify in what ways and for what purposes his or her model is similar to a particular real-world system” (p 743). Testing therefore means assessing whether the degree of similarity between the model and real world is sufficient for the specific purpose the model is designed. Thus a model is either suitable or not depending on its usefulness for the purposes intended, and not merely for the accuracy of its predictions.

Taking cue, the goal of the explanatory model is to account for the influence of cognitive ideas and political economic structure for the specific purpose of explaining variation in anti-corruption reform outcomes among African countries. The data analysis in this study therefore assesses whether the explanatory model is consistent with empirical observations about anti-corruption reforms rather than attempting to prove whether the model is true or predicting reform outcomes through hypothesis testing. Due to data limitations, empirical analysis for this study aims at looking for statistically accurate descriptions of the relationships between the structural features and individual level variables and anti-corruption reform outcomes. I therefore use OLS to test the type and strength of relationship that each structural feature has with anti-corruption reform outcomes as measured using control of corruption measures. If I find that structural features including ideas are influential, then the study will have provided generalizations to guide further research.

In the study, I utilize quantitative methods and trace politico-economic ideas and their impact using public opinion data generated by the Afrobarometer series 2, and 3, covering the period 2002-2005. Afrobarometer is a comparative series of standard national public attitude surveys on political and economic issues in selected sub-Saharan

African countries. It provides the most comprehensive survey data on political and economic attitudes including democracy, market reforms, and civil society in sub-Saharan Africa thus allowing for cross-national comparisons of politico-economic ideas and their impact on policy outcomes.

Data, obtained using stratified, multi-stage, area probability samples, was initially collected data between 1999 and 2001 in seven Southern African countries (round 1) and each subsequent round has added data from more countries. Round two was conducted between May 2002 and October 2003 in 12 countries, round 3 in March 2005- February 2006 (16 countries) and the latest round (4) was conducted between March and June 2009 in 20 countries. In the study, I focus on rounds 2-3 because some questions relevant to developing my indicator of politico-economic ideas are omitted in round 4.

Countries undertaking some political and economic reforms form the basis of country selection in the Afrobarometer series, though the series includes countries that have witnessed internal political conflicts and macroeconomic decline. Thus, the countries selected for this study represent the most politically competitive, open societies in the region, and as such are not truly representative of the region. The countries included in the analysis are: Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Lesotho, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia (round 2, and 3), Benin, and Madagascar (round 3).¹¹ Though the selected countries provide a good regional geographic coverage, we should be careful not to generalize the findings to the entire continent.

¹¹ I dropped Zimbabwe from the analysis because questions related to some indicators of the politico-economic variable were omitted in the country's survey questionnaire.

The rest of the study is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides a broad overview of donor-initiated anti-corruption reforms in Africa. It shows the theoretical foundation of the reforms, and a brief history of donors' (un)changing views about the nature of the reforms. In addition, the chapter provides an overview of the critical perspective, a grouping of studies critical about donor-initiated reforms including neopatrimonialism paradigm as the dominant approach to understanding implementation of the reforms. Chapter 3 provides a more detailed discussion about neopatrimonialism explanations of anti-corruption reforms. The chapter contends that neopatrimonialism explanations are not sufficiently specified to account for variation in reform outcomes among countries subject to similar 'neopatrimonial constraints' and subsequently leads to deterministic conceptions about anti-corruption reform outcomes among African countries. I illustrate this point through a case study of two countries Kenya (poor performer) and Ghana (relatively successful).

Chapter 4 begins with a discussion of neopatrimonialism as a concept, in particular showing its limitations and some critiques of the neopatrimonialism paradigm. The identified weakness and critiques inform the proposed explanatory model set out in the chapter. The chapter therefore serves as a transition from neopatrimonialism to an alternative explanation and a primary focus on the role of ideas in the rest of the study. Here I introduce the concepts of 'expectations', 'opportunities', and 'capacity' as constituent parts of the political economy, and also identify two roles for ideas: as an informal structural feature ('expectations'), and at the micro-level as a medium for interpreting the political economic environment and influencing societal confidence.

In chapter 5, I discuss the use of public opinion data to tap into latent variables that identify politico-economic ideas. The chapter addresses the challenges of developing a quantitative measure of ideas by focusing on survey instruments, and organization of beliefs through the concept of belief tightness. In the chapter, I argue that people rely on their core values and beliefs to understand the world around them, and therefore develop a measure of politico-economic ideas using a set of core values about governance. The chapter highlights inter and cross national differences among people's politico-economic ideas in the selected countries and the sources of the differences. I also argue that belief structures and ideas among politically relevant groups are influential in identifying the role of ideas.

Chapter 6 presents results of the data analysis, and provides a discussion of the results. Empirical data suggests that the explanatory model is suitable for the purpose of explaining anti-corruption reform outcomes among the selected countries. While neopatrimonial explanations demonstrate links between interests and reform outcomes, this research demonstrates the impact of politico-economic ideas as a structural feature. Equally important for the purpose of this study the empirical results lead to further development of the explanatory model.

Chapter 7, my conclusion, consists of a summary of the research and findings, the implications of the research (both theoretical and policy), limitations of the study, and notes on future research. In the chapter, I also propose an action plan that aims at targeting citizens' underlying ideas about the society as an effective means of advancing anti-corruption reforms in African countries.

1.6 Conclusion

This study has three primary goals. First, the study mainly aims to provide the foundation for a more comprehensive explanation of divergent anti-corruption reform outcomes by bringing together various factors identified as influential into a single model. The explanatory model developed in this study should therefore be viewed as the beginning for future ideational studies of institutional reforms in African countries, and as I will note in the study, much remains to be done in terms of theoretical development of the model. Second, it is an examination of the importance of cognitive ideas viewed from citizens' perspective. As Johnston (1998, 88) correctly argues "while institutional reforms focus-rightly- upon the opportunities and alternatives open to officials, it makes equal sense to consider those available to citizens, both as they affect their vulnerability to corruption and as they shape possible opportunities for responding to it". If successful, the results of this study can contribute to designing effective strategies to mobilize Africans against corruption.

Third, the study is an attempt to recast our approach towards African politics by rejecting the core assumptions of the dominant neopatrimonialism paradigm, highlighting divergence among African nations, and emphasizing the often under theorized effects of cognitive ideas on the dynamics of political and economic processes in Africa. In doing so, the study also contributes to the emerging literature critical of the use of neopatrimonialism to understand all facets of African politics, and partly aims to provide an alternative theoretical basis for PEA studies (rather than turn to neopatrimonialism).

CHAPTER 2. ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORMS IN SUB-SAHARA AFRICA

2.1 Introduction

If scholars once saw corruption as an inevitable evil, now it is considered an intolerable evil.¹² Once corruption emerged as the cause of all political and economic problems in developing nations, fighting corruption became a major industry both within academic and policy circles. In recent years, an increasing number of scholars, primarily in development economics, have used tools of economic theory to examine the causes, consequences, and remedies of corruption. Development economists in the World Bank (for example Susan Rose-Ackerman, Daniel Kaufmann) emerged as industry leaders and their definition and interpretation of corruption influenced both corruption studies and anti-corruption efforts in developing nations including African nations.

The economic perspective is one of two dominant perspectives that shape prevailing dominant views about corruption and anti-corruption in Africa. Economic treatments of corruption focus on the principal-agent dilemma, opportunism, and formal regulative institutions. That is, corruption is a principal-agent dilemma- the principal (citizens) employs agents (politicians and bureaucrats) to act in the principal's best interests but the

¹² Corruption was certainly not always acknowledged as a serious problem in developing countries. Some scholars, within the functionalist tradition, argued that there were positive effects of corruption on development (for example Nye 1967), corruption is likely to increase private investment and capital formation if the resources are invested locally (Leff 1964), and improve government efficiency by overcoming bureaucratic red tape and humanizing politics (Huntington 1968). Furthermore, some also argued that corruption is inevitable in early stages of modernization (Huntington 1968). Recent empirical results, however, tend to reject the functionalist arguments that justify corruption.

agents, as rational actors occasionally exploit opportunities to act in their own interests. Anti-corruption therefore implies providing solutions to resolve this dilemma, usually through formal state regulatory institutions and the neoliberal economic orthodoxy that promotes limited government and market-friendly policies.

Critical perspective, the other dominant perspective, is actually a loose collection of writings critical of the economic perspective. The most influential of which, at least with regard to corruption and anti-corruption in Africa, is the neopatrimonialism paradigm. Neopatrimonialism theorists focus on lack of a clear demarcation between private and public spheres, the dominance of personalistic tendencies and clientelism in African governance systems, and the functionalist role of corruption in African countries to understand anti-corruption. These scholars depict corruption as a sort of informal institution that operates through personal connections and informal rules. Unlike the economic perspective that exclusively emphasizes economic incentives to engage in corruption, neopatrimonialism paradigm pays attention to incentives rooted in the economic, political, as well as social structure. Anti-corruption, according to this view, lies in dismantling the governance structure that perpetuates corruption.

In this chapter, I utilize these two intellectual perspectives to provide background information and examine current thinking about anti-corruption reforms in Africa. The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I identify an operational definition of corruption. Next, I show that the economic perspective guides formulation and execution of donor-initiated anti-corruption reforms in the region. In addition, through a brief historical overview of the reforms I also argue that this perspective defines donors' expectations and frustrations about reform outcomes. Then, I show that the critical perspective provides an answer to

the frustrations expressed by the donor community and also influences PEA studies. In this study, I am mainly interested in the dominant view revolving around the neopatrimonialism paradigm. Essentially, neopatrimonialism scholars contend that there is a mismatch between the donor view and the political ‘logics’ underlying African politics. As Diana Cammack (2007, 599) frames it, “for reasons that suit the internal dynamics of individual donors, the global aid regime, and African governments, all behave as though power resides within these government institutions and they function as designed... Rather than their behavior being seen as logical according to a frame of reference that is rooted outside the rational, democratic state in traditional socio-economic and political processes.” As I will show, neopatrimonialism studies focus on personal relations within formal and informal institutions and clientelism to explain political and policy processes in African countries, which in turn influences how they explain anti-corruption reforms.

2.2 What is Corruption?

The following story illustrates my understanding of corruption as used in this study. In 2009 during the Christmas festive period, to illustrate his willingness to fight corruption, the newly elected President of Ghana John Atta Mills broke off from the country’s Christmas tradition of sending gifts to people in authority to state that he would not be accepting Christmas presents (BBC News December 24 2009). According to the presidential spokesperson, “some people bring gifts and their motives are genuine. Others, perhaps, just want to establish a relationship that would, in a sense, influence decisions that you might have to make in the coming year that relate to their interests.” The

spokesperson added, “so you cannot really differentiate in terms of the different motives that people bring to this gift-giving exercise”.

The intriguing feature of this story is that it illustrates three recurring themes concerning the concept of corruption. The first is where President Mills spurns gifts because of fear of compromising his official position. This action indicates that corruption entails taking advantage of an official position for self-gain. The second, where President Mills determines that the gifts may be interpreted as bribes, highlights the view that it is not always clear what actions are corrupt or not. This implies that there is a cultural basis to our understanding of corruption. The third theme highlighted by ‘some people’s intention to build a personal relationship with the president’, indicates that corruption is maintained through personal connections, and governed by the availability of resources, and opportunities.

President Mill’s purported fear of compromising his official position highlights the public office approach, which defines corruption as “abuse of public power for private gain”. This is the mainstream definition of corruption. It is generally agreed that corruption is a concept that relates to the idea of officials, in public or private sectors, deviating from a standard or rules that govern their behavior to pursue self-enrichment (or enrich others within a network) at the expense of their public. For the purpose of the study I adopt this definition because it embodies what I believe are the main dimensions of corruption.

Referencing Chakrabarti (2001), for an activity to be considered corrupt it must satisfy four criteria. First, corruption involves two or more parties seeking undue expected value (in the above story, influence decisions- supply side, or receive gifts-

demand side) with one party taking advantage of an authoritative position to benefit (the president). Second, the parties pursue self-serving goals in which they benefit unfairly at the expense of everybody else (establish favorable relationship with president to ensure future favorable decisions). Third, corruption involves an informal contract that regulates what behavior is expected or not (President receives gifts and gift givers receive favorable policies). Fourth, it involves some risk of socio-legal censure (resulting in the President's hesitance to accept gifts).

President Mill's inability to differentiate gifts from bribes highlights a cultural dimension about corruption. Sociological/postmodernist tradition asserts that different cultural and political traditions create ambiguity about the mainstream definition of corruption. According to this tradition, what counts as corruption depends on how we define 'abuse of power' and 'private gain' (Azeem 2009; Hindess 2005). This means we can easily fall into the trap of using the term as "a basic descriptor for a myriad of behaviors loosely linked to some sense of the breaking of laws, illicit personal enrichment or the abuse of power/privilege" (Brown and Cloke 2004, 282). After all, according to this view, many activities we typically identify as corrupt, such as side payments, cronyism, and nepotism, can be entirely legitimate in a given cultural context (De Maria 2005). This makes it difficult to determine a universal basis of what practices may be considered corrupt (Warren 2004), implying that corruption should therefore be evaluated in each specific environment (Nas et al 1986). These scholars' arguments typify the public opinion approach in which public norms about integrity and honesty determine what we consider as corrupt.

I agree with Mathew Hall's (2009) assertion that though there is validity to concerns of cultural variations, these concerns only contest the mainstream definition around the edges. Cultural-based objections concern activities that constitute corruption rather than the principal-agent dynamic of corruption or separation of public and private spheres. What constitutes corrupt activities may be in the eye of the beholder and the nature of socio-legal censure may vary. But certainly, cultural arguments do not contest the act of exploiting an official position and seeking undue expected value. This is why even Africanist scholars who lament that the mainstream definition is eurocentric and call for 'localized' understanding of corruption, end up using the very same definition in their studies (for example de Maria 2005a).

While we are unlikely to arrive at a single universally acceptable, watertight definition of corruption, the mainstream definition serves as a valid frame of reference for anti-corruption studies in Africa. Admittedly, this definition has some weaknesses¹³, but it is useful for this study mainly because it influences the design of the anti-corruption reforms. Moreover, the definition relates to the widely accepted nature of corruption in Sub-Sahara Africa. For instance, in his discussion of corruption in the continent, Nwabuzor (2005, 122) defines corruption as "including the outright diversion and conversion of public funds to private use by public officials; the bribery of public officials by multinationals or other private sector entities as inducements to obtain government patronage and contracts; and the extortion of money and other considerations

¹³ Some weaknesses include, it suggests that advantages gained in corrupt transactions are only personal and monetary in nature, encompasses many different fronts of action, and it assumes corruption is limited to the public sector.

by public officials as a condition for awarding the same patronage.” Thus, like the economic view, I consider corruption as primarily a principal-agent problem.

The common distinction of corruption based on different levels of public officials (agents) who exploit their positions for illicit benefits reflects the principal-agent dynamic. Petty corruption (or administrative corruption) refers to the extortion and acceptance of bribes, favoritism to lower taxes, and low-level procurement deals that street level and mid level bureaucrats, for example, the police, low-level civil servants, and judges perpetuate at the expense of the public. Senior government officials perpetuate grand corruption, which involves soliciting kickbacks for large-scale procurement and public works contracts, and purchasing goods and services at inflated prices, often resulting in huge financial losses. “When both petty and grand corruptions are pervasive in a country, corruption is said to be systemic” (Abdulai 2009, 393).

In contrast, predatory corruption (looting corruption) involves large-scale misappropriation of state resources by high-ranking government officials and politicians for political purposes. It includes looting public coffers, outright theft of public resources including land (‘land grabbing’), and fictitious payments where large sums of money are paid for goods and services that are not delivered. Predatory corruption is usually associated with kleptocracy, which Mobutu Sese Seko made famous in Zaire and is considered the most damaging and biggest threat to development. These distinctions also provide useful insights into donor strategies to combat corruption and indicate that there are different incentives, scales, and implications of public sector corruption.

2.3 Anti-Corruption Reforms in Sub-Sahara Africa

As I mention in the previous chapter, there is strong agreement within the donor community on the kind of reforms required to combat ‘abuse of public office for private gain’. Looking more specifically at the nature of the anti-corruption reforms, an economics view of corruption undoubtedly influences the reforms. The economic view depicts corruption as a type of rent-seeking behavior in which actors (public officials, private citizens, and business leaders) are constantly searching for uncompensated transfer of monetary goods at the expense of others because of exploiting their position on some public policy (Rose-Ackerman 1999, Bowles 1999). Corruption, by this account, is a crime of opportunity that requires two willing participants on both sides of a corrupt transaction: a supply side (payer of bribe) and a demand side (recipient of bribe), and a ‘victim’. These rationally calculating agents engage in corruption if they expect to derive net positive benefits from a corrupt transaction.

For economists, there is nothing uniquely African about corruption in Africa. Every economy, no matter what the level of democracy, has elements of corruption.¹⁴ People are people, if they face the same incentives they will behave in the same rational way. What matters are the conditions- influencing choice and opportunities to engage in corrupt transactions- that are likely to sustain a corrupt equilibrium within societies. Unfortunately for Africans, the theorized conditions that favor perpetuation of corruption are rather well entrenched in the region.

¹⁴ However, many scholars, policy analysts, and commentators tend to underemphasize corruption in western societies and at the same time overemphasize corruption in developing nations.

First, according to economists, corruption principally occurs where public officials have large bureaucratic discretion, are in a monopoly position, and there is little accountability. These conditions reduce the costs of taking part in corrupt transactions while increasing the incentives for bureaucrats to engage in rent seeking behavior (Andvig and Moene 1990; Klitgaard 1988; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Mauro 1995; Bardhan 1997; Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Stapenhurst 2000). For instance Klitgaard devised a simple equation to account for the incidence of corruption: C (*Corruption*) = M (*Monopoly*) + D (*Discretion*) – A (*Accountability*). In addition, inadequate remuneration for public officials compounds the incentives to engage in corrupt transactions.

Second, corruption is a product of state intervention in the economy because excessive government regulations create more opportunities for corrupt public officials to extract rents at a lower cost and higher net benefits from corrupt transactions (Mbaku 1996, 2003; Collier 2000; Tanzi 1998). In other words, the larger the size of state, the more likely corruption will be entrenched. For example, Mbaku (1996), a public choice scholar, identifies the ideological movement that justified statism (government involvement in the economy) and one party rule as the root of high levels of corruption among African states. This movement, according to Mbaku, resulted in heavily regulated political and economic systems that bred rent-seeking opportunities and corruption. These scholars assume that the disciplining effects of efficient markets will reduce corruption, and therefore recommend economic liberalization (for example Boerner and Hainz 2009).

Third, institutional economists argue that the roots of corruption lie in dysfunctional state institutions (Goel and Nelson 2005; Kaufmann 2003; Knack 2003; Kpundeh 2004;

McAuslan 1996; Werlin 2002). According to institutionalists, corruption is likely to occur where protective and empowering institutions remain weak, or the reach of empowerment is limited. For example, UNDP (2008) modifies Klitgaard's equation to suggest that C (Corruption) = M (Monopoly) + D (Discretion) – A (Accountability) – I (Integrity) – T (Transparency). According to these scholars, in corrupt African countries no effective counteracting institutions exist to enforce cooperation and compliance and thus minimize rent-seeking behavior. In fact, the judiciary and police, the two main institutions supposed to control corruption through enforcement of laws, are themselves the most corrupt institutions. Thus, institutionalists argue that attention must be paid to the institutions that regulate socio-political relations, and provide an incentive system that makes corruption highly lucrative (for example Khan 2009).

In addition to these conditions, technocrats in the donor community also emphasize normative considerations that admonish corruption as a form of unethical behavior or wrongdoing (Eiras 2003) or violation of public trust (Todaro and Smith 2003).

Corruption is said to thrive in societies that lack public integrity and public scrutiny of public officials (Klitgaard 1988; Collier 2000). In such societies, certain norms including less severe feelings of guilt, reduced risk of punishment and inherited reputations for corrupt behavior tend to perpetuate corruption (Collier 2000).

Historical Overview

With all these conditions highly prevalent in Africa, World Bank technocrats argued that effective anti-corruption reforms should focus on a 'big push' that targeted corruption from several fronts at once. This included attacking the incentives that give rise to and perpetuate corrupt behavior, reducing opportunities for corrupt behavior, and

making corruption a high-risk and low-gain endeavor. Since technocrats assumed the rationale for engaging in corruption was common everywhere, they expected universal anti-corruption reforms to work in any part of the world.

Implicit in their interventions, World Bank and IMF technocrats also brought in political concepts into their vision of anti-corruption reforms. According to Harrison (2005a), World Bank theory of political action- drawn from rational choice, new public management, and institutionalism provides a “basically harmonious view of political change, based on positive sums or at least convergence of interests... and promote a complementary relationship between (a reinvigorated) state and (an emerging) market economy”(p 255).¹⁵ The reforms, it was hoped, would empower domestic social forces to protect a new social, political, and economic order of a limited, market-friendly government that is transparent and accountable. Anti-corruption reforms therefore lie within broader governance reforms, which for most donors equal a liberal view of governance (Rose-Ackerman 2004). These economic views and political concepts not only informed the nature of anti-corruption reforms but also donors’ expectations about reform outcomes, and impatience at lack of anti-corruption progress.

The initial emphasis, from mid 1990s to early 2000s, focused on structural reforms like privatization, deregulation, trade liberalization, civil service reforms (including increased pay for bureaucrats), establishing competitive procurement systems, and enhancing policing systems including judicial reforms and specialized anti-corruption

¹⁵ According to Harrison, Rational choice relies on individual pursuit of ranked preferences to understand behavior. Society is an aggregation of these preferences, which are constrained by institutions or repeated games. New Public Management advocates for minimal state intervention in the economy and argues that state agents act to maximize their utility according to the incentives in which they are embedded. Institutionalism, in the Douglas North tradition, focuses on the role of the state with market-complementing institutions, which support the functioning of free markets.

agencies (Matscheza and Kunaka 2000; Boadi 2002). Pushing the reforms on African governments often included using technocratic, generic, and broad language, which acted as cover giving donors the right to engage in political activity under the guise of technocratic intervention (Polzer 2001). However, even within the international development policy circles, after a few years of implementing the structural reforms there was concern about the impact of these reforms.

By early 2000s, there was consensus within the international development community that these policies were ineffective. For instance, Haarhuis and Leeuw (2004) argued that there was limited empirical evidence of the effectiveness of the reforms. Similarly, Kaufmann (2003) a leading World Bank economist, concluded that “the usefulness of anti-corruption ‘campaigns’, creation of new institutions or passage of laws, as well as traditional public sector management and legal reform approaches, may have been over-rated.” In particular there was concern that uniform application of these policies paid little attention to the different levels of persistent and entrenched corruption that exist in the various African countries (Riley 1998, Doig and Riley 1998, Huther and Shah 2000).

More importantly development economists heed the argument among scholars of African politics that the donor community “underestimate(d) both the depth of the roots of corruption in the very fabric of African states, and its resilience in the face of reform measures imposed from abroad” (Szeftel 2000, 428). Equally important was the affirmation that corruption is not merely about individual economic choices but an organized and collective enterprise responding to political, economic, and social incentives. In other words, in Africa corruption is a group act (Ochonu 2008). In addition,

it was also recognized that countries had different state capacities to implement the reforms. All these were an affirmation that the then thinking about corruption within the international development community was inadequate.


These developments influenced the evolution of the PEA approach that sought to bring together insights from economic and critical views. As I mention in the previous chapter, PEA seeks to understand the formal and informal dimensions of political and economic processes that are likely to affect success of donor led developmental policies in developing countries. “The aim is to look behind the façade of formal institutions, and move beyond the broad generalization that politics matter” (Unsworth 2009, 886). Various international development organizations including World Bank, USAID, DFID, SIDA among others, commissioned various PEA studies on reform measures they funded. These studies favored an approach that emphasizes real distribution of power in the society.

PEA analysts adopted use of the neopatrimonialism paradigm to position themselves on the cutting edge of analyzing politics and governance in developing countries, and consequently solidified use of neopatrimonial paradigm within international development policy circles. Using PEA, some analysts broke off from their peers in the development field to argue that downsizing the state and political liberalization were necessary rather than sufficient conditions for the reduction of corruption.

By mid 2000s, there also emerged renewed efforts to ‘turn the tide’ against corruption. The appointment of Paul Wolfowitz as the President of World Bank in 2005 rejuvenated the anti-corruption agenda within the Bank because he made anti-corruption a top priority in his agenda (ironically he later quit his post due to corruption allegations).

In 2006, Wolfowitz unveiled the Bank's renewed three-prong strategy: expand anti-corruption support to high-risk countries, minimize risk of corruption in World Bank funded projects, and incorporate input from stakeholders including non-profit organizations and other donor organizations. The strategy emphasized a 'learning by doing' philosophy for implementing the anti-corruption plan (McWilliams 2008).

World Bank technocrats and policy entrepreneurs championed for a renewed focus on institutional building and country-specific reforms. Packaged as governance reforms, World Bank technocrats redesigned a wide range of policies that focus on curbing the immediate institutional circumstances assumed susceptible to reform. The renewed focus turned to four types of measures to combat corruption: enforcement, prevention, state building, and transmitting positive values and norms that strengthen the three measures (Heineman and Heimann 2006). A large part of the current anti-corruption strategies currently in progress supposedly seeks to: 1) to encourage legal and institutional reforms that are tailor-made to relate to existing societies and cultures by building on existing law and institutions within the different African countries; 2) incorporate local input into the policy design process; and 3) to assist the civil society to represent their interests against the negative impacts of corruption. Figure 1 below illustrates the policies that collectively constitute anti-corruption reforms in Sub-Sahara African countries.



Source: World Bank

Figure 1: World Bank Multi-Pronged Anti-Corruption Reforms Strategy

The renewed focus however did not result in any fundamental changes to the way the World Bank and IMF approached anti-corruption reforms in Africa (Unsworth 2009).¹⁶ The ideological orientation of the reforms remains neoliberal economic orthodoxy and attempts to install a governance structure modeled on liberal values continues. In addition, although the donor community proclaimed a newfound belief in incorporating local input into designing appropriate anti-corruption measures, the commonality of programs among the different African countries casts doubts on the sincerity of that aspiration. Nevertheless, the reforms provide the legal and institutional framework that if properly implemented can result in successfully reducing corruption in African countries.

¹⁶ Unsworth (2009, 889) argues that donors are unlikely to change their approach because they “operate in an environment that values optimistic action rather than reflection, and where the focus is still heavily on financial and technical issues”.

2.4 Critical View

The donor community's approach to anti-corruption in Africa has come under attack from various scholars and development policy practitioners. Here I group the litany of critics about the World Bank and IMF's stance on anti-corruption into three general groups: those who criticize the anti-corruption agenda itself; those who reject the moral foundations of the anti-corruption movement; and those who reject the conceptual foundations of the reforms. With regard to the anti-corruption agenda, some critical scholars worry that the donor community is straying from its mandate, and view anti-corruption reforms as part of the rhetoric of a Post-Washington consensus (Fine 1999; Hindess 2005), and an attempt to create an enabling international environment for easier flow of international capital (Gore 2000; Brown and Cloke 2004).

Other critical scholars cast doubts on donors' sincerity to combat corruption because donors pursue self-promotion (Hanlon 2004), seek excuses to cut assistance to countries that do not promote their interests (de Maria 2005a), conveniently sidestep political aspects of corruption (Szeftel 1998), and adhere to geopolitical concerns (Michael 2004)¹⁷. Such concerns are amplified in the irony of the World Bank and IMF's tough talk on corruption and simultaneous plans to expand lending to countries that do not exactly practice 'zero tolerance' towards corruption. Other scholars argue that a single-minded focus on fighting corruption will not bring development. On the contrary, it merely diverts attention from other issues of no less importance for those countries struggling to

¹⁷ For example, according to Michael (2004), until the early 2000s, five countries- South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia- accounted for majority of all the donor-sponsored anti-corruption activity in the region.

lift themselves out of poverty (for example Grindle 2004; Khan and Hazel 2005; Khan 2006; Theobald 1994).

Another group of critical scholars rejects the moral foundations of the global anti-corruption movement. For instance, de Maria (2005b) slams anti-corruption reforms as a manifestation of neocolonialism that ignores local histories and practices. Similarly, Brown and Cloke (2004, 280) are critical of the “pervasively paternalistic slant to much of the way in which corruption in the South is characterized”. Within this group critics contend that anti-corruption norms are not universal and social norms that make corruption self-perpetuating counter any attempts to establish these norms (Hasty 2005; Mishra 2006; de Sardan 1999).

At the conceptual level, some critical scholars reject the analytical arguments that form the basis of the anti-corruption reforms. For instance, Gerring and Thacker (2005) argue that state intervention, as measured by public spending, does not necessarily imply more corruption while Sosa (2004) argues that increasing wages is an ineffective strategy for reducing corruption in developing countries. Larbi (2007) shows that public disclosure policies do not deter public officials from engaging in corruption. Khan (2006) rejects the assumption that greed and discretion primarily cause corruption by arguing that there are different incentives to engage in corruption resulting in different types of corruption (economic, political, structural, and predatory corruption.)¹⁸ He adds that donor-initiated anti-corruption reforms only target the economically least damaging type

¹⁸ Economic corruption- associated with state intervention in the economy; Political corruption- motivated by the need to maintain political stability in a context of severe fiscal scarcity; Structural corruption- sustained by structural weaknesses of property rights; and Predatory corruption perpetuated by the inability of political leaders to impose and enforce social order.

(economic corruption). The other types, according to Khan, are more economically destructive, characterize African countries, and perpetuated through neopatrimonialism.

Neopatrimonialism

The most influential critical views have emerged from proponents of the problematic neopatrimonialism paradigm. Neopatrimonialism scholars analyze anti-corruption reforms from the perspective of an alternative governance structure in which rulers rather than citizens are the ‘ultimate principals’ in the society thereby reversing the principal-agent dynamic. These scholars’ chief concern is the way the “reforms are contested and adopted within different political ‘logics’ to those the donors rely upon to execute reforms” (Harrison 2005a, 256). Neopatrimonialism scholars portray donors as being blind to the complex interplay between institutional reforms, political power, and institutional structures. Simply put, they argue that donors need a realistic view of governance in African states because it is not what they perceive or expect.¹⁹

Neopatrimonialism theorists begin their inquiry by asking how political authority is exercised in a polity, particularly in the absence of bureaucratic norms associated with western states. Faced with the ‘reality’ that African states are like an exclusive club for elites accountable to a narrow group of patrons and not in the interest of most of the population, they find their answers in Max Weber’s ideal forms of authority, specifically patrimonial and rational-legal forms of authority.

Most neopatrimonialism accounts understand patrimonial authority to imply that personal relations form the basis of power and that no distinction between private and

¹⁹ This was the message that propelled PEA as the preferred analytical tool for practitioners and consultants within the donor community.

public sphere exists. In the Weberian ideal type, patrimonial authority refers to an authority structure whereby obedience is owed to the person who occupies the traditionally sanctioned position of authority and who is bound by tradition.

Neopatrimonialism theorists differentiate this authority type with rational- legal authority in which power is exercised through legally established formal rules within a bureaucratic structure and the private sphere is separated from the public sphere.

Neopatrimonialism is a juxtaposition of both forms of authority: a hybrid patrimonial/ rational-legal type of authority in which personal relations and a blurry line between public and private spheres blend with an established rational bureaucracy. In neopatrimonial states, institutions do not effectively mark out the boundaries between state and society, public and private interests, and market and bureaucratic allocations of goods (Hyden 2006). “Informal institutions persist and personal relations remain central at both the political and administrative levels of a given country, even though at least formally a modern state with a rational bureaucracy at its disposal is established” (Bechle 2010, 2). Therefore, the major claim salient in neopatrimonialism accounts is that “informal, particularistic politics of the rulers pervade formal state institutions” (Von Soest 2007, 623).

Although neopatrimonialism theorists have yet to come up with universally accepted indicators of the concept, three core features are usually identified with the concept (as I will claim in chapter 4, neopatrimonialism is used in more than one way. In this section, I discuss the most common usage- as a regime type). These include concentration of power, personalistic relations, and patronage. First, according to the paradigm, a state is neopatrimonial when patrons and their clientelistic networks dominate state authority and

the president is the paramount patron with wide discretion over the decision-making process including bureaucratic appointments and resources (van Walle 2001, 2003). All agents, political and bureaucratic, owe their government positions to the president thereby creating “an exchange relationship between unequals” (Boas 2001, 700).

Second, by concentrating power around the president, those in power prefer to govern through personalized and informal relationships rather than formal state structures. Accordingly, patronage ties between regular Africans and political elites condition the incentives and rules that regulate socio-political interaction in the society. In this understanding, the logic of “giving and granting of favors” is fundamental to institutional-building and political outcomes (Cromwell and Chintedza 2005, 2). Thus, patron-client relationship is viewed as the principal mechanism regulating political and economic life in African countries (Bratton and van Walle 1994; Wantchekon 2003).

Third, in the patron-client relationship, patrons offer state resources to their clients in return for loyalty and clients support their patrons to gain access to state resources. According to neopatrimonialism theorists, leaders’ legitimacy derives from their ability to nourish the clientele upon which their power rests (Chabal and Daloz 1999) rather than through traditions as with patrimonial authority. The leaders therefore appropriate state resources based on political survival rather than long-term development concerns resulting in politicized resource allocation systems (Hyden 2006). This clientelist system is in many cases understood to be built on the capture and control of state resources. Corruption is therefore associated with the (mis)use of state resources.

In this neopatrimonial system, theorists view corruption as a defining feature of the state itself and generated by the same underlying societal forces that sustain the political

regime in the first place. Corruption, according to this view, plays a vital role in sustaining patron-client relationships and political power by serving as a non-budget mechanism for resource allocation, enabling elites meet informal obligations and demands by citizens, and maintaining political stability (Charap and Harm 2002; Githongo 2006; Khan 2001; Lindberg 2003; Szeftel 2002; Timamy 2005). Corruption also serves vital economic and social roles by ensuring private material accumulation, supporting one's extended family and kinship ties, and rising in the social ladder (Bracking 2009; Hasty 2005; Mbaku 1996; Singh 1999). Neopatrimonialism theorists therefore view corruption as a property of the structure of interactions among several actors, part of everyday life, and an informal institution that thrives alongside formal state institutions. Simply put, corruption is essentially an immutable feature of neopatrimonial systems.

Neopatrimonialism scholars usually summon the ghosts of colonialism to trace the origins of the neopatrimonial system and attendant corruption in Africa. Here the argument is that colonialism conditioned norms, values and social obligations that influence incentives to engage in corruption (for example Osoba 1996), and created somewhat 'confused' African bureaucrats and leaders whose aspirations for social status symbols of the colonial masters were reinforced by the social uncertainty of urbanization (for example Williams 1987). In addition, colonialism influenced political and economic institutions that sustain neopatrimonialism and corruption in post-independence Africa (Amadi 2009; Cheeseman 2006; Erdmann and Engel 2007; Mutonyi 2002) including promoting ethnic favoritism and authoritarian administration (Maxon 1994).

Timamy (2005) offers a refreshingly different view about the effects of colonialism. For Timamy it is the prevailing ideas about the colonial state that were transferred to the post-independence state that matter. According to Timamy, “the experience of colonialism led the African masses to, correctly, view colonial state institutions as forces of usurpation of African resources” (pg 385). He adds, “it generated the mentality that the state, and all the material resources at its disposal belonged to ‘another’, and it was in this context that systemic corruption began.”

According to Timamy, in post-independence Africa, the transition from a colonial administration to an African one was simply a change of guard; the view of usurpation of state resources continued unabated. In the evolving political situation, nepotism and patronage became widespread as leaders employed their kin and expended state resources to serve narrow ethnic and private interests. Timamy argues that African leaders later reinforced this political environment of illicit use of public assets to shield themselves from their political rivals. Timamy’s argument is refreshing because he traces corruption to the public’s notions of state and economy. For Timamy, political independence did not translate into a different view of the state; a view that sowed the seeds of corruption.

However, Timamy does not offer empirical evidence to back his claims. Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether these views have changed in the course of time. Timamy takes a good step in divulging into ideas but falls short on theorizing effects of time and social environment. One cannot deny that there is some continuity between the past and present, but we have to account for different experiences and ideas that may have shaped people’s views in the post-colonial period. Furthermore, he perpetuates the mystical African who is similar in Nigeria, Mali, and other countries. Do

Africans in different countries hold similar views about the state and economy like in the 1960s and 1970s? Alternatively, have ideas about the state changed? Is there variation in Africans' views? If so, does the change and variation in ideas influence anti-corruption reform outcomes? These are some questions largely ignored in the literature but which are critical to understanding corruption and anti-corruption reforms.

Timamy's static view of African politics resonates with neopatrimonial explanations on anti-corruption reforms. Neopatrimonialism scholars tend to spell out the institutional structure, or personalistic incentives, or some cultural basis branded in phrases like 'neopatrimonial regimes', 'neopatrimonial incentives', 'neopatrimonial logic', and then proceed to show how these deviate from a rational bureaucracy (aka western societies) to undermine anti-corruption reforms. The neopatrimonial system, which has been applied to virtually all African countries "assumes a virtually intractable culture of clientelism and corruption" (Taylor 2006, 282).

Neopatrimonialism scholars suggest that African leaders and societies are incapable of reforming or overcoming the insurmountable obstacles placed by a political system that fosters impunity and therefore exclusively focus on reform failures. For instance Medard (2002, 397) emphasizes that reducing corruption "supposes a radical transformation of the society, the elite, and the social, economic and political system which is not likely to happen. The problem is that corruption is not only a cause it is also a symptom. This change, even if it can be encouraged, cannot be generated from outside."

²⁰At best, neopatrimonialism scholars predict that half-hearted attempts to reduce corruption characterize politics of anti-corruption reforms resulting in 'partial reform

²⁰ By radical transformation, Medard implies adopting western institutions.

syndrome'. Partial reform syndrome refers to the situation whereby leaders commit rhetorically to reform but only carry out reforms to the extent it does not hurt the politically powerful (van Walle 2001, 2003).

This conclusion is not surprising because neopatrimonialism scholars tend to reduce African politics to a 'rush for spoils' characterized by personal accumulation, clientelist factions jockeying for access to state resources and power, and a culture of impunity or what I call 'neopatrimonial constraints'. For instance, Tsamenyi, Onumah, and Sa'id (2011) argue that African leaders view politics as a 'winner-take-all' game with respect to protecting parochial interests rather than promoting citizens' welfare and public interest. The state, as neopatrimonialism scholars contend, therefore serves the interests of particular groups and interests that have captured it. And even after more than a decade and a half of political liberalization and democratic experimentation, this cannibalistic view of African politics persists. Today, "most political regimes in Africa are unconsolidated hybrid systems" (Bratton and Mattes 2009, 2) due to the neopatrimonial nature of the regimes. Thus as I will show in the next chapter, neopatrimonialism accounts tend to arrive at largely similar conclusions about reform outcomes in countries where political actors are subject to similar 'neopatrimonial constraints' and therefore have difficulties explaining divergent reform outcomes among such countries.

2.5 Conclusion

Since the mid 1990s, the donor community has sought to address the problem of 'abuse of power for private gain' in African countries. Based on an economic perspective of corruption, donor-initiated anti-corruption reforms seek to impose a liberal governance structure in African countries despite claiming to tailor reforms to individual countries

and incorporate local input in the design of the reforms. Criticisms of these reforms are wide ranging, the most dominant of which is the neopatrimonialism paradigm that partly influenced international development scholars and practitioners in their attempts to explain institutional reforms in developing countries through the PEA approach. .

Neopatrimonialism scholars focus on ‘neopatrimonial constraints’ to explain political and policy processes in African countries and through this prism explain anti-corruption reform failures. In the next chapter, I illustrate neopatrimonialism arguments through a case study of Kenya and Ghana and make the case that the arguments are too deterministic to account for divergent responses to anti-corruption among Africa nations.

CHAPTER 3. NEOPATRIMONIALISM EXPLANATIONS: KENYA AND GHANA CASE STUDY

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I contend that neopatrimonialism studies focus on insurmountable obstacles created by what I call ‘neopatrimonial constraints’- personal accumulation, clientelist factions jockeying for access to state resources and power, and a culture of impunity- to explain political and policy processes in African countries. Extending this view to anti-corruption reforms, these studies tend to focus exclusively on explaining reform failures. Subsequently, neopatrimonialism explanations are not sufficiently specified to account for variation in reform outcomes among countries subject to similar ‘neopatrimonial constraints’.

In this chapter, I illustrate this point through a case study of Kenya and Ghana. Both countries have implemented donor-initiated anti-corruption reforms since the mid-1990s with varying results. In Kenya, it is widely accepted that anti-corruption reforms have not resulted in a reduction in corruption while in Ghana empirical evidence suggests that corruption has reduced in the last decade. For instance, according to CPI scores, corruption in Ghana has reduced from 3.5 in 2000 to 4.1 in 2010 (on a 1 -10 scale- higher figures indicating less corruption). These cases are well matched for comparative analyses because they share similarities in the key factors that impact reform outcomes identified in chapter 1 including both are ‘neopatrimonial regimes’, characterized by a

particularistic political culture, and have competitive political systems. Additionally, both were among seven African countries chosen to pilot a model course in anti-corruption action planning developed by the World Bank Institute in early 2000s (Asamoah 2003).

As I will show, neopatrimonialism scholars explain reform outcomes in Kenya: that neopatrimonial constraints account for failure of the reforms to reduce corruption in the country. Ghana, on the other hand, is an interesting case because it is debatable whether reforms have had the desired effects. Some scholars and anti-corruption practitioners argue that corruption has reduced while neopatrimonialism scholars take the opposite view. As I will argue, this view among neopatrimonialism scholars is logically consistent with the theoretical foundations of the paradigm, and subsequently leads to deterministic conceptions about anti-corruption reform outcomes among African countries.

3.2 Kenya: Under Neopatrimonial Leash

In 1997, Kenya became one of the first countries to bear the wrath of the donor community when the IMF refused to grant a loan to the Kenyan government on grounds of the government's failure to curb widespread corruption (Michael 2004). At the time, many observers and Kenyans regarded the country as suffering from systemic corruption (a view that still holds to date). For example, Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index consistently ranks Kenya as one of the most corrupt nations in the world. In fact Kenya is widely acknowledged as a country where a culture of corruption is deeply embedded in all aspects of public life (for example Szlapak 2002), and where the fight against corruption has not borne progress (for example Persson, Rothstein and

Teorell 2010). The literature attributes this relative failure to reduce corruption in the country on the neopatrimonial nature of Kenyan politics and governance.

Various scholars characterize the successive governments in Kenya, from the Jomo Kenyatta administration through the Daniel arap Moi administration, to the current Mwai Kibaki administration as neopatrimonial and further argue that this neopatrimonial rule entrenched immediately after independence (for example Amadi 2009; Kasfir 2009). For instance, Amadi (2009, 33) argues that (after independence in 1963) “the political elite did not benefit from widespread acceptance. Hence they had to resort to frequent use of force (concentration of power) and provision of personal favors in order to project the power of the state.”

Mbai (2003) correctly notes that the first President Jomo Kenyatta’s administration set in motion a series of constitutional amendments that consolidated power within the presidency resulting in an all-powerful presidency. Unlike the recently adopted new constitution, the previous Kenyan constitution vested wide-ranging powers on the presidency including unilaterally appointing all political appointees, judges, and senior bureaucrats, and restructuring the bureaucracy including ministries.²¹ The president was also above the law, had powers to unilaterally dissolve parliament, and dominated the policy process through presidential directives. Consequently, to date the executive dominates other branches of government and erodes the system of checks and balances leading to deficits in transparency and accountability.

²¹ A new constitution was promulgated in August 2010. The constitution has restructured the institutions of governance and concomitantly devolved power from the presidency. In addition, it embraces devolution of the government to the local level by creating elected local governments at the county level. The constitution divides the country into 47 counties each with an elected governor and members of local legislature. Previously Kenya was administratively divided into eight provinces, each under a politically appointed Provincial Commissioner.

Mbai adds that first President Kenyatta then President Moi used these powers to establish personal rule including appointing their henchmen to all key positions in the bureaucracy. Within this context, as Anangwe (2004) argues, public administrators who have wide discretion to carry out policy implementation lacked the autonomy to resist political interference by politicians in the form of dispensing patronage. Thus, political rule in Kenya gradually became more centralized both formally and informally as elites increasingly resorted to patronage to build political coalitions (Amadi 2009; Kasfir 2009).

Scholars further contend that the dominance of ethnicity in the Kenyan society, which defines the nature of patron-client relations and pursuit of political power in the country, further perpetuates neopatrimonialism in the country (for example Mbai 2003; Murunga and Nasong'o 2006). Consequently, as Murunga and Nasong'o show, resource allocation is designed to favor ethnic groups allied to the president leading to further ethnic polarization within the Kenyan society. Murunga and Nasong'o add that ethnicity intertwines with politics of redistribution to justify political participation and policy orientation in the country. Githongo (2006, 21) supports this assertion. He argues that Kenyans do not reject corruption per se, but the corruption perpetuated by elite from one ethnic group to the exclusion of other ethnic groups, especially theirs. Therefore, the ability to influence politics and attain political loyalty in the country often comes through mobilizing ethnic support (Githongo 2003).

Corruption: This neopatrimonial nature of successive regimes has led to massive corruption in the country that is well entrenched, complex, and affects all levels of prosperity (Mutonyi 2002). Indeed various reports indicate that all three types of corruption- petty, grand, and looting- are prevalent in the country. For example, the

national human rights body, KNCHR, has documented numerous reports on the misuse of state resources including cases of grand and looting corruption. The reports, Accountability Statement for 2003-08, show that grand corruption manifests itself in procurement deals in which senior bureaucrats inflate the prices of goods and services and in some cases demand bribes prior to awarding contracts.²²

Petty corruption is also rampant. Ever since the Ndegwa Commission of 1971 allowed public officials to engage in business while in office (to compensate for low wages), civil servants have taken advantage of their official positions to engage in corruption. Popularly known as 'toa kitu kidogo' (Swahili for give something little), Kenyans routinely bribe civil servants for basic services like passport issuance, and police for traffic law violations. No doubt corruption is well entrenched in the Kenyan society and doing something about reducing it remains an important task.

Anti-Corruption Reforms: Since the mid 1990s, the successive governments of Presidents Moi and Kibaki have adopted and implemented donor-initiated anti-corruption reforms. Corruption in Kenya became a major issue ever since the infamous Goldenberg scandal was publicly disclosed in 1993. In the Goldenberg export compensation scandal, approximately US \$850 million was looted from the country's Central Bank through a private bank owned by the main suspect in the scandal, Kamlesh Pattni and James Kanyotu, then director of the Directorate of Security Intelligence (Karanja 2003).²³

²² For a discussion of public procurement-related corruption and reforms in the country see Mosoti (2005).

²³ Some accounts claim the Kenyan government lost \$600 million or lower and others estimate the losses at US\$ 1 billion. The figure quoted above is the one quoted by a commission that was set up to investigate the scandal.

In 1991, Pattni a well-connected businessman exploited a government scheme designed to persuade exporters to repatriate their hard currency earnings in which the government promised a 20% premium on foreign exchange deposited in the Central Bank. With help from senior government officials, Pattni negotiated to earn 35% compensation for export of gold and diamonds through his company Goldenberg International (Karanja 2003). Through fake documentation the Ministry of Finance under then Vice President and Minister of Finance George Saitoti, and the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) under then Governor Eric Kotut authorized and paid for non-existent gold and diamond exports to Dubai and Switzerland (RoK 2005).

The scandal, which has become the symbol of looting corruption in the country, cost the government a fifth of the country's Gross Domestic Product and is directly connected to the economic crisis experienced in the country in the 1990s (RoK 2005; Warutere 2005). In 2003, President Kibaki set up a commission of inquiry to investigate the scandal. In addition to Pattni, the commission implicated then President Moi and his family members, then Vice-President George Saitoti, and senior government officials at the Central Bank, Finance Ministry, and Commissioner of Mines office (BBC February 3 2006). These officials have either never been prosecuted, or prosecutions did not result in any convictions.

The scandal epitomizes Kenya in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the Moi administration became delinquent with the country's resources. President Moi had the myth of the 'Big Man' that inspired fear and awe from politicians and citizens alike and ruled within the framework of a one-party state until 1992. To consolidate his rule, President Moi used a mix of ruthlessness (violence, intimidation, torture, and

unwarranted arrests), dispensing patronage through the ruling party KANU, and heavily interfering with the civil service.²⁴ With the advent of multipartyism in 1992 and subsequent formal opposition to his power, President Moi resorted to misappropriating public land to dispense patronage favors to his cronies and foes for political survival (Otieno 2005). In the 1990s, the president's cronies looted state resources with impunity and designed the largest corruption frauds in the history of the country like the Goldenberg case.

Having gained notoriety as a 'haven for corruption' the donor community (especially IMF and World Bank) mounted pressure on the Kenyan government to implement various anti-corruption reforms. In the 1990s, the Moi administration instituted various structural reforms that reduced opportunities for bureaucrats to engage in rent seeking behavior and corruption. Price control was abolished, import licensing requirements removed, trade and foreign exchange liberalized, and many state corporations privatized. In addition, the Kenyan government strengthened its financial accounting and internal audit systems through Integrated Financial Management System, a World Bank project that streamlined financial operations within the bureaucracy.

Szlapak (2002) incorrectly classifies these reforms as very ineffective. Whereas it is correct to point out that corruption continued, the reforms did eliminate opportunities for relevant bureaucrats to engage in rent seeking. Otieno (2005, 73) correctly points out that in the 1990s President Moi resorted to misappropriating public land because "other avenues of corruption were increasingly closed down by advancing economic

²⁴ Moi resorted to these tactics because he ascended to power in 1978 from a politically weak position. He was determined to push out the elite cliques that dominated political power in the country during Kenyatta's regime.

liberalization”. However, as Khan insightfully notes, these structural reforms target petty corruption and some aspects of grand corruption (or what he calls economic corruption) whilst ignoring looting corruption.

Therefore, even as Moi’s government implemented these structural reforms, corruption especially the looting type continued unabated. In 1997, again under threats to withhold budget support funds from the donor community, the Moi administration established an anti-corruption agency, Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority (KACA). KACA was however later declared unconstitutional because it had investigative and prosecutorial powers that constitutionally resided with the Kenya Police and Attorney General. After failed attempts to reestablish KACA through an act of parliament, President Moi established the Kenya Anti-Corruption Police Unit through an executive order in 2001.

By 2002, President Moi who paid lip service to anti-corruption initiatives all through his reign focused his political attention on the general election held later that year to elect his successor. By the end of his reign, the reforms were not effective in reducing corruption and the donor community had suspended cooperation with his government arising from concerns about systemic corruption. President Moi left a legacy of massive corruption that included a tattered social and economic infrastructure, jaded donors, substantial budget deficits, and rising poverty levels in the country (Githongo 2005).

It is within this context that President Mwai Kibaki took over the presidency in 2003. President Kibaki and NARC (a coalition of opposition leaders who band together to defeat former President Moi’s preferred successor) were elected in the December 2002 election on an anti-corruption platform. At the beginning of his presidency, President

Kibaki made all the right moves. The government initiated a ‘radical surgery’ of the judiciary that saw the removal of judges and magistrates on the grounds of corruption (T.I Kenya 2007). President Kibaki also created a new Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs to coordinate anti-corruption efforts (Otieno 2005). In addition, the President created a new bureaucratic position- permanent secretary in the Office of the President for Ethics and Governance (with direct access to the president) - and appointed a renowned and highly respected anti-corruption crusader John Githongo to spearhead government efforts against corruption. With much enthusiasm and optimism, Githongo undertook his crusade to ensure that corrupt networks under the previous government did not reestablish themselves in the new government.

Within a few months of taking over, Kibaki’s government also enacted two key pieces of legislation. The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (2003) established The Kenya Anti Corruption Commission (KACC) to take necessary measures for the prevention of corruption in the public and private sectors; investigate acts of corruption and economics crimes; recover public funds/property acquired through corruption; and enlist members of the public in fighting corruption through education (KACC website). The second legislation- Public Officer Ethics Act- requires public officials to disclose their wealth (including wealth of their spouses and children) and provides a code of conduct for all public officers. The Kibaki administration also instituted investigations into abuses of the past, including the Commission of Inquiry into the Goldenberg Scandal and the Commission of Inquiry into Irregular and Illegal Allocation of Public Land (also known as the Ndung’u Commission) which unearthed massive complicity in allocating public land to politically influential people.

In total, the Kibaki administration laid out an elaborate anti-corruption institutional infrastructure. In the country, the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC), Department of Ethics and Governance, the National Anti-Corruption Steering Committee, Efficiency Monitoring Unit, Comptroller and Auditor General, the Inspectorate of State Corporations all play different roles in the fight against corruption. Indeed, in the first year of the new government, Kenya witnessed a series of dramatic steps to fight corruption and in return, IMF resumed lending in November 2003 (Otieno 2003).

Though some scholars argue that when a new president is elected, there is a twenty-four month window of opportunity before old corruption networks reestablish themselves (for example Githongo quoted in Ofeibe 2003), the honeymoon in Kenya did not last that long. According to Murunga and Nasong'o (2006, 8), the shift from Moi's to Kibaki's administration was merely a shift from 'Kalenjin mafia' to Mount Kenya mafia.'²⁵ Within two years of the new government, a major corruption scandal- Anglo Leasing scandal- erupted to dampen the enthusiasm that greeted Kibaki's ascension to power. If the Goldenberg scandal rocked Moi's government, Anglo Leasing scandal dealt a devastating blow to the reputation of newly elected President Kibaki's administration.

Anglo-Leasing scandal involved an organized and fraudulent scheme between politically well-connected businesspersons and senior government officials. The scandal began in 1997 during Moi's reign and continued until 2005 (therefore involving the

²⁵ In the common everyday interpretation of political events in Kenya, the kitchen cabinet is commonly referred to as the mafia to indicate the criminal and secretive nature of the politically powerful networks of elites. Under Moi, the kitchen cabinet was referred to as Kalenjin mafia because Moi hails from the Kalenjin ethnic group. Mount Kenya in this usage refers to the three communities, Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu. These communities reside around the Mount Kenya region, are linguistically related, and form a political ethnic coalition.

Kibaki administration).²⁶ The scandal involved lease financing and supplier credit arrangements between the Kenyan government and 14 companies, both real and non-existent, based in UK and Switzerland. The government made commitments, in the form of irrevocable promissory notes, for 18 single-sourced and massively overpriced security and security-related projects (KNAO 2005). According to KNAO, the government stopped payments in June 2004, though some foreign-based suppliers through litigation threats for breach of contract received payments in 2005. In total, the government paid US\$ 395 million including US\$ 41.8 million by the Kibaki administration. Implicated in the scandal were powerful cabinet members with close connections to President Kibaki, though none faced prosecution for the crime (Githongo 2005, 2).

Public opinion suggests that corruption in Kenya remains rampant despite the presence of an elaborate anti-corruption infrastructure in the country. According to a survey conducted by the KACC, National Enterprise Survey on Corruption 2009, respondents perceived a high level of corruption in the country with 67% of the respondents believing that corruption was increasing. Furthermore, empirical measures of corruption levels, including the World Bank Control of Corruption Index and Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, support this view.

Assessing anti-corruption reforms in Kenya: Kenya's pattern of implementing anti-corruption reforms supports the assertion that African leaders undertake implementation to appease the donor community. In the last 15 years, World Bank and IMF, and governments of Britain, US, Sweden, and Denmark, have at various times withdrawn or

²⁶ For a detailed account of the scandal, please refer to Special Audit Report by Kenya National Audit Office (2005).

scaled back their aid to Kenya due to corruption concerns. Former President Moi routinely accepted donor demands for reforms only to frustrate implementation once the donor community released funds. Accusing President Kibaki of a similar pattern, various political commentators note in a Daily Nation article (August 02 2005) that President Kibaki's initial steps against corruption were only done to appease donors and motivated by attempts to unfreeze foreign aid suspended during Moi's reign.

As with most of Africa, the dominant literature places primary responsibility for anti-corruption failures in Kenya on politicians (as the beneficiaries of corruption). For example, Githongo argues that Kenyan political leaders deliberately sabotage anti-corruption efforts once these efforts start getting effective (quoted in Ofeibea 2003). This may explain former President Moi's lethargic response to anti-corruption initiatives. If the accusation that the president benefited from the Goldenberg scandal is true, then it explains his hesitance to fight corruption. To some scholars, even outrages of opposition leaders against corruption are nothing more than political grandeur aimed at appeasing the public. For instance, Mbugua (2009, 1) states, "my own belief is that Kenyans cannot win the war against corruption because those who speak out against it largely do so because they do not have the opportunity to be corrupt."

Critics further assert that Kenyan political leaders lack political will to successfully implement anti-corruption reforms. According to his critics, President Kibaki had an opportunity to impose his political will to fight corruption when the Anglo-Leasing scandal first emerged. In the course of investigating the scandal Mr. Githongo, the symbol of anti-corruption in the country, became frustrated by political interference with the investigations and lack of progress with arraigning the main suspects to court. Under

death threats, Githongo resigned in January 2005 and fled to exile in England.²⁷ “Mr. Githongo’s resignation was due to frustrations he faced from a President who seemed uninterested in what was being done to fight corruption” reckoned Ms Gladwell Otieno, then executive director of TI Kenya (quoted in Bosire 2005). Many analysts and practitioners saw Githongo’s flight to exile as the defeat of the anti-corruption drive in Kenya and an indication of President Kibaki’s lack of political will to combat corruption (Daily Nation February 08, 2005).

Kibaki initially showed signs of political will but waned off as his term progressed. According to Robinson (2007), such a trajectory is common in African countries: leaders achieve a degree of initial success but the imperative of preserving the institutional foundations of neopatrimonial politics gradually undermine the initial success. Thus, neopatrimonial accounts understand Kibaki government’s failure to sustain radical reforms as a consequence of the entrenchment of neopatrimonial incentives in the new government especially the need for political survival. Disputing the 24-month window of opportunity thesis, Lawson (2009) contends that upon ascending to power; new presidents develop their own patron-client networks as a political survival tactic that derail any incentives for reforms (see also Otieno (2005).

Otieno blames regime instability for lack of success in reducing corruption in Kenya. By June 2004, President Kibaki’s hold on power was tenuous at best, which in turn engendered regime insecurity. His coalition partners in NARC were dissatisfied with unfulfilled agreements concluded prior to the 2002 election to share power. President

²⁷ For an account of Githongo’s investigation see news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/09_02_06kenya_report.pdf

Kibaki responded to increasing opposition to his rule by expanding his cabinet (thereby overturning his earlier pledge not to preside over a bloated cabinet) and appointing members to his cabinet from opposition parties.²⁸ Otieno argues that political infighting among members of the ruling coalition in the first years of President Kibaki's reign shifted attention from anti-corruption initiatives as elites sought to consolidate power. This, according to Otieno, in turn facilitated the opportunity for corrupt networks to regroup and recruit new members from the new government.

Neopatrimonialism explanations of Kenya's poor record also focus on the neopatrimonial constraints imposed on formal institutions that render them unaccountable or unresponsive to the public and inefficient in the fight against corruption. According to T.I Kenya (2007), failure to check corruption by senior political figures in the government and lack of prosecutions cast doubts on the institutions, including Judiciary, KACC, Police, and Attorney General's office, ability to effectively implement anti-corruption reforms. These doubts in turn have led citizens to question the legitimacy of these institutions and distrust their political leadership (Diepeveen 2010; Mwangi 2008).

Lawson (2009) views the predicaments of KACC and its recorded inability to prosecute powerful political elites as the result of a struggle between ruling elites and KACC for control of the anti-corruption agenda. She contends that between 2005 and 2007, elites won the struggle and in the process deliberately marginalized KACC.

Lawson further asserts that KACC leadership on the other hand did little to improve its bargaining position vis-à-vis political elites and in the process did not build its capacity to

²⁸ Framed as 'government of national unity' this action effectively spelt the demise of NARC as a political party and the beginning of political strife that culminated with the election fiasco of 2007 and subsequent post-election violence.

tackle corruption in the country. This, according to Lawson, explains KACC's recorded lack of resources and capacity to effectively police and prevent corruption in the country. Like other neopatrimonialism scholars, Lawson views failure to reform as the result of deliberate actions of the political elites.

Neopatrimonialism scholars contend that the introduction of political liberalization and democratic procedures in Africa in the early 1990s did not substantially transform the neopatrimonial basis of African states. Therefore, any potential benefits of democracy on the fight against corruption are largely missing in the region.²⁹ For instance, Mwangi (2008) correctly contends that in Kenya political liberalization has increased demands for grand and looting corruption as political elites seek to fund their increasingly expensive electoral campaigns.³⁰ Despite this pitfall, Mwangi argues that political liberalization provides an opportunity for fostering reforms.

Mwangi remains optimistic that the opening up of political space has helped ensure the emergent civil society acts as a deterrent against corruption. Githongo (2003) too argues that a coalition of media, civil society, and international community helped reduce corruption in the country in the early years of Kibaki's administration. However, according to Nyabuga (2007) there is an adversarial relationship between government on one hand, and media and civil society on the other hand, which is evolving two decades after the end of tight controls under the single party rule. Nyabuga further casts doubts on the role of the media to hold the government accountable by contending that lack of

²⁹ The theorized mechanisms through which a liberal democracy curbs corruption include politicians' fear of being thrown out of office in periodic elections, and the institutionalization of effective accountability and transparency mechanisms including the active participation of civil society groups.

³⁰ The Political Parties Act was signed into law in October 2007 to address concerns of political party financing. The legislation provides for state funding for political parties while limiting the use of foreign-sourced funds for electoral campaigns.

stable financial foundations, and the need to compete in an uncertain media, economic and political environment have conspired media organizations to capitulate to government demands for uncritical press coverage.

Mutonyi (2002) argues that personal interests tied to ethnicity complicate anti-corruption reforms in Kenya especially the prosecution of corrupt officials. Legal proceedings against corrupt officials often appear to target one community since most senior government officials come from the President's ethnic group (Kikuyus under both Kenyatta and Kibaki regimes, and Kalenjins in Moi's regime). For instance, in October 2010 a cabinet minister suspended over corruption charges, William Ruto, alleged that his suspension was a political ploy to harass his Kalenjin community.³¹ Since the Kenyan society is ethnically driven, such messages (like Ruto's) potentially lead to political vulnerabilities for the ruling political leaders and engender political violence.

Taken together, all these explanations portray neopatrimonial politics as an insurmountable obstacle to the success of anti-corruption reforms in Kenya. This allegation is repeated in other African countries. How about in Ghana where numerous reports suggest that corruption has indeed reduced in the last decade. How do neopatrimonial scholars explain this phenomenon?

3.3 Ghana: Succeeding?

Like Kenya and every other African nation, Ghana is widely considered a neopatrimonial state where corruption is part and parcel of everyday life with deep roots in the society, culture, economy, and politics (for example Booth et al 2005; Gyimah-

³¹ Ruto has a pending criminal case on charges of illegally acquiring public land and later selling it to a state owned corporation at an exorbitant price. He had filed a constitutional case challenging the legality of the criminal case. The constitutional court struck down his appeal facilitating his suspension as stipulated in the Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes Act.

Boadi 2002; Haruna 2003; Hasty 2005). Nevertheless, while corruption is prevalent in the country, it is debatable whether there is a definable reduction in corruption levels.

Neopatrimonialism scholars view anti-corruption reforms as largely ineffective (for example Abdulai 2009; Azeem 2009; Boadi 2010) while others, particularly practitioners, argue that there has been a definable reduction in the country (for example Asibou 2008; Bossman 2006; Doig, Watt and Williams 2005, 2006; GNA 2010; US Department of State 2009). As I previously mention, empirical data supports the latter view. Ghana has fared rather well compared to other African countries. For example, Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2010 rates Ghana as the seventh least corrupt nation in Africa. The ratings also classify corruption in the country as a ‘serious problem’ rather than ‘rampant’ as in the case of Kenya and thirty-one other African nations.

The dominant literature on anti-corruption reform outcomes in Ghana begins from the perspective of neopatrimonial politics leading to largely similar conclusions like Kenya. Scholars trace the entrenchment of neopatrimonialism in Ghana to the immediate post-independence period. After independence in 1957, first President Kwame Nkrumah’s administration, like many African leaders at the time, favored a one-party political system with a strong central government. Moreover, like President Kenyatta in Kenya, President Nkrumah instituted a series of constitutional amendments that consolidated power within the presidency. These amendments, according to Tsamenyi, Onumah, and Sa’id (2011) paved the way for predatory politicians and bureaucrats to abuse power and feed on corruption.

President Nkrumah was overthrown in a military coup in 1966 on allegations of abusing power and corruption, a trend that characterized Ghana's political scene until 1992. Altogether, there were four successful military coups, the last of which was led by Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings in December 1981. According to Boadi (2002, 2010) and Booth et al (2005), throughout the alternating civilian and military regimes, from Nkrumah administration in the 1960s through Acheampong and Akuffo military regimes, to the first Rawlings military regime, neopatrimonialism was entrenched in the country.

In the early 1990s, President Rawlings succumbed to donor and domestic pressure for political liberalization, and in 1992, a new constitution was promulgated providing for a democratic system. Gyimah-Boadi (2002, 2010) argues that rather than provide a break from neopatrimonial ties, the constitutional reforms entrenched a neopatrimonial regime through provisions that concentrate power in the hands of the presidency. Through constitutional powers, the 'all-powerful' president can use discretionary authority to make temporary appointments of senior bureaucrats (serving in 'acting' capacities), unilaterally create and restructure the bureaucracy including ministries, agencies, and departments, and is free to appoint as many ministers as he pleases. In addition, Gyimah-Boadi argues that the constitutional power to appoint cabinet from members of parliament has weakened parliament's willingness to hold the executive accountable.

The executive branch therefore has power and control over patronage that government officials abuse for personal and electoral gains (Boadi 2010, Booth et al 2005). For instance, Gyimah-Boadi contends that Ghanaian leaders mobilize ethnicity and regionalism through acts like appointing senior bureaucrats based on loyalty and kickbacks rather than on merit for political purposes. He portrays Ghanaian politics as a

‘zero sum’ game in which leaders utilize their official positions to protect their interests, and their supporters. Hence similar to Kenya, scholars argue that in Ghana the executive dominates other branches of government and erodes the system of checks and balances, which in turn leads to deficits in transparency and accountability.

In Ghana, according to various accounts, state patronage is dispensed through ‘horizontal’ interest groups including business, professional, and religious groups (Booth et al 2005) or directly to citizens through regular contact with elected officials (Lindberg 2003) in exchange for political loyalty. For instance, Lindberg (2003) argues that the practices of patronage are widespread in Ghana. He notes that Ghanaians perceive members of parliament as wealthy and in control of state resources, which they should share with their people. Constituents often approach members of parliament for favors like money for hospital bills, or handing out ‘chop’ money- small sums to constituents (Kenyan parliamentarians face similar demands from some of their constituents). Subsequently, as Gyimah-Boadi argues, despite two decades of a democratic political system, Ghana is still struggling to break away from neopatrimonialism.

Corruption: Neopatrimonialism scholars trace the prevalence of corruption in Ghana to the rent seeking activities of public officials though Ghana has not witnessed any mega corruption scandals that have rocked the country and perpetuate negative perceptions about corruption levels to the scale of Goldenberg and Anglo leasing scandals in Kenya. Nevertheless, there are allegations of looting corruption in the Ghanaian media. For instance, President Kufuor was alleged “to have used his son as a front to buy a hotel adjacent to his private residence and had used state security apparatus to coerce the former owner into selling it” (Bossman 2006, 2).

In another illustration, since relinquishing power, former President Kufuor was accused of engaging in illegal allocation of public land to his cronies (Daily Democrat October 24 2010). In addition, a civil society organization Committee for Joint Action (CJA) also accused officials in the Kufuor and current Mills administration of selfishly grabbing state lands (Ghana News Agency October 26, 2010). Grand corruption is reportedly common in the country with reports of senior public officials seeking bribes to award large scale contracts dominate Ghanaian media headline news. In addition, Osei-Tutu et al (2010, 250) argue that “corruption occurs throughout the procurement process and project cycle; with the root causes being project participants such as political influencers, public servants, clients, consultants, contractors, and suppliers.”

Petty corruption also exists in the Ghanaian society. Considered a consequence of poor pay, low-level civil servants are known to demand “dash” (tip) in return for providing services like assisting with license and permit applications (US Department of State 2009). According to Karuna (2003), bribing schoolmasters, ministry employees, and telephone service providers to get their jobs done is a common feature of the Ghanaian bureaucracy. Hasty (2005) also notes that custom officers demand bribes at ports of entry, police officers regularly collect bribes from commercial drivers, and even journalists demand bribes to cover news stories. No doubt, the different types of corruption exist in the Ghanaian society. The relevant question here is whether anti-corruption reforms have resulted in reducing corruption levels in the country.

Anti-corruption Reforms: Starting with UNDP, the donor community has been involved in anti-corruption reform initiatives agenda in Ghana since 1998 though more focused

attention did not materialize till the early 2000s.³² Prior to this period, Ghana established anti-corruption institutions in the constitutional reforms of 1992. The new constitution entrenched the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), an independent constitutional body with three institutions under one umbrella: human rights institution, ombudsman office, and anti-corruption agency. CHRAJ investigates cases of suspected corruption and misappropriation of public funds, and prosecutes offenders.

The Rawlings administration also passed the Serious Fraud Office Act in 1993 that created the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), a statutory investigative agency under the Attorney General's Office, to investigate corrupt practices in both the public and private sectors. SFO investigates, monitors, and prosecutes (under authority of the Attorney General) offences involving serious economic losses to the state. However, as Asibou states, SFO did not commence operations until five years later in 1998. CHRAJ and SFO are Ghana's two main anti-corruption bodies.

Even with the establishment of these institutions, allegations of corruption consistently plagued the Jerry Rawlings administration (1992-2000) as political opponents highlighted corrupt practices in the administration. According to Sandbrook and Oelbaum (1997), after the 1992 elections President Rawlings resorted to pervasive clientelism and personalism to dominate the political scene as he sought to neutralize formal institutions and political opposition. They state, "the Fourth Republic of Rawlings bears a strong resemblance to Nkrumah's First Republic. Clientelism, personalism, and

³² Ghana was also one of the first African nations to implement structural reforms in the 1980s. Under President Jerry Rawlings (then a military ruler), these reforms were undertaken as part of economic restructuring of the economy rather than guised as anti-corruption efforts.

corruption have returned with a vengeance” (p 614). In fact, corruption was a major issue in the 2000 election, which the incumbent party lost.

Sandbrook and Oelbaum argue that despite the entrenchment of neopatrimonialism, a liberal counter movement also emerged in the country during the 1990s. Indeed, by the end of the decade Ghana witnessed a peaceful transition of power- a rare occurrence in African politics. In January 2001, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) under the leadership of John Kufuor took over power after his party defeated the incumbent NDC party in a peaceful election. In his inaugural speech, newly elected President Kufuor declared a policy of zero tolerance on corruption. Just like the Kibaki administration in Kenya, in its first year the Kufuor administration proceeded with haste to stamp its mark on anti-corruption initiatives. In its first year, the Kufuor administration signaled its commitment by repealing criminal libel and sedition laws (previously used to curtail freedom of the press) in July 2001, and for the first time in the country’s history, a sitting cabinet minister was prosecuted and convicted on corruption charges (Asamoah 2003).

In early 2001, then Vice President Aliu Mahama launched the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GACC) and promoted an action plan that envisioned the government working closely with the civil society- a novelty at the time. Under pressure from donors to address corruption, President Kufuor also established the Office of Accountability through an executive order to monitor and prevent abuses by political appointees and senior bureaucrats (Doig, Watt, and Williams 2005). In 2003, working closely with the donor community, the Kufuor administration also passed various legislation aimed at curbing corruption. These included the Public Procurement Act to harmonize and regulate procurement processes and curb corruption in the public sector,

Financial Administration Act and Internal Audit Agency Act to promote public accountability.

In the judiciary, reforms included inauguration of the Complaints and Courts Inspectorate Division of the judicial service in 2003, a code of ethics for judges and judicial officers in 2005, 'fast track' courts (to settle cases within three months) and electronic processing system in some courts in 2005. These reforms, according to Ayine et al (2007), have had a positive impact of reducing corruption in the judiciary. The Kufuor administration also passed a Whistleblower law in July 2006 to encourage citizens to volunteer information about corruption to the relevant authorities. In early 2006, President Kufuor restructured government ministries to reduce some ministries and forced out a number of ministers implicated in corruption scandals.

The Kufuor administration also initiated other anti-corruption reforms. In October 2007, for the first time ever, the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament held a public hearing open to the media and public. The administration, in conjunction with civil society representatives, also initiated the Freedom of Information Act to allow greater access to public information, though it was not passed by the time of elections in 2008 (and not yet to date). Taken together, in Ghana there is a wide range of anti-corruption legislation the Public Procurement Act, the Financial Administration Act, the Assets Declaration Act, the Whistleblower Act, and the Anti-money Laundering Act.³³

Assessing Anti-corruption Reforms: As I previously mention there are differing views about reduction of corruption in the country and neopatrimonialism scholars view the

³³ Whistleblower law was passed in July 2006 to encourage citizens to volunteer information about corruption to the relevant authorities. However, Abdulai (2009) argues that this law is ineffective because it requires citizens to provide extensive evidentiary proof of corruption for a case to be investigated, who in turn have become reluctant to report cases.

reforms as largely ineffective. Given their evaluation about progress in the country, prevailing neopatrimonialism explanations on anti-corruption reforms in Ghana mimic the explanations elaborated about Kenya. Generally, the literature focuses on the twin issues of lack of political will and institutional constraints to explain anti-corruption reform outcomes in Ghana. Meanwhile, another group of scholars argues that Ghana is improving despite institutional obstacles to the reforms.

Opponents and scholars criticize President Kufuor's zero tolerance policy as lacking demonstrated political will, tepid and merely political rhetoric that did not match political actions (for example Ablefa 2004; Abdul-Rahman 2005; Abdulai 2009; Azeem 2009; also see Africa Confidential 6 February 2004). For instance, Abdul-Rahman (2005) points out that President Kufuor appointed the wife of a senior government official to head the Office of Accountability thereby raising questions about the effectiveness of the institution to monitor senior government officials and politicians. Various critics also cite President Kufuor's response to corruption scandals among senior officials through cabinet reshuffles rather than investigating the implicated ministers as evidence of lack of political will. In some cases, a number of ministers accused of graft remained in office (Gyimah-Boadi 2010). Osei-Tutu et al (2010) point to the Kufuor administration's rescinding on a pledge to nominate a board member to the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition as an indicator of the administration's lack of political will. Like in Kenya, neopatrimonialism scholars primarily blame politicians for failure to reduce corruption.

Abdulai (2009) argues that the Kufuor administration's commitment to the fight against corruption waned off in later years of the administration as the imperative to sustain neopatrimonial relations strengthened (like President Kibaki in Kenya).

Supporting this assertion, Gyimah-Boadi (2010, 140) states, “the administration increasingly displayed an arrogance of power and sense of official impunity.” Boadi cites President Kufuor’s reinstatement of a cabinet minister previously indicted for abuse of office and contempt of Parliament as evidence of political arrogance.

The Kufuor administration may be guilty of lack of political will, but “a monolithic indifference to allegations of corruption is not present in Ghana” (Doig, Watts, and Williams, 2006, 168). Doig, Watts, and Williams add, “(*the government*) does not have the same impunity from and indifference to criticism and indeed, acted in response to allegations about the conduct of ministers and senior officials rather than ignoring them (albeit doing so without acknowledging the allegations).” According to Doig, Watt, and Williams (2005), the Ghanaian government has acted on reports of corruption in a way that is notably different and more responsive than the governments of Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Doig, Watts, and Williams view the Kufuor administration’s lack of indifference to allegations as an improvement in the country.

Neopatrimonialism literature also dwells on the ‘neopatrimonial constraints’ that affect the functioning of formal anti-corruption institutions. Several observers contend that to protect their interests, politicians- especially the president and his powerful cronies- deliberately undermine both CHRAJ and SFO by curtailing the institutions’ independence and resources through cutting funding, dropping cases, or curtailing the security of tenure of top directors. First, CHRAJ and SFO lack financial independence because they are dependent on the central government for budgetary allocations. This leaves the institutions vulnerable to political machinations because politicians can counter

any assertions of independence from the political authorities by underfunding the institutions.

For instance, Abdulai (2009) cites frequent accusations on the Kufuor administration for failing to provide the entire budget for SFO because it treated the institution with suspicion for instituting legal proceedings against senior government officials and frequently clashing with the Attorney General over prosecution of cases (see also Ablefa 2004). Even scholars who view Ghana as succeeding in the fight against corruption observe that both CHRAJ and SFO have suffered frequent budget cuts or denied an increased budgetary allocation by the government (see Asibou 2008; Bossman 2006; US Department of State 2009). Nevertheless, despite these frustrations, they argue that these institutions have a positive impact on fighting corruption. For instance, Asibou cites successfully investigated and prosecuted cases involving senior politicians, in both Rawlings and Kufuor administrations to illustrate effectiveness of the reforms.

Second, critics argue that the constitutional requirement that all cases investigated by CHRAJ and SFO are submitted to the Attorney General and Minister of Justice who then decides whether to prosecute the cases or not in court render the institutions toothless. Since the Attorney General position is a political position, politicians exert influence at this stage of investigations to ensure non-prosecution of high-ranking officials. Third, the constitution permits the president to fill senior bureaucratic positions on an acting capacity for extended periods of time. According to Boadi (2010), President Kufuor abused this loophole to appoint the heads of both CHRAJ and SFO on acting capacities. Serving in an acting capacity implies that the directors did not enjoy security of tenure and hence susceptible to political manipulation (Boadi 2010; Keith 2005). This

interference, according to Abdulai (2009), explains the few high profile prosecutions witnessed in the country. Therefore, just like KACC in Kenya, SFO and CHRAJ are reputed to pursue the ‘small fish’ (low-level bureaucrats) rather than the ‘big fish’ (politicians and senior bureaucrats).

However, even with these restrictions CHRAJ and SFO pursued corruption charges against former officials in the Rawlings and Kufuor administrations that created tensions between the agencies and the Kufuor administration (Asibou 2008; Gyimah-Boadi 2010). These institutions together with the civil society and media, according to Doig, Watt, and Williams (2005, 2006), have created a constraining environment for public officials especially politicians and shown a willingness to address high-level corruption as the executive’s influence dilutes. In one of the very few comparative studies on success and failure of anti-corruption agencies among African countries, Doig, Watt, and Williams (2005) attribute the relative reduction of corruption in Ghana (and better record than the other countries) to this constraining environment and moderate initial corruption levels relative to the four other countries. Their analysis of anti-corruption agencies in the five countries highlights the critical role of the context within which political actors attend to anti-corruption.

The above discussion illustrates differences about how scholars evaluate anti-corruption progress that in turn influence how they explain anti-corruption reform outcomes in the country. On one hand, for instance, Doig, Watts, and Williams seem to understand progress in relation to how the reforms are creating institutional limitations on leaders’ behavior. Thus the fact that Ghanaian leaders are no longer indifferent (even though their response is less than ideal) and anti-corruption institutions are creating an

increasingly constraining environment for public officials (as evidenced by the tension between the government on one hand and CHRAJ and SFO) signals progress.

Neopatrimonialism scholars, on the other hand, focus on a lack of prosecuting corrupt public officials, especially senior officials, as the standard for judging anti-corruption reforms³⁴. This view is logically consistent with their primary focus on how elites protect their parochial interests including corrupt activities. In this study I support Doig, Watt, and Williams' stance on success because as I previously mention, I think that fighting corruption is an ongoing social process and many scholars and analysts are guilty of utilizing overly high standards of 'zero corruption' that even western societies do not achieve.

3.4 Anatomy of Kenya and Ghana Cases

Neopatrimonialism scholars view the impact of anti-corruption reforms in both Kenya and Ghana as limited and hardly convincing a cynical public while presenting largely similar accounts to explain reform outcomes in both countries. Essentially that in both countries, neopatrimonialism continues to undermine anti-corruption reforms: leaders lack political will- there is discernible gaps between rhetoric and implementation of reforms; protect their parochial interests; and new administrations begin their tenure with enthusiasm only to ebb away in later years. In addition, due to political interference anti-corruption institutions in both countries suffer from lack of independence and resources and subsequently do not prosecute high-ranking government officials suspected of corruption.

³⁴ Prosecution, according to Githongo, is the bluntest instrument available in the fight against corruption because corrupt officials prefer to be prosecuted since their well-paid lawyers can frustrate the legal proceedings for many years.

These accounts capture some reality about anti-corruption reforms in Africa. Admittedly, self-interested politicians frustrate implementation of reforms, political leadership is important, and the institutional structures in Africa leave a lot to be desired. Nevertheless, focusing exclusively on the obstacles mounted by neopatrimonial politics especially the political logic of protecting parochial interests has two implications. First, this theoretical premise leads to explaining political behavior as sustaining corruption and predict that political actors will engage in activities to undermine reforms. But, if political leaders and elites are protecting their parochial interests in corrupt societies then why has corruption reduced in Ghana and more importantly, why for example does Ghana fare better than Kenya? Thus, due to its theoretical premise the neopatrimonialism literature fails to account for diverse reform outcomes, and do not tell us what generates positive changes.

Second, because of the above weakness, neopatrimonial scholars tend to overlook cases that do not exactly fit their theoretical models (a weaknesses noted by Pitcher 2004) or alternatively deemphasize reduction in corruption levels in order to fit outcomes into their theoretical predictions. For instance, Vitus Azeem, the executive secretary of the local chapter of Transparency International in Ghana, who in an interview could not provide an explanation for the gains made but was quick to point out weaknesses within the country's reforms, exemplifies the neopatrimonial stance.³⁵

³⁵ He failed to provide an explanation in a press interview upon release of Transparency International Corruption Perception ratings that indicated a reduction in corruption levels in the country (see GNA 2010).

3.5 Conclusion

As I have shown through a case study of Kenya and Ghana, while neopatrimonial accounts offer valid explanations about why anti-corruption reforms fail, they tend to offer deterministic assessments about reforms in the region. This has something to do with the way we use the concept of neopatrimonialism within the context of governance in African countries. Signals are that we need to challenge the dominant discourse if we want to explain diverse reform outcomes. In the next chapter, I discuss the concept of neopatrimonialism in detail and propose an alternative explanatory model that potentially explains diverse anti-corruption reform outcomes among African countries.

Epilogue on Kenyan case: Kenya held a general election in 2007 pitting President Kibaki and his main political rival Raila Odinga. It was an acrimonious election with accusations of rigging, voter intimidation, and outright theft of votes. After President Kibaki was controversially declared the winner by a narrow margin, violence and civic conflict broke out in various parts of the country that threatened the stability of the country. The violence only stopped when the two rivals agreed to share power and form a coalition government. Since its inception in 2008, the coalition government has been locked in numerous disputes over political appointments for senior administrative personnel, policies, and parliamentary business as patronage and parochial interests dominate politics in the country (Ndegwa 2010). According to Ndegwa because of these disputes and a bloated cabinet, corruption has increased in the country.

However, the promulgation of a new constitution in August 2010 and the appointment of a new executive director for KACC, PLO Lumumba, a lawyer with CSO links, have rejuvenated the crusade against corruption. The new liberal constitution,

which provides the framework for a legal and democratic approach to fighting corruption, has had immediate effects. Parliamentary watchdogs, including the Public Accounts Committee, are increasingly bringing abuses of power by public officials to book. Furthermore, KACC has also successfully recovered some state property stolen by corrupt officials. For example, in a report on Daily Nation June 14 2010, KACC handed state land illegally allocated to state officials and powerful individuals back to the state. In October 2010 alone, four ministers resigned or were suspended from their cabinet positions following allegations of graft (Sunday Nation October 31, 2010). In addition, Raila Odinga, the current Prime Minister, has also added political weight to the fight against corruption through his attempt to suspend two cabinet ministers implicated in corruption scandals, and leading the fight to recover the Mau forest from land grabbers. There is hope that the tide can turn in the country.

CHAPTER 4. POLITICAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS MODEL: 'EXPECTATIONS', 'OPPORTUNITIES', AND 'CAPACITY'

4.1 Introduction

So far I argue that the neopatrimonialism literature does not account for variation in anti-corruption reform outcomes in part because the explanatory models that exist are blinded by their deterministic conceptions. The purpose of this chapter then is to shift emphasis from neopatrimonialism to an explanatory model that overcomes these shortcomings. In the chapter, I develop an alternative explanatory model that recognizes the intersection of people and structures in the fight against corruption. The explanatory model regards anti-corruption reform process as a process about political actors- their thoughts and actions, and their surroundings and is therefore both a structural and individual issue.

The model explains divergent outcomes via two channels. In the first, a country's political economic structure influences anti-corruption reform outcomes: reform outcomes depend on how political actors' ideas ("expectations") interact with the conditions they live in ("opportunities"), and institutional constraints ("capacity"). Political actors take into consideration these structural features, via interactive rationality, that collectively shape expectations on political action, willingness to act, and ability to act on anti-corruption in their country. In the second, the reforms depend on how political actors at the individual level construct the 'reality' of the political economic structure

within which they attend to anti-corruption reforms through their cognitive ideas (ideas that tell the actors ‘what is’ and ‘what to do’). Hence the model postulates that the political economic structure and the reality that citizens construct form the informational context that political actors take into consideration when attending to anti-corruption reforms. In other words, reform outcomes are context-specific, including the ideational context.

To build this model, I begin by reviewing the use of neopatrimonialism to explain politics in African countries. I argue that the current neopatrimonialism literature is deterministic principally because it focuses on a dominant underlying political ‘logic’ that fixes political actors in terms of preference and norms that justify the pursuit of material self-interest at all costs. Next, I discuss two major critiques of the use and conception of neopatrimonialism that suggest insufficient specification of neopatrimonialism models. First, that among African countries the nature of patrimonial relations differs depending on how people understand their relationship with rulers. This critique implies there are alternative political ‘logics’ that matter. Second, that under certain circumstances, African leaders do not act as predicted by neopatrimonial theories implying the dominant political ‘logic’ is context-specific.

In the second part of the chapter, using Political Economic Analysis I build a simple and parsimonious model with variables partly drawn from the literature to explain anti-corruption reform outcomes. First, I group influential variables into three organizing concepts, ‘expectations’, ‘opportunities’, and ‘capacity’, which I identify as constituents of the political economic structure. Next, I discuss how these constituent features may influence anti-corruption reforms. I also show the centrality of politico-economic ideas

(ideas that relate to the political economy), as evidenced by citizens' 'expectations', interpretations, and societal confidence that create 'mutual expectations', in explaining anti-corruption reform outcomes. In doing so I raise the central question that I seek to answer in the rest of the study: 'do politico-economic ideas among the public influence anti-corruption reform outcomes in African countries, and how?'

4.2 Neopatrimonialism Revisited

Recall in the previous chapter I state that neopatrimonialism is a juxtaposition of Weberian patrimonial and rational-legal types of authority. Though this is the original intent, scholars have applied neopatrimonialism as a concept to different contexts and for a variety of purposes beyond signifying a type of authority. I identify three broad strands of the different uses of the neopatrimonial concept to explain African political and policy processes.³⁶ One strand focuses on personal rule- paternal leadership often by a 'strongman'- in which the president dominates the political process in such a way that policy outcomes depend on the president's personal whims. In this formulation, all official relations are privatized as presidents depend on patron-client ties and use of state resources to get their followers to comply with their authority. An example of this use is Cammack (2007).

A second strand rejects the conception of African politics as essentially all privatized and informal. This strand is chiefly concerned with how informal relations blend with formal, impersonal institutions to define a specific regime type. In this view,

³⁶ Pitcher, Moran and Johnston (2009) identify four interrelated uses of the concept: as a set of social relations; as rent seeking behavior and personalist patterns of authority; as an economic logic that blurs the line between public and private spheres; and as a characteristic of a regime type. Unlike Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston, I consider the economic logic as the principal underlying factor that brings together the other uses. I, therefore, do not include economic logic as one type of how the concept is used.

neopatrimonial states represent a unique stage of political development that inspires leaders to circumvent existing formal institutions in favor of informal relations. For example, van de Walle (2004, 45) states that “in most states the two tendencies (*rational legal and patrimonial*) coexist, overlap, and are engaged in what amounts to a struggle for control of the state.” In addition, “even in the least institutionalized states in the region, there are rational-legal pockets attempting to assert themselves”. This implies that neopatrimonial rule weakens formal institutions and there are ‘degrees’ of neopatrimonialism, though the demarcation of these degrees is not clearly illustrated. Examples include Bratton and van Walle (1997) and Erdmann and Engel (2007).

A third strand uses neopatrimonialism to define a set of social relations that cloud people’s judgments to accept personalism and justify exploitation of state resources. This strand emphasizes relations within the state because ‘privileged access to state institutions facilitates upward social mobility and material accumulation’ (Hasty 2005) while suggesting an intractable culture of clientelism. This use is especially common among anthropologists and political culture studies such as de Sardan (1999) and Hasty (2005).³⁷

Despite different uses of the concept, all three strands emphasize the importance of informal relationships to explain policy and institutional reform failures among African countries. The first use, personalism, focuses on unbridled informal relations leaving the impression that political leaders are unconstrained in their pursuit of self-interests. This is

³⁷ By identifying this strand I raise doubts about Morrison’s (2007, 119) assertion that “scholars have keenly analyzed neopatrimonialism without probing underlying perceptions that reify it.” It may be true for some scholars but certainly, an entire branch of neopatrimonial studies focuses on this issue.

what Kenya under President Moi represents, a disturbing example of unconstrained neopatrimonial interests, and leaders operating with impunity, and disregarding impersonal rules if not plain incompetence.

In the second use, as regime type, informal relations struggle for control with formal institutions, usually winning the battle as manifested in the consistent ‘lack of political will’ explanations. For example, according to this view informal rather than formal institutions better served Presidents Kibaki, Kufuor, and Rawlings’ interests leading them to have little interest and political will to implement and enforce anti-corruption reforms. In the third use, it is the informal relations which determine who benefits from access to state resources that establish social relations within African societies and create a culture of impunity. Taken together, according to neopatrimonialism theorists there is something fundamentally wrong with African societies that makes them favor informal relations that ultimately underpin the political and economic malaise that has characterized countries in the region.

Yet, there is nothing deterministic about informal relationships. To ascribe some form of policy outcome based on neopatrimonialism (like in the anti-corruption literature), neopatrimonialism theorists assume a priori the influence of particularistic self-interests- the uncaused cause of neopatrimonial-based explanations. In other words, these theorists view all political and policy action as instrumental action of self-enrichment at the expense of society and institutions as instrumental products that elites use to maximize their material interests.

Neopatrimonialism theorists therefore perceive policy interaction as social exchange modeled on the material benefits of actions or as Callaghy (1987, 100) frames it, “state

power and interests of the ruling group are the central focus of state policy.” For instance, Booth et al (2005) argue that in African countries the ability of public officials to formulate and carry out policies in accordance with public interest is heavily constrained by the requirement to service patronage networks. Citizens’ tacit support for politicians too is assumed to signal material returns for their support (for example Manzetti and Wilson 2007; Wantchekon 2003).³⁸

My main concern about the use of neopatrimonialism to explain the policy process in African countries and by extension anti-corruption reform outcomes is the core conception that limits policy action to instrumentality. That leaders seek political survival or pursue self-interests is not different from politics around the world. What is different is the view that in Africa, politicians pursue material self-interest and political survival through patron-client relationships at the expense of everything else in the society. This view is far from the reality. No doubt, politics in the region leaves a lot to be desired but even though some leaders blatantly pursue self-interests, the present reality is far more complex. In fact, according to some scholars this view of ‘personalized and clientelistic’ African states has far reaching consequences.

First, as Orvis (2006) notes, neopatrimonialism scholars cannot explain variation in policy outcomes except as a result of a leader’s personal idiosyncrasies and political skills. This is because it is “a one variable explanation for broad national outcomes” (Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston 2009). Second, such an understanding of African politics is narrow and potentially omits critical factors that may explain different outcomes. For

³⁸ However, this is a narrow construction of citizens’ demands. Citizens may ultimately accept less, but may desire policies that are more broadly defined rather than merely satisfying their parochial interests.

example, Pitcher (2004) notes that by generalizing about the region, neopatrimonialism theorists take away some complexities that characterize the political and economic processes in different African countries. Furthermore, as various scholars observe, material benefits and elites' self-interests are not the only basis of all 'neopatrimonial transactions' (for example Pitcher, Moran and Johnston 2009).

Third, as Szeftel (2002) notes, this view implies that African politics are devoid of ideals, struggle for ideas, notions of equality, or other societal values that serve the public interest. So, for example if an African government rejects neoliberal economic reforms, neopatrimonialism scholars tend to explain this policy action as serving vested material interests rather than exhaustively considering other factors such as leaders' ideological rejection of neoliberal economic ideas. Recently some neopatrimonialism theorists, for example van Walle (2004), have expanded their accounts to include a role for ideas. However, where theorized, ideas are derivative of the mode of analysis and limited to serving as instrumental justifications for political actions.

Fourth, as Pitcher, Moran and Johnston (2009, 127) note, "They (neopatrimonialism scholars) ignore the impact of change, and they blind us to the rationality that may exist within responses to that change". In other words, neopatrimonialism scholars overlook the varied ways Africans have adapted to political and economic reforms and changes in their countries. These concerns have resulted in a growing body of literature critical of the use of neopatrimonialism to explain all facets of political and policy processes in African countries.

Neopatrimonialism Critique

It is important to note that I do not contest the importance of informal relationships; rather it is limiting the modus operandi in these relationships to instrumentality that I find objectionable. Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston (2009), who focus on the theorized informal relationships, raise somewhat similar concerns. Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston provide what in my view is the most valuable critique of neopatrimonialism because they differentiate between use of the concept and its meaning. They reject the idea that neopatrimonialism defines a particular regime type as commonly used and attribute this misapplication to a misreading of Max Weber. They contend that for Weber patrimonialism is “not a synonym for corruption, bad governance, violence, or evidence of a weak state” (p 126). Rather patrimonialism means a distinct form of how leaders acquire legitimacy and secure compliance from their subjects in a reciprocal relationship built on customs, traditions, and norms (a point that neopatrimonialism theorists tend to overlook- especially reciprocity).

In their own words, “rulers and subjects understand the customs and expectations governing their relationships, enabling subordinates to hold their leaders accountable” (Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston 2009, 144). They further assert that in patrimonial societies, rulers seek obedience through status, loyalty, deference, as much as material exchange. Therefore, as they contend, understanding patrimonial relations should focus on neither material interests-based incentives nor rulers’ dominance over subjects but on the cultural framing of how citizens give compliance and in turn hold elites accountable. Applying their understanding of patrimonialism to the case of Botswana, they show that

the country often regarded as an African success story is actually the most patrimonial (in contradiction to neopatrimonial predictions).

Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston's analysis of the concept is insightful in relation to explaining anti-corruption reform outcomes. First, the analysis implies that there are alternative competing political 'logics' depending on how people understand their relationship with rulers. Second, their emphasis on the cultural framing of the relationship between rulers and subjects is extremely helpful in revisiting and reconstructing our theoretical understanding about the nature of political relationships in African polities. Foremost, it calls for us to pay particular attention to the role of citizens and the ideational context that underpins patrimonial relations. In their view, citizens are equally as important as the rulers- especially how they understand their relationship with their leaders and give consent to be governed. We should however be wary not to overemphasize customs and traditions and ultimately fall into the trap of cultural determinism (culture as the factor that determines all political and social outcomes). This can be especially limiting when we bear in mind other neopatrimonialism critics' assertion that contextual factors shape different incentives that matter in the reform process.

Other scholars have argued that under certain circumstances or conditions, African leaders do not behave in ways predicted by neopatrimonial theorists (for example Kjaer 2004; Taylor 2006). These critics implicitly infer that influential political 'logics' are context specific and therefore focus on contextual factors, especially those factors that affect the immediate environment, to explain divergent outcomes among similar 'neopatrimonial states' in public sector reforms (Kjaer 2004), and anti-corruption

initiatives (Taylor 2006). For instance, analyzing the cases of Kenya and Zambia, Scott Taylor argues that the competitiveness of elections, nature of electoral coalition, timeliness (rapid initiation of proceedings), corruption reach, and international pressure determine the likelihood of prosecuting a past president on corruption charges. Simply put, anti-corruption reform outcomes are likely to vary depending on the context within which implementation takes place.

Lawson (2009, 76) argues that both Taylor and Kjaer do not nullify the importance of neopatrimonialism; rather the identified “contextual factors matter within the broad incentive structures associated with neopatrimonial politics.” What Lawson does not realize, however, is that she is engaged in transforming neopatrimonialism into a ‘catch-all’ concept.³⁹ I agree with Pitcher’s (2004) assertion that neopatrimonialism has been overused and misapplied to discuss African countries. Neopatrimonialism has become a code word for all ills in the region (Ottaway 2003) and possesses little analytical value (de Grassi 2008; Pitcher 2004; Pitcher, Moran and Johnston 2009). “As the term is increasingly invoked more widely, it is being used more loosely, and precise connotations, justifications, and limitations of the concept are lost as it is turned into a default explanation or deus ex machina” (de Grassi 2008, 110).

None of this is meant to deny that neopatrimonialism accounts are useful. Indeed, there are various advantages to this paradigm. For instance, de Grassi (2008) notes that neopatrimonialism accounts draw attention to the relationship between state, society, and economy; provide a valuable basis for understanding the perpetuation of corruption in the

³⁹ In her argument, what constitutes ‘neopatrimonial incentives’ can be expanded to fit any political outcome and practice.

region; and emphasize the problems of state capacity. In addition, the paradigm highlights the critical role of human agency in shaping policy outcomes and directs us to pay attention towards patterns of behavior in African politics. Indeed, we can build on these strengths to explain anti-corruption reform outcomes in the region.

However, use of neopatrimonial concept to characterize political and policy processes raises some concerns. The above-mentioned concerns- misunderstanding the core concept (Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston), inflexibility to account for contextual influences (Kjaer and Taylor), and a catch-all concept (de Grassi and Ottaway) - are ultimately linked together by neopatrimonialism theorists' insistence on instrumentality within informal patron-client relationships. Like Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston, I question the purported nature of informal relationships though I focus on (mis)use of the concept of neopatrimonialism rather than its meaning. This probably explains my inclination to ditch the concept and develop an alternative explanatory model that addresses my principal concern.⁴⁰

To address my principal concern- the tendency to reduce all policy action to instrumentality- I turn to discursive institutionalism (D.I.) because D.I. scholars argue that ideas and interests are not separate entities (for example Blyth 2002; Jacobsen 1995). That is 'what we think and believe' (ideas) influences 'what we want' (interests). Furthermore, D.I. scholars contend that ideas are transformative in their own right and not strategic tools that actors utilize instrumentally or merely cultural norms and values embedded in everyday action (for example Schmidt 2008). Rather, ideas construct agents

⁴⁰ Both de Grassi (2008) and Pitcher, Moran and Johnston (2009) discuss the merits and demerits of the concept and ultimately believe that the concept can be salvaged. I am not so optimistic. I think its use to describe all of Africa's troubles undermines any analytical utility and is irredeemable.

understanding of interests and direct their actions within institutions. Thus while agents always have interests, ideas make interests collectively actionable by specifying the ends of the collective action or ‘what to expect’ (Blyth 1997, 2002; Schmidt 2008; Stone 2002). Presumably, ideas also direct political action within the informal relations that characterize African political and policy processes.

Empirical evidence suggests that ongoing political reforms in African countries have resulted in evolving views and conceptions among Africans about authority and relationship with their leaders. For example Taylor, (2006, 285) states that “Africa’s democratic experiments have helped foster a popular expectation of accountability and public awareness, at least, of how power might be exercised in the public interest, thereby laying the groundwork for a bona fide anti-corruption campaign.” Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) also show that Africans value civil and political freedoms over economic goods when evaluating political performance.

Exploring these emerging views, which suggest politics in African countries are evolving, is a potentially fruitful basis for developing an explanation of divergent anti-corruption reform outcomes among African countries. Hence, an alternative way of understanding political and policy processes in African countries is to explore how political actors view their society as the basis of political action. In other words, political actors’ ideas about their environment and environmental influences shape their engagement within the political process. Such a basis avoids the deterministic conceptions of self-interest like neopatrimonialism accounts.

4.3 Political Economic Model

I build upon scholarship critical to use of neopatrimonialism, specifically citizens as integral to the policy process, the impact of contextual factors, and the ideational context underpinning informal relations to propose an explanation about divergent anti-corruption reform outcomes among African countries. As I mention in the first chapter, I utilize the Political Economic Analysis approach as my analytical framework. Recall that PEA scholars assume that political and economic spheres are interconnected, and that institutional reform outcomes depend on the political economic environment. Therefore, central to their intellectual pursuit, PEA scholars strive to identify conditions under which change is likely to occur by focusing on political and economic factors, and institutions.

Assumptions

Similar to proponents of PEA, I seek to develop an explanatory model that explores the link between political, institutional, and economic factors that may advance the anti-corruption agenda. Advancing the PEA perspective, I focus on how a combination of the above factors influences political and institutional change. Hence, the proposed explanatory model rests on three core assumptions: First, that in any African country, the country's political economic structure influences political actors' activities and incentives to facilitate or constrain anti-corruption reforms. Second, that ideas play a dual role in the reform process: as an integral component of the political economic structure (macro-level), and as a cognitive framework that defines the impact of contextual factors through the meaning that citizens attach to the factors (micro-level). Third, that people define the environment even as the environment constrains people's behavior. As Berman (2001,

235) notes, “political behavior is a product both of actors’ motivations, interests and preferences and the constraints and opportunities of their environment.”

Structural Level Influence

As shown in Figure 2 below, the political economic structure influences the policy environment that includes political actors involved in everyday activities related to anti-corruption including opposition from vested interests. Political actors include political leaders who provide leadership and make the decisions regarding the reforms, bureaucrats who implement the reforms, and leaders and bureaucrats who oppose the reforms. Actors also include social entrepreneurs (including the civil society) and the donor community who wage anti-corruption campaigns.

Citizens too are important actors in the anti-corruption reform process. Even if elites dominate the political and policy processes in Africa, the public are not haplessly manipulated with respect to influencing political and policy outcomes (see Reinikka and Svensson 2005). As political space opens in African countries undertaking political liberalization, leaders need support from the populace to stay in power and are therefore more attuned to citizens’ demands (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005), organized groups’ pressures (Pitcher 2004), and are “engaged in games, often multilevel, in which the strategies and incentives of the other players are also important” (Lawson 2009, 95).

Social scientists make assumptions when explaining human behavior that lead to different explanations and predictions about institutional changes and reforms. Most theorists agree that political actors make decisions for a reason in line with their goals, whether the decisions are objective or not. There is a growing recognition that people act within the constraints of bounded rationality. That is, political actors are intentionally

rational but because of cognitive limitations, taking into account ‘non-rational’ considerations (for example emotional attachments), and lack of complete information, they occasionally do not make objective decisions. Likewise, during institutional reforms political actors take into consideration other factors like deeply held beliefs or environmental demands in their decision making process.




Figure 2: Political Economic Model: Macro-Level

For instance Rothstein’s (2011) application of interactive rationality to explain corruption provides a useful basis for understanding how bounded rationality influences political actors’ behavior in relation to anti-corruption. Rothstein describes interactive rationality in the sense that rationality is highly dependent on how the ‘real-life context’ informs mutual expectations about how other individuals will act. For Rothstein, the ‘real-life context’ represents historically established formal and informal institutional settings surrounding the agents, hence “behavior depends on how the existing institutions inform the agents’ ‘mutual expectations” (Rothstein 2011, 233). He subsequently argues that in corrupt societies, deeply held beliefs about corruption create a real life context in

which agents are likely to engage in corruption because they expect other agents to take part in corrupt exchanges (creating a ‘social trap’). In this regard, the agents’ behavior depends on a specific informational context (most people will be corrupt) characterized by deeply held beliefs about how others will behave in connection to corruption.

Of particular relevance for this study is the implication that political actors take into account the ‘real life’ context in their decision-making. Rothstein largely limits his analysis to beliefs about corruption (higher order information) to predict political actors’ behavior and concludes that incremental changes for the better in corrupt societies are highly unlikely. Yet, corruption like most institutions thrives under certain conditions to serve a specific purpose and must evolve to address changes in these conditions. Hence, political actors also cope with disequilibrium and environmental change that may influence their mutual expectations and behavior at a given time. In other words, political actors also take into consideration lower order information in their decision-making process.

For instance, as previously mentioned, the election of a new president in both Kenya and Ghana ushered in a wave of anti-corruption initiatives. It is reasonable to suggest that during this period, the enthusiasm to fight corruption influenced corrupt political actors to proceed with caution and informed their mutual expectations about how other individuals would act.⁴¹ This period did not necessarily challenge deeply held beliefs about corruption, but nonetheless influenced political actors’ beliefs about other actors’ willingness to reform. Similarly, we can extend the influence of ‘real life’ context to

⁴¹ For instance, citing cognitive psychological explanations of human behavior, Weyland (2008, 287) argues that people go to great lengths to avoid known losses, instead risking the unknown by keeping to the current path.

include the environment within which the reform are implemented that boundedly rational actors take into consideration in their decision making and by extension influence their behavior to facilitate or constrain anti-corruption reforms.

An analysis of the politics of anti-corruption reforms literature reveals a large number of factors that shape anti-corruption politics in two main ways: leaders' willingness to reform, and state capacity to implement the reforms. In addition to these two ways I add an often forgotten third way: people's expectations with regard to political action in their country. Hence, to build a parsimonious model I group influential factors into three organizing concepts, 'expectations' (possibilities that political actors envision about the society), 'opportunities'⁴² (current political and economic conditions), and 'capacity' (political and economic institutions and features) that collectively form a country's political economic structure ('real life' context). Political actors are nested within countries whose political economic structures vary depending on the mix of 'expectations', 'opportunities', and 'capacity'.

When deciding how to act, implications of these structural features, including setting standards of political action and legitimating the reforms ('expectations'), willingness to act ('opportunities') and ability to implement reforms ('capacity'), influence political actors' decisions. Hence, different political economic structures influence different anti-corruption outcomes through their implications, and at the same time pressure for change can come from changes in the political economic structure that alter political actors' decisions to implement incremental changes. Table 2 below summarizes the components

⁴² The concept of political opportunity structure, adopted from the writings of Arzheimer and Carter (2006), is a useful concept to organize different political variables but much less useful as an analytical concept because of its vagueness (different scholars can include different variables to constitute the structure).

of the influential political economic structure. In the next section, I discuss each of the component parts.

Table 2: Components of the Political Economy Structure

Components	How impact reforms	Role of Ideas	Influential factors
'Expectations'	Influence political action and legitimation of reforms	Structural-shared expectations	Politico-economic Ideas
'Opportunities'	Influence incentives and willingness, especially due to uncertainties	Construct reality- Interpretation	Political timing, Regime (in)stability, Levels of corruption, Economic conditions
'Capacity'	Influence ability to carry out reforms	Construct reality- Societal Confidence	Level of Economic Development, Rule of Law

'Expectations': Politico-Economic Ideas as Structural Feature

The first important component is the ideational context. According to Schmidt, D. I. scholars evaluate the role of ideas depending on the nature of ideas, which consists of level of generality and type of content. She differentiates between three levels of generality: policy ideas- policy solutions proposed by policymakers; programmatic ideas- underlying assumptions and ideals of the policy ideas proposed; and philosophical ideas-

including organizing ideas, values and principles that are rarely contested in the society.⁴³ Each level in turn contains two types of content: cognitive and normative. Cognitive ideas tell political agents “what is” and “what to do” while normative ideas refer to “what one ought to do”. Schmidt also notes that D.I. scholars tend to focus on programmatic and philosophical ideas to account for major institutional reforms.⁴⁴

In the same vein, to explain the impact of ideas on anti-corruption reform outcomes in Africa, I focus on programmatic and philosophical idea types to develop ‘politico-economic’ ideas. As I mention in the first chapter, politico-economic idea as used in this study is “a paradigm or worldview (sum collection of ideologies, assumptions, and goals) that includes the control of human behavior and the role of governmental institutions” (Anechiaricio 1994). It is a cluster of cognitive thoughts and normative values including role of the state in society and economy, and political accountability hence related to the underlying values of the anti-corruption reforms.⁴⁵

Prevailing politico-economic ideas are influential in the form of shared expectations.⁴⁶ Expectations, according to Legro (2000), are what societies anticipate based on dos and don’ts of the dominant idea in the society and the justifications for the

⁴³ Other scholars, for example Campbell (2002), have identified other categorizations, which can be redefined to fit into these three types.

⁴⁴ Blyth (2003) also argues that the use of particular levels of generality among discursive institutionalists depends on the research agenda and types of questions asked.

⁴⁵ I do not limit my examination of anti-corruption to ideas about corruption because anti-corruption reforms encompass numerous political and economic institutions and therefore to explain the role of ideas, we cannot limit ourselves to views about corruption. That said, since corruption is rooted in beliefs about the proper exchange in society (de Sardan 1999; Hasty 2005; Yang 2009), politico-economic ideas indirectly relate to beliefs about corruption.

⁴⁶ To study the impact of politico-economic ideas on anti-corruption reform outcomes, I assume that based on his or her politico-economic idea, each citizen has expectations about how to control corruption in the society though some citizens may not express relevant expectations. I therefore focus on the impact of individuals’ shared ideas rather than societal values or culture.

cause of action chosen. Legro notes, for example, that if the dominant idea prescribes a certain action and action is taken on that basis, the society will anticipate socially desirable results. Expectations are created, communicated, socially shared, and enforced outside official state channels. They permeate the informal relationships deemed critical to policy processes in African countries to form an informal structure through which actors define their interests (including ‘neopatrimonial interests’). ‘Expectations’ are therefore a subtle feature of the political economy that exists in political actors’ minds.

‘Expectations’ influence the reform process in two ways: First, ‘what is expected’ forms an informal standard and benchmark for political action including how political actors act in the political process. This is because ideas provide “the recipes, guidelines, and maps for political action” (Berman 2001). For instance, Blyth (1997) argues that ideas make collective action possible by telling political actors ‘what to do and what future to expect’ and coordinating the expectations of various political actors. Thus rephrasing Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston’s argument, it is the politico-economic ideas and resulting expectations governing the relationships between rulers and subjects that matter and enable citizens to hold their leaders accountable.⁴⁷

For instance, if citizens widely expect their leaders to embrace values like political accountability then the leaders will strive to be accountable or face sanctions however defined (leading to self-enforcing limits on behavior on the part of the leaders). Conversely, if citizens do not highly value accountability then their leaders have little incentive to be accountable. Shared expectations therefore serve to constrain actors’

⁴⁷ I replace customs and traditions with politico-economic ideas because the difference between ideas and culture is the extent to which ideas are dynamic constructs and not static structures (Schmidt 2008, 320).

behavior including how they act and react to the anti-corruption reforms (depending on whether citizens can enforce sanctions) especially in politically competitive societies that typically involve many political factions competing for power. At the very least public attitudes constitute a critical contextual feature that leaders take into consideration (Logan 2008).

Second, expectations also govern what are acceptable reforms or not depending on how people view the world. Shared expectations legitimize the reforms process because institutional reforms are likely to succeed depending on the degree of compatibility between the underlying ideas represented in the reforms and underlying societal values and norms in a society (Hasty 2005; Misangyi, Weaver and Elms 2008; Yang 2009). Expectations are therefore transformative when they shape actors' interests to accommodate change.

To sum up so far, I contend that politico-economic ideas through shared expectations form an influential feature of the political economic environment by serving as "guides to public actors for what to do, as well as being the sources of legitimation for what such actors do" (Schmidt 2008, 308). Hence, it is reasonable to expect that when the public embrace (through their expressed politico-economic ideas) the underlying liberal ideas and values associated with donor-initiated anti-corruption reforms, these legitimating politico-economic ideas partly lead to positive reform outcomes in a society.

However, expectations are neither always clearly defined nor homogenous in a society because citizens' politico-economic ideas may widely vary or evolve within the society (or some citizens may not even express any ideas). For example, Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) argue that Africans' cognitive ideas have modified over time

as they adapt to democratic and economic reforms in the region. This is a significant observation because it says that if political actors uphold a wide variety of politico-economic ideas (and none for some) they may have different reasons to act or undertake a variety of actions in similar circumstances. This means political actors will react to reforms in many different ways destroying any coordination to demand reforms and constrain their leaders' actions. Thus, when 'expectations' are not clear-cut and the community is fragmented, citizens face an agreement problem about how to constrain their leaders' behavior and what is expected with regard to anti-corruption. In other words, the effect of politico-economic ideas, as a structural feature, partly depends on in-country variation of the ideas.

When deciding on how to proceed with reforms, political actors take into account the informal ideational structure. In countries where 'expectations' are clear cut and the community is not fragmented, and congruent with the underlying ideals of the donor-initiated reforms, political actors are more likely to implement anti-corruption reforms and subsequently have a positive effect of reducing corruption in the country. However, 'expectations' impact is also bound by the specific conditions under which people live their daily lives and alone do not create the incentives and opportunities for political action. The circumstances surrounding political actors also influence the way they engage in the political process including in ways they may otherwise not envision (Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2010). The incentives to promote or challenge anti-corruption reforms therefore partly depend on domestic political and economic conditions and features. As some scholars argue, domestic politics influence the degree of acceptance or

rejection of ideas promoted by donor communities particularly international financial institutions (IMF and World Bank) (for example, Hwang 2007; Varshney 1989).

“Opportunities”: Political and Economic Conditions

Political and economic conditions are assumed to influence institutional reforms in specific ways by virtue of the opportunities and constraints that they provide. These conditions provide political and economic stimuli, especially uncertainties in a changing environment that Africans respond to as they face demands for anti-corruption reforms (for example see Boerner and Hainz 2009). As Kjaer and Taylor argue, the immediate environment influences donor-initiated reform outcomes in different ways that neopatrimonial incentives may not explain. Thus, complexities of dealing with these conditions are central to our explanation of anti-corruption reform outcomes.

Citizens, bureaucrats, and political leaders contend with these conditions in their everyday experiences and respond in different ways that are not motivated by self-interest alone. As D.I. scholars argue, there are many reasons for political action other than self-interest that provide the meaning for actions taken (see Schmidt 2008, 318). Whatever the motivations, political actors may reevaluate their politico-economic ideas, incentives for political action, commitment to the anti-corruption agenda, and ultimately their willingness to engage in anti-corruption as they live through certain conditions such as political timing, regime stability, economic conditions, and levels of corruption in a society. These factors define the “opportunities” component of the political economic structure, which essentially represents the political and economic circumstances within which political actors attend to anti-corruption reform politics.

These factors contribute to existing uncertainties in the society and ultimately influence how political actors react to the ‘reality in the country’ and subsequent willingness to facilitate or constrain reforms. First, political timing, especially periods after power alternation, influence the immediate incentives for reforms. For example, as I show in the previous chapter, in both Kenya and Ghana, increased efforts to reduce corruption including a flurry of anti-corruption initiatives characterized the period after the ascension of opposition parties to power as both Presidents Kibaki and Kufuor followed up on their electoral platforms of anti-corruption. Timing is also important because according to Robinson (2007), over time presidents lose momentum to institute and support reforms as neopatrimonial concerns take precedence.

Regime stability, identified by the nature of electoral coalitions, too is an influential factor because ‘leaders allow institutions to emerge and function when they are in a position of strength’ (Kjaer 2004; Orvis 2006; Wahman 2010). According to Khan (2001), only a stable dominant political faction can carry out the transformative interventions envisioned in the anti-corruption reforms. On the other hand, due to insecurities unstable regimes tend to take a short term view of their political commitments (Branch and Cheeseman 2008) while undermining the kind of long term commitments required to implement anti-corruption reforms (Khan 2005). For example, as noted in the Kenyan case study, President Kibaki’s hold on power was tenuous as he faced an increasingly active political opposition to his administration. He subsequently shift away from the reform agenda (Otieno 2005), and failed to prosecute former President Moi and his cronies (Taylor 2006).

Worsening economic conditions further exacerbate uncertainties within the society due to falling public revenues and limited fiscal resources. As Khan (2006) notes, under such conditions of economic insecurities, leaders have fewer political resources to maintain political stability and may fear the political risks associated with reform of entrenched corrupt practices. This is partly because anti-corruption reforms produce unintended consequences that political leaders may not control (Lawson 2009). Furthermore, successful anti-corruption reforms do not guarantee that a country will register impressive economic growth rates (Khan 2001, 2006).

In such circumstances, as neopatrimonialism scholars assert, leaders may implement reforms to appease the donor community without fully committing themselves to real reforms. Furthermore, citizens in such countries may be less interested in the anti-corruption reform agenda as they struggle to meet their daily needs even if they uphold reform legitimating politico-economic ideas. Alternatively, these conditions may galvanize the fight against corruption especially if anti-corruption agents successfully emphasize a link between corruption and economic woes in their societies.

The immediate environment also influences anti-corruption reform outcomes through the impact of existing levels of corruption in the society. For instance, Shah and Huther (2000) note that in countries experiencing endemic corruption- where corruption is so common that everyone has a routine experience in dealing with it as part of their everyday life- anti-corruption agencies serve a function in form only and not in substance. Simply put, it is more challenging to rein in on widespread corruption in the society (Rothstein 2011). For instance, the existence of many beneficiaries of corruption both within and outside the state partly contributes to the ineffectiveness of anti-corruption

agencies and complicates the fight against corruption (Taylor, 2006) and influences people to expect others to engage in corruption (Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2010; Rothstein 2011).

In summary, responses to the immediate environment affect political actors' willingness to pursue anti-corruption reforms in ways that may or may not undermine the reforms. Thus, for example, in countries experiencing wrangling political factions, falling public revenue, and high levels of corruption, political actors take these concerns into consideration as they decide on what to do and subsequently influence their willingness to facilitate or frustrate the reforms. Drawing from the literature, we can infer that political actors are less willing to facilitate reforms in such an environment because of the associated uncertainties and the need to maintain status quo. Though the immediate environmental context is important, the institutional structure in a country may offset its impact because political actors also operate within specific political and economic institutions. Explaining reform outcomes, as Grindle (2004) argues, should not only be cast as an issue of whether political agents 'will or will not' but also 'can they or not' carry out the reforms.

"Capacity": Political and Economic Institutions

It is widely accepted within the academic and practitioner communities that political institutions influence anti-corruption reform outcomes. In particular, that the dominant political institutional framework among African countries that concentrates power around the presidency has a negative impact on anti-corruption reform outcomes. This institutional framework limits political space thus motivating politicians to be less attentive to local political concerns (Cheeseman 2006; Isaksson 2010); limits the

functioning and influence of CSOs (Kew 2005); influences decision making process to invest less political and economic resources in the anti-corruption reform agenda (Keith 2005); impacts acceptability of ideas and interests from particular sources (Poteete 2003); and undermines the rule of law and official political institutions (Ittner 2009, 183). Simply put, how power is distributed and utilized in a society affects how political actors behave in the reform process.

In addition, political actors may be willing to successfully implement reforms but lack the capacity to move forward with equal vigor on all policy and institutional reforms required at once due to the degree of resource availability in a country (Grindle 2004; Khan 2001, 2005, 2006). Taken together, how political institutions and economic features constrain (or not) the ability of political actors to implement reforms is central to explaining anti-corruption reform outcomes in African countries. These institutions and features comprise 'Capacity', the third component of the political economic structure, and reiterate the society's ability to implement and enforce anti-corruption reforms.

The rule of law best exemplifies the impact of political institutions on anti-corruption reform outcomes in Africa. This is because rule of law entails enforcement of formal rules and imposes statutory limits on the exercise of political power (Linz and Stephan 1996; Weingast 1997),⁴⁸ and is as much an attribute of both regime and state because it involves the interaction of state structures and democratic procedures (regime) (Bratton and Chang 2006). In addition, rule of law is intricately connected to corruption (Goldschmidt and Schwartz 2003; Logan and Mattes 2010; Uslander 2005) and Africans

⁴⁸ Safeguarding individual liberty and property rights from the arbitrary power of the state is the typical frame of reference for rule of law. For example, the World Bank governance indicators operationalize rule of law as the rate of crime, the fairness of judiciary and the enforceability of contracts.

consider enforcement of the rule of law as the most important aspect of a democratizing state (Bratton and Chang 2006).

Conventional wisdom states that rule of law influences political capabilities that governments must have to maintain essential conditions for an honest and accountable government, including basic prerequisites for a democratic system (for example Uslander 2005, 20). That is, a foundation of political and civil rights rooted in a functioning legal system is crucial to democracy and sustaining anti-corruption initiatives. The assumption here is that rule of law is necessary for democracy, which in turn is necessary for reducing corruption. However, not only is the effect of rule of law on democracy not clear cut (Carothers 2003) but the effect of democracy on anti-corruption is also not clear cut (Saha 2008; Sung 2004; and Rock 2007).

What matters, for anti-corruption reforms, is how realities of the law in the country affect political agents' ability to implement and enforce the reforms. Crucial here is not only fairness and neutrality of the enforcement of formal rules but also how political actors understand, use, and appreciate the law. Presumably, in countries with established rule of law (where political actors appreciate and use the law), enforcement of laws limits the actions of political leaders including those opposed to anti-corruption efforts while concurrently allowing anti-corruption crusaders the political space to enforce reforms. At the same time though, the content of the laws is also critical. It is not enough to enforce the law; the law should reflect the ideals and goals of the society.

Explaining the effects of rule of law therefore depends on whether we adopt a procedural view (for example; Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz 2003; Uslander 2005) or

both procedural and substantive view (Gathii 1999; Logan and Mattes 2010).⁴⁹ For instance, Gathii (1999) notes that procedural rule of law may have little impact on anti-corruption reforms if reformists do not address the substantive component to include shared societal values.⁵⁰ Therefore, it is more appropriate to argue that in countries with well-established procedural and substantive rule of law, political agents are more likely to have the political resources to pursue reforms because leaders cannot abuse the law with impunity.

Hypothetically, even if all African countries have established rule of law, their governments still face numerous challenges of resource availability including organizational and financial weakness, excessive dependency on foreign funding, lack of access to information, and lack of professionally trained manpower, which hamper their anti-corruption agencies (ADB 2004). After all, for instance, “the more money a country has, the better its judiciary will be trained and paid, and the stronger the judicial institutions will be overall” (Joireman 2001, 590). As Khan and Grindle observe, many governments in developing countries lack the capacity to undertake many reforms and manage the conflicts that the reforms produce at the same time. Therefore, the second set of capabilities critical to anti-corruption reform outcomes revolve around resource availability, which is influenced by the level of economic development (Doig, Watt and Williams 2005a; Grindle 2004; Keith 2005; Khan 2005, 2006).

Khan suggests that the anti-corruption reforms promoted by the donor community are more likely to be effective in countries that generate sufficient legal tax revenue for

⁴⁹ Substantive view means focusing on the written law or content of the law.

⁵⁰ In his study, Gathii shows how the Kenyan government used procedural rule of law to undermine anti-corruption reforms.

tackling social problems and sharing wealth. He (2001, 33) states “ the only long term solution is to acquire the economic development that will allow fiscal resources to increase to the point where political stability can be maintained in these countries in a transparent and generalized fiscal transfer”. However, even in such countries, how the reforms are funded matters (Doig, Watt and Williams 2005a) including the political incentives to fund reforms (Abdulai 2010). This means that political and economic capabilities are ultimately intertwined.

To summarize, political and economic capabilities- represented by rule of law and economic capacity respectively- constrain or facilitate how much political actors ‘can get done’ despite what they ‘want to get done’. This implies that the institutional framework influences political agents’ political ability to implement reforms especially in light of the limitations and constraints they have to contend with in their everyday activities concerning anti-corruption. According to the literature reviewed, it is reasonable to expect that political actors in countries with more resources are more likely to facilitate anti-corruption reforms. Incorporating ‘capacity’ into my explanatory model therefore implies that anti-corruption reforms do not entail only political agents’ interests (ideas) and incentives, as commonly emphasized, but also what political agents can or cannot do within a given institutional framework.

Linking Macro-level to Micro-level: Interpretation and Societal Confidence

So far, the proposed explanatory model asserts that a combination of citizens’ expectations, environmental possibilities, and institutional context influence political actors’ decisions and actions related to anti-corruption reforms and subsequent outcomes. At its core, this argument implies that political actors are constrained by a political

economic structure that defines meaning and individual action. This in turn has two major implications: 1) that countries with similar political economic contexts should achieve similar anti-corruption reform outcomes, and 2) it emphasizes a structural understanding of political action that subordinates agency to structure. Both implications though are disputable. First, it is also conceivable that countries with similar political economic contexts can achieve varying anti-corruption outcomes, and second we need to bring agency into the model.

To address both limitations, I assume that through their ideas and actions, political actors influence the effects of the environment as much as the environment constrains their actions. That is, cognitive ideas define the impact of contextual factors through the meaning that citizens attach to the ‘opportunities’ and ‘capacity’ features of the political economy. This is because ideas endow material realities with meaning and purpose (Jacobsen 1995) and form the cognitive frame through which reality is interpreted in a specific direction (Surel 2000). Therefore, through ideas we can link agency to structure by focusing on the meaning political actors attach to various structural features in the society. Put this way, it is reasonable to argue that two countries with a similar political economic structure may witness different reform outcomes depending on their citizens’ interpretation of the political economic environment.

Through ideas, political actors partly construct the reality within which they respond to anti-corruption reforms. In other words, people’s mutual expectations and how they judge the world around them influences how they interpret and react to the environment in which reform implementation takes place. Political actors, therefore, interpret the political economic structure in their countries in ways that make some structural features

‘actionable’. For example, because Kenyans link ethnicity with societal inequalities (Branch and Cheeseman 2006; Githongo 2006) elites, for instance, manipulate ethnicity by claiming ethnic persecution to avoid prosecution and therefore block anti-corruption reforms (Mutonyi 2002).⁵¹ In this case, it is the perceived inequalities associated with ethnic affiliation rather than ethnicity per se that matters.

Githongo further notes that ethnic inequalities as perceived by citizens undermine societal confidence in the governance institutions of society. This is so because lack of societal confidence is the result of the degree of divergence between citizens’ views of institutional goals and their expectations about the likely outcomes generated by formal institutions (Koene 2006). Koene further states that societal confidence reflects the trust that existing institutional mechanisms will effectively deal with the challenges of institutional reforms. Institutional trust is therefore important because it encourages political involvement and contributes to public support for democratic ideals (Mishler and Rose 2005) and impacts the rule of law (Logan and Mattes 2010).

Hence, through societal confidence or lack thereof, citizens dictate the impact of some ‘capacity’ features including anti-corruption institutions. For example, there is consensus in the literature that Africans are cynical about their government’s efforts to fight corruption which in turn limits the citizens’ interest in demanding for reforms, and worse still makes them complicit in corrupt activities (for example Lavalée, Razafindrakoto, and Rouband 2008). In addition, as You and Khagram (2005, 139) argue, “people are more likely to consider political institutions and rules in unjust

⁵¹ Morrison also argues that how members of an ethnic group view about themselves in relation to other groups is important in shaping political behavior (Morrison 2007).

societies as favoring the rich, as unjust, and as lacking legitimacy. More people are likely to circumvent laws and regulations when they are considered illegitimate.”

That the impact of “opportunities” and “capacity” partially depends on citizens’ interpretations and societal confidence respectively raises the possibility that there are varying and competing ‘realities’ (mutual expectations) within a country. Therefore, in addition to possibly serving as an independent variable, ideas also explain anti-corruption reforms outcomes through an evaluation of mutual expectations- how people interpret the political and economic conditions in their country and their confidence in their government’s ability to implement reforms as illustrated in Figure 3 below. Political actors, as boundedly rational actors, take into consideration these mutual expectations in their decision making and behavior regarding anti-corruption reforms.




Figure 3: Political Economic Model: Micro and Macro-Level

Overall, the proposed model implies that political actors attend to anti-corruption within a political economic structure that influences their activities. A critical implication

of the model is that Africans' ideas about the political economy and its relation to reform outcomes are important to explaining how anti-corruption reforms have played out in their countries. We can submit these claims to rigorous empirical tests using data from a large number of comparable nations because after all the impact of politico-economic ideas can only be established empirically. In this case then, the pertinent empirical question becomes 'do politico-economic ideas among Africans influence divergent anti-corruption reform outcomes and if so how'?

4.4 Conclusion

Theoretical weaknesses of the neopatrimonialism paradigm have increasingly come under scrutiny as scholars of African politics debate the merits and demerits of the concept. For instance Pitcher, Moran and Johnston (2009, 126) correctly note that neopatrimonialism theorists "ignore variations of power and accountability within African states that may lend themselves to insightful comparisons with countries elsewhere". Likewise, I note that neopatrimonialism theorists persistence with an instrumental conceptualization of policy processes in African countries limits their ability to explain divergent anti-corruption reform outcomes among similar 'neopatrimonial states' in Africa.

I have suggested that pursuing an alternative explanation that builds on the strengths of neopatrimonial explanations, invokes criticisms of the neopatrimonialism concept, and adopts a non-instrumental view of African politics offers an improved model for explaining anti-corruption reform outcomes in the region. I have also suggested that Political Economic Analysis provides a useful framework to realize such ambitions, especially with its focus on the impact of the political economic environment on

institutional reforms. In this regard, I have proposed an explanatory model that assumes interactive rationality based on the environment. In other words, that anti-corruption reform takes place in a background of people's expectations and the 'reality' of the country's political and economic conditions, and institutions that political actors take into consideration.

I have also suggested that taking ideas seriously improves upon existing explanations on anti-corruption reform outcomes. Taking ideas seriously is advantageous because it implies numerous competing political 'logics' in African societies. Hence, I emphasize ideas and not culture because ideas are dynamic constructs rather than the static structures of culture. The enterprise of taking ideas seriously and incorporating them in a theoretical model with explanatory power requires that we start by clearly identifying the influential ideas and then empirically determining their explanatory power. In the remainder of the study I embark on such an enterprise. In the next chapter, I tap into public opinion data to measure the relevant politico-economic ideas.

CHAPTER 5. POLITICO-ECONOMIC IDEAS

5.1 Introduction

It is the day after a World Bank/IMF joint conference on attaining sustainable economic development in Sub-Sahara Africa. In one of the conference panels, scholars of African politics, international development practitioners, and policy analysts assembled to evaluate anti-corruption reforms instituted by World Bank and IMF in Sub-Sahara Africa. This is all imaginary. The participants were asked to offer their views and explanations about the success or failure of the reforms. This question is not imaginary. This is a legitimate question being commonly asked within international development circles.

The explanatory model described in the previous chapter partly claims that citizens' beliefs have an effect on reform outcomes as a critical contextual feature that political actors take into consideration. Essentially, I argue that how African citizens visualize their societies, the plurality of these visions, and the (in)congruence to ideals underlying anti-corruption reforms matter in explaining reform outcomes. What then are the influential politico-economic ideas that attitudinally predispose citizens toward creating a contextual feature conducive for rejecting or supporting the reforms?

For various reasons, empirical analysis of the explanatory model requires that I adopt a quantitative approach. First, since establishing the influence of the identified

factors is a key goal of the study, setting 'ceteris paribus' conditions are important for the study. Second, a quantitative approach accommodates my ambition to compare anti-corruption reform outcomes in numerous African countries through comparability of data across the countries. Third, a related issue is the scope of the study. The study aims to probe the effects of ideas among the public in numerous African countries making a qualitative approach time consuming and expensive to conduct.

However, adopting a quantitative approach to study the role of ideas comes at the expense of developing contextual explanations that qualitative methods can yield because quantification does not address the complexities and context of public discourse. Taking a quantitative stance therefore means trading off developing descriptive contextual explanations for comparability of influential factors on a multi-national scale. I opted for the latter because I think it is important first to identify correlations and then tease out explanations of the causal dynamics involved. This way we can facilitate an organized and detailed investigation into the important factors that shape anti-corruption reform outcomes. This study should therefore be viewed as a beginning for future ideational studies on institutional reforms in Africa.

Before proceeding to an empirical analysis of the explanatory model, I think it is important to first discuss the empirical measurement and distribution of politico-economic ideas because not only are these ideas critical to the explanatory model but also because taking up a quantitative study of ideas means I have to pay attention to three main concerns. First, I need to identify the precise nature of the politico-economic ideas that I argue are relevant to explaining reform outcomes. Here I assume that people rely on their core values and beliefs to understand and make sense of the world around them. In

this study, therefore, an individual's politico-economic idea is an expression of his/her interconnected notions and beliefs based on governance values related to the role of state in society and economy, and control of leaders' behavior.

Second, I also need to show that the ideas can be adequately measured using public opinion data. Undoubtedly, to achieve this objective I have to address various conceptual and measurement validity issues. In this chapter, I take into consideration issues like relationship between opinions and ideas, whether people truly hold expressed ideas, and identifying valid indicators of politico-economic ideas. Third, the explanatory model also requires that I not only compare individuals' politico-economic ideas within and across countries but also have enough variance to test the explanatory claims.

Empirical analysis, using data from Afrobarometer series ascertains that there is significant variance to warrant an empirical investigation of ideas' relationship with anti-corruption reform outcomes. The data also shows that most citizens of African countries believe in an active state led by leaders accountable to the public though the degree of how active and accountable varies within and across countries (Hence unlike Timamy I do not grossly generalize about Africans' beliefs (see Chapter 2). This lack of societal consensus suggests multiple sources of idea formation among Africans. In this regard, I find that country experiences, being poor, supporting the ruling party, and cognitive awareness influence Africans' politico-economic ideas. What follows in this chapter then is a formal, comparative, and empirical study of politico-economic ideas in selected African countries.

5.2 Politico-economic Idea Content

As I mention in the previous chapter, I conceive a politico-economic idea as a worldview that includes the control of leaders' behavior and the role of governmental institutions. As a worldview, a politico-economic idea signals a kind of belief system that serves as a fundamental cognitive and normative presumption through which individuals interpret the world around them, apply their understanding of the world to various experiences, political events, information, and justify their actions. Collectively, citizens' politico-economic ideas form the 'expectations' structure that I argue political actors take into consideration when deciding on how to proceed with anti-corruption reforms.

Many observers of African politics argue that patrimonial relations and subsequent appeals to clientelistic considerations trample ideological concerns in ways that relegate ideology to the sphere of irrelevance in African societies (for example Conroy-Krutz and Lewis 2011; Lindberg 2003; van Walle 2003, 304-6). If ideological reasoning plays a negligible role in Africans' thought process, and given my earlier objections to instrumental thinking, then alternatively Africans derive their political views from core values and beliefs. This stance on values and beliefs-based political views, is in line with the perspective in public opinion literature that focuses on people's core values and beliefs rather than ideological orientation to uncover their beliefs systems (for example Converse 1964; Feldman 1988; Heath, Evans and Martin 1994). Thus, even if we cannot use western-based ideological scales to identify Africans' thoughts, they derive their political views from core values and beliefs that subsequently form informal standards of political action in their societies. .

Analytically, therefore, we can think of a politico-economic idea as a cluster of interconnected values and beliefs that prescribe desirable modes of the interrelationship between state, economy, and society, and control of leaders' behavior (reflected in conceptions of the ideal scope of the state in society and economy, and political accountability). What then is the content of the relevant politico-economic ideas within the context of anti-corruption reforms?

I identify the content of politico-economic ideas via Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz's (2003) view of governance norms and values that anchor people's worldviews. Building on existing cross-cultural psychology, Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz contrast varying cultural values with liberal values, including individualism and tolerance for dissent views, seen as necessary in a democratic society. Conventional accounts of African politics adopt a similar approach in identifying attitudinal orientations, particularly deference to authority and communalism, as salient to political and economic reforms. For instance, Logan (2008) argues that Africans' preference for deference to strong presidents ('big man') delegitimizes oppositional politics resulting in dominant party systems.

I adopt a similar approach to identify politico-economic ideas because, as I previously mention, 'expectations' matter in explaining reform outcomes through influencing standards of political action and (in)congruence to values and beliefs underlying the reforms. Hence, two worldviews, which I label 'libertarian' (liberal) and 'populist' (deference-communalism) predispose citizens toward consciously or unconsciously facilitating or constraining anti-corruption reforms. To be clear, I am not arguing that upholding specific worldviews means supporting corruption or not, rather

that inclination to particular worldviews has consequences on the reforms. After all, cognitive ideas tell actors ‘what is and what to do.’

Although the donor community state that they are not involved in politics, it is quite clear that they explicitly advocate two strands of liberalism- economic and political liberties. As I previously mention, at the core of donor-initiated anti-corruption reforms is the belief in a market-friendly government that is accountable and transparent. This view includes liberal values on control of leaders’ behavior via accountability and role of governmental institutions in which the state enjoys legitimacy and authority derived from a democratic mandate. In addition, this view is built on the traditional liberal notion of limited powers for the government through laws and rights of the individual.

This worldview or politico-economic idea, which I label *libertarian*, entails a belief in individual citizenship and locates individual selves as independent citizens who are the fundamental basis of politics and social life. In this worldview, promotion of group interests is considered voluntary, rejects unequal distribution of power in the society and values individual uniqueness including taking care of oneself (see Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz 2003). Hence, libertarian governance norms and values include valuing procedure and rule of law, active democratic citizens with some control over their lives and state, and tolerance for dissent and diversity among competing groups.

For instance, concerning control of behavior, individuals are expected to question their leaders’ actions and influence leaders’ behavior to comply with written laws and regulations and accept responsibility for their actions. Components of anti-corruption reforms that seek to establish vertical and horizontal accountability including institutional restraints, political accountability, and civil society participation reflect these values. The

primacy of individual rights also means protection of the private, as manifested in the belief in a market-friendly government that guides the public sector management and private sector reforms.

In contrast to the libertarian worldview (politico-economic idea), political cultural studies frequently characterize Africans as valuing communalism particularly communal unity and solidarity (Mattes and Shin 2005) and deference to authority (Logan 2008) that preclude public support for democracy and reforms. Citing historical and institutional legacies and cultural influences, some scholars suggest that Africans prefer communal good over individual rights, value primacy of close-knit social relations and are predisposed to adapt a deferential view of political authority resulting in passive and dependent subjects (for example Etuonga-Manguelle 2000; Owusu 1992).

This worldview or politico-economic idea, which I label *populist*, entails a belief about ways of allocating responsibility and scarce resources that gives precedence to group welfare over individual interests and includes accepting and obeying role obligations in unequal power relationships. The individual is embedded to a group and values maintaining status quo, and restraint of actions or inclinations that might disrupt group solidarity or traditional order. Culturally, customs like kinship obligation, loyalty to a patron, and respect for authority reflect these values. Politically, African leaders' populist appeals that entail direct appeals to the masses while overlooking state institutions express these values. In these appeals, leaders focus on unregulated power and the government's direct involvement in people's lives purportedly to benefit the

people whom the leaders glorify (Carbone 2005).⁵² These values and beliefs correspond to the third strand of neopatrimonialism (see chapter 4), and their dominance in a country suggests citizens are less likely to support donor-initiated anti-corruption reforms.

Broadly speaking, adherence of any of these two worldviews influences anti-corruption reforms. Though the polar positions outlined above are perfectly reasonable in identifying and describing Africans' worldviews, it is also true that people have views that do not necessarily fall neatly into any of these worldviews (i.e. lack of belief tightness). For instance, some people may display flexibility by adopting views from both positions, or renounce participation in both collectivities and individualism. As previously mention, there are emerging ideas among Africans as they live through political and economic reforms that potentially influence how they understand, and participate in the political process. For instance, Mattes and Bratton (2007, 195) argue that "(Africans') attitudes result from both individual and national differences in what citizens learn from short, medium, and long term experience about what democracy is and what it does."

Hence, to identify the relevant politico-economic ideas I incorporate the possibility that people strongly or weakly adopt aspects of both extreme viewpoints to their worldview. The politico-economic ideas index I develop in this study encompasses both extremes in a continuum ranging from a populist pole on one end to a libertarian pole on the other. Before discussing measurement of these politico-economic ideas, in the next section I address the challenge of empirically measuring ideas.

⁵²For instance, we can explain President Robert Mugabe's land reforms in Zimbabwe from a populist view. By providing land to the masses, President Mugabe was essentially sending ideational appeals to the populace that center on him as provider of the people's wellbeing and as a result should be accorded wide powers to 'protect the masses' from the common enemies especially foreigners and their local puppets.

5.3 Measuring Ideas

According to some scholars, empirically demonstrating the role of an idea is never an easy task and one which ideational scholars in comparative studies have not convincingly accomplished (Chwiero 2007; Parsons 2002; Schonhardt-Bailey 2005). For instance, Chwiero (2007) criticizes D.I scholars for failing to both demonstrate the causal weight of ideas net of other factors ('how much' problem) and evaluate the bias-efficiency tradeoff. He attributes these weaknesses to the dominant use of qualitative methods and suggests quantitative methods to manage the 'how much' problem. However, as he notes, opting for a quantitative approach means addressing what he calls the 'how to' problem-developing a valid measurement of ideas.

In quantitative ideational studies, scholars follow different approaches in their attempts to develop valid variables to represent ideas. For example, Chwiero uses organizational background as a proxy for ideas that individuals in an organization share while Schonhardt-Bailey (2005) advocates the use of content analysis to measure ideas. Though both approaches are effective in some instances, they are not suitable for a multi-nation comparative study of citizens' ideas like this study.

The purpose and context of ideas as conceptualized in this study dictates that I utilize survey research data. There are clear limits, however, to the use of survey research to measure ideas that warrant closer scrutiny. In particular, using public opinion data raises measurement and conceptual validity concerns including 'can we identify ideas from responses to survey questions'? Moreover, do opinions reflect ideas? In addition, the risk of introducing biases is considerable especially because people do not necessarily reveal their true preferences when answering survey/poll questions and their answers

maybe random choices (Alvarez and Franklin 1997; Bartels 1986; Bishop, Tuchfarber and Oldendick 1986).

Public Opinion Data as a Source for Measuring Ideas

I address each of the above three concerns in what is my defense for using public opinion data to develop a quantified measure of politico-economic ideas. First, we can identify ideas from responses to survey questions depending on the precise format and wording of the questions. Responses to causal questions- questions that require respondents to ascertain how causally relevant variables affect each other- reflect respondents' value orientation as opposed to questions that focus on assessments of current events (Caplan 2006). This is because as, Caplan argues, answers to causal questions are cognitively demanding prompting people to use their beliefs and ideas to respond to the questions.

Similarly, Likert-scale questions that begin with statements like “let’s talk for a moment about the kind of society we would like to have in this country” tap into people’s ideas because responses to such questions signal what people think about their ideal society. Likewise, survey instruments in which the interviewer describes two polar alternatives and asks respondents to choose their position elicit more than a reflection of opinions to tap into ideas albeit in the context of the researcher’s predetermined characterization.⁵³ Thus, answers to causal, specific types of Likert-scale questions, and choice questions provide latent attributes about what the respondent thinks and reveal

⁵³ However, we have to be aware of the inherent limitations of closed statement questionnaires especially in limiting respondents’ answers mainly because people have distinctive ways of looking at the world that are not covered using standard survey instruments (see Scott et al 2003).

general beliefs. Put this way, it is reasonable to develop a measure that identifies what people think about the political economy from well-worded survey questions.

Second, with regard to opinion-ideas connection, Zaller (1991, 84) points out that “every opinion is a marriage of information and values- information to generate a mental picture of what is at stake and values to make a judgment about it”. This implies that in some instances (depending on the nature of the question) stated opinions are formal and outward expressions of ideas, beliefs, and norms making reference to these terms easily interchangeable. Therefore, a careful analysis of an opinion (usually assessments of current events) and beliefs assists in identifying ideas from responses to survey questions.

Nevertheless, even if we can develop a quantitative measure of ideas from public opinion data using well-worded questions and a careful analysis of what constitutes an opinion and an idea, we still need to address concerns about the nature of answers that people provide to researchers. That is, the validity of even simple responses may often be open to question. For instance, some researchers note that people are unwilling to reveal their preferences to strangers or that people answer survey/ poll questions for different motivations other than providing their true opinions or views. This is a significant concern especially in African societies where, as Bratton, Mattes and Boadi (2005) argue, a tradition of survey research is not well entrenched and there is a long history of government censorship. Methodologically, this implies that we may potentially use ‘random responses’ to identify ideas.

Admittedly, it is difficult to conclusively determine whether a respondent’s answers reflect his/her real preferences. However, relevant to this study, Bratton, Mattes and Boadi (2005, 55-59) provide a valuable defense for the use of Afrobarometer data that

essentially negates some concerns raised about appropriateness of survey data. They point to a low rate of refusal to answer questions, low 'don't know' response rates, and find no self-censorship effects that affect the quality of responses to argue that the Afrobarometer data does indeed capture respondents' attitudes, opinions, and beliefs about various issues.

Other researchers raise substantive concerns about individuals' responses by arguing that few people reason for themselves about how political ideas are related to each other and that most have attitudes that cannot translate into consistent preferences (for example Zaller 1992). Research on mass belief systems in America, notably Converse (1964) has shown that large portions of the American mass public lack meaningful, coherent, and stable attitudes. Converse argues that in mass publics, attitudes on political issues tend to be unorganized and only weakly associated meaning responses to survey questions are in fact a random 'non attitude' with minimal constraint.

Though a long line of research disputed the above argument by suggesting faulty empirical analysis (for example Achen 1975; Ansolabehere, Rodden and Synder 2008; Barton and Parsons 1977; Judd and Milburn 1980; Wyckoff 1987), minimal constraint on mass belief systems is now regarded as well established and the broad debatable issue is one of degree of consistency (for example Alvarez and Franklin 1994; Bartels 1986; Bennett 1989; Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002). In Africa, various scholars similarly show that Africans display inconsistent belief systems (for example Conroy-Krutz and Lewis 2011; Pereira, Davids and Mattes 2002).

It is not possible here to survey all the literature on what is a complex and multifaceted issue. The central point though is that discussions about non-attitudes,

inconsistent, and unconstrained attitudes suggest a cautionary tale about substantive implications for using quantitative measures of ideas. Researchers typically portray consistent reasoning as important and as such tend to consider inconsistent and unconstrained belief systems to signal little competence among the public and a threat to the quality of democracy in a society (for example Althaus 1998). Similarly, inconsistency raises doubts about how unsophisticated individuals evaluate politics and policies.

But then again, for two reasons the story is not so straightforward. First, there are conflicting views about whether widespread ignorance is in fact a threat especially considering the impact of information on individuals' opinions. For some, ignorance matters and the goal should be to reduce the difference between well-informed and actual public opinion (for example Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002). For other scholars, and I agree, ignorance is not a threat because individuals develop political information processing devices (or 'cognitive shortcuts') including policy metaphors (Lau and Schlesinger 2005), brand names (Tomz and Sniderman 2005) and core values (Feldman 1988) to grope their way to political and policy preferences. Simply put, even poorly informed citizens use heuristic cues to evaluate political and policy issues, and form coherent political views (Bartels 1996; Lupia and McCubbins 2000). In the context of this study, this is a particularly important observation because African societies are considered 'low-information' societies (Conroy-Krutz and Lewis 2011; Mattes and Shenga 2007).

Second, focusing on attitudinal consistency implies paying attention to the link between responses to questions and the underlying organization of beliefs usually on

ideological grounds. Thus, the purported connection between attitudinal consistency and underlying ideological disposition ignores the potential for sophisticated, multidimensional belief structures (Carmines and Stimson 1982; Luttbeg 1968; Jackson and Marcus 1975). After all, people have core beliefs that are in conflict with one another (Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Feldman and Zaller 1992) and display idiosyncratic belief systems that do not necessarily fit into a predetermined ideological scale. Paradoxically unconstrained or minimal constrained opinions or beliefs may signify a ‘reflective’ public especially during periods of reforms like respondents for this study.⁵⁴ During periods of crisis new ideas challenge existing ideas (Blyth 2002, Legro 2000) meaning that people may be contemplating the advantages and disadvantages of both new and old ideas in ways that may result in inconsistent or unconstrained ideas.

The public may not be well informed but like Bratton, Mattes and Boadi (2005, 37) I resist the temptation that some Africans lack views on matters important to their own livelihoods. I too fully expect that Africans think about salient issues and have beliefs and ideas about the society. To address concerns about the public’s attitudes and ideas, I think what is important is to focus on how individuals organize their belief systems and their support for policy positions under different scenarios (Alvarez and Brehm 1995). In this case, rather than inconsistent attitudes or no constraint or low degree of constraint what individuals may lack is belief “tightness” based on some predetermined schema. Martin (2002, 861) describes belief tightness as the degree to which holding some belief implies

⁵⁴ Data collection for the survey data took place against a background of continuing political and economic reforms (including anti-corruption reforms).

holding or not holding other beliefs as beliefs in the same domain may be connected via webs of implications.

Though Martin focuses on belief tightness at the social group level, in this study I adapt the concept to individuals' belief systems based on a set of core values. I prefer to focus on belief tightness rather than belief constraint because belief tightness adopts a neutral language that takes away negative connotations that accompany discussions about low constraint belief systems. Second, unlike emphasis on constraint that implies paying attention to prediction (we should know what a person thinks about different issues from his/her ideological orientation) focusing on belief tightness emphasizes the structure of belief systems as more important than why attitudes/opinions should be interrelated.

Again, the public may not organize their ideas as well as some researchers would like but they do have thoughts and beliefs (especially using cognitive shortcuts) that they express in their responses to survey/poll questions. Moreover, by paying attention to individuals' idiosyncratic organization of ideas via the concept of belief tightness we can distinguish how individuals reason from their responses to survey questions. Generally, therefore, by paying careful attention to the survey instruments utilized, making a clear distinction between opinions and ideas, utilizing appropriate datasets, and focusing on belief tightness to address doubts about how people reason for themselves, I take into account concerns about using public opinion data to measure ideas. In addition, Bratton, Mattes, and Boadi's validity checks find that the Afrobarometer data I use in this study reflects the respondents' attitudes, opinions, and beliefs.

Data Source

I acknowledge that quantitatively measuring ideas will have its critics but I am certain that such an approach is suitable for this study. I therefore seek to develop a quantitative indicator of politico-economic ideas that can explain anti-corruption reform outcomes in Africa using public opinion data. Fortunately, the only existing set of comparable data for African countries, Afrobarometer survey series, is available and useful for such purposes. Afrobarometer is a cross-national public opinion survey that employs a standard questionnaire with equivalent terms across different African countries thus allowing for cross-national comparisons of politico-economic ideas and their impact on policy outcomes. Equally important, it includes causal, appropriate Likert-scale, and choice questions that I deem valuable to creating a measure of politico-economic ideas. As I mention in chapter 1, I focus on rounds 2-3 because some questions relevant to developing my indicator of politico-economic ideas are omitted in round 4 and round 1 covers few countries.

5.4 Measurement of Politico-Economic Ideas

Confident that it is appropriate to use Afrobarometer data to measure ideas in this section I discuss the measurement of politico-economic ideas. To operationalize politico-economic ideas I cannot claim to capture the libertarian and populist politico-economic ideas in full but I can identify indicators of the ideas with reasonable precision (for an overview of the structure of a politico-economic idea see Table 3). First, in relation to accountability, one concern in Africa is the lingering effects of strong presidents with insufficient limits on their powers on political and reform outcomes. Africans may be accustomed to living under powerful presidents and internalized norms leading to a

tendency against criticizing leaders as opposed to valuing individual rights with important implications for the reforms.

Table 3: Structure of Politico-economic Idea

Nature of Idea	Properties	Related Reform	Indicator
Philosophical	Ideas about authority and relationship with rulers	- Institutional Restraints	- President vs. Parliament making laws
		- Political Accountability	- Respect vs. Question Authority
Programmatic	Role of state in the society and economy	Public Sector management	Retrench civil servants
Philosophical		Competitive Private Sector	Individual vs. Government responsibility

For instance, the donor view emphasizes institutional checks and balances, and civil society participation to achieve horizontal and vertical accountability respectively. However, it is possible that when citizens have a deference view about authority, expressed through ideas about separation of power and criticizing leaders in authority that inhibits the expression of political dissent (Logan 2008, Bratton, Kibirige, and Sentamu 2010), such respect for authority is likely to limit civil society participation. This is

because passive acquiescent citizens are less likely to think that leaders are subject to consent of the governed. This in turn makes it difficult for civil society activists to draw a committed public to their side.

Hence, I utilize items to identify citizens' ideas about separation of powers/limitations on presidential power, and uncritical mentality towards authority to identify ideas about control of behavior (*political accountability*). With regard to horizontal accountability (checks and balances between government institutions), in Afrobarometer, respondents are asked the following question, "Which of the following statements is closest to your views? A- The members of parliament represent the people, therefore they should make laws of the country, even if the president does not agree. B- Since the president represents all of us, he should pass laws without worrying about what parliament thinks". The question, like all questions included here as indicators of politico-economic ideas, is rated on a 5 point scale from strongly agree with one option (A) to strongly agree with the opposite viewpoint (B) and includes options for somewhat agree with A or B. Those who differentially cede more power to the president are coded as populists, while respondents in favor of legislative powers are coded to reflect libertarian ideas.

Second, anti-corruption reforms also reflect vertical accountability that requires citizens to uphold values of an active democratic citizenship (leaders answerable to citizens). To identify peoples' views about active citizenship, Afrobarometer asks, "Which one of the following statements is closest to your view? A-As citizens we should be more active in questioning the actions of our leaders. B- In our country these days we should show more respect for our leaders." Responses to this question reflect varying

ideas about accountability via belief in critical citizens ranging from those in favor of respect towards authority (populist) to believing in a critical citizenry (libertarian).

Together both measures, accounting for both vertical and horizontal accountability, tap into ideas about control of political behavior in the society.

The second major feature of the donor-initiated anti-corruption reforms is the emphasis on a limited role of the state in society and economy. A critical component of which is whether citizens believe they are autonomous economic agents that reinforces the neo-liberal polity of market exchange and small government or dependent on the state as responsible for providing welfare. It is possible that a predisposition to seek the state as provider of welfare will influence citizens to reject, or at least be non-committal, to attempts at reducing the role of the state even if such reforms contribute to reducing corruption especially among rent seeking civil servants. Hence, the social and economic dimensions of a politico-economic idea relate to philosophical and programmatic ideas about the ideal scope of the state and desirability of neoliberal economic reform programs. In this regard, the third indicator of politico-economic ideas relates to views on the relationship between state, market, and society (*role of the state*).

A measure of ideas about the role of the state includes evaluating citizens' sense of individual responsibility for personal well being (for example Conroy-Krutz and Lewis 2011). In Afrobarometer, respondents choose the type of society they would like to have in their country between “people should take care of themselves and be responsible for their own success in life”, and “the government should bear the main responsibility for the well being of the people.” It is important to note that responses to this question do not necessarily relate to the neoliberal view of ‘government hands off people’s lives’. It may

simply revolve around whether or not people should receive handouts or assistance from the state. Nevertheless, equating individuality to liberal ideals, I assume that individuals who believe they are autonomous economic agents endorse libertarian values while those who strongly support state involvement favor populist values.

Beyond beliefs about the role of the state, the reforms require a commitment to neoliberal economic reforms. As I previously argue, identifying people's ideas also entails focusing on their support for policy positions under different scenarios. In the Afrobarometer survey, no questions probe people's views and commitment to ideals about management of the whole economy when they factor in the costs and benefits of the economic arrangements. However, the survey includes a good proxy that indirectly measures ideas and commitment to neoliberal economic reforms. Specifically I utilize a proxy that highlights public sector management reforms, a core part of the anti-corruption reforms and neoliberal economic reforms. Public sector reforms include reducing the size of the civil service through retrenchment and offering better remuneration packages to minimize incentives for civil servants to engage in corruption.

In Afrobarometer survey respondents are asked whether they favor or reject civil service retrenchment especially when they consider its costs on employment and the country's budget. Specifically, "which one of the following statements is closest to your view: A- All civil servants should keep their jobs, even if paying their salaries is costly to the country. B- The government cannot afford so many public employees and should lay some of them off. It is noteworthy that the expressed views about civil servants retrenchment may incorporate other considerations separate from ongoing economic reforms. For instance, a respondent may know a friend or relative who lost his/her civil

service job or someone they rely on for support. In addition, attitudes towards the government implementing the reforms rather than the reforms themselves may influence people's responses. Since I also pay attention to people's commitment to reforms, the above concerns challenge the respondents' commitment to civil service reforms in light of other considerations that may influence their ideas and commitment about the reforms. Those who support retrenchment at all costs are coded as endorsing libertarian values, while the opposite view signifies populist values.

Composite Variable

I create an index of politico-economic ideas by averaging the four above-mentioned indicators. The resulting single politico-economic index is a continuous variable that ranges from populist ideals to libertarian ideals. The variable reflects the multidimensionality and complexity of ideas; considers political, social, and economic dimensions; includes different goals of the anti-corruption reforms; and takes into account the concept of belief tightness. From the standpoint of belief tightness, I expect those Africans who uphold libertarian values to strongly favor separation of powers, freedom to criticize leaders, retrenchment of a bloated civil service, and believe in their own industry. On the other hand, I expect populists to believe in a state structure that controls much of their lives and accepts the state's decisions that do not necessarily reflect their will.

Before examining the distribution of politico-economic ideas among Africans, I first test the reliability of the politico-economic ideas index. Results of reliability and inter item analysis reveal poor results for the index: the indicators do not produce a reliable measure. The observed low reliability may be because people do not necessarily extract

views from a common pool as measured in the reliability tests. In addition, frequency distributions may be skewed to the polar positions leading to lower inter-item correlations. In this regard, I therefore conduct Factor Analysis to identify the dimensionality of the index and the main sources of variance underlying the indicators. Confirmatory factor analysis using principal component analysis shows two components accounting for 56% (both 2002 and 2005 data) of the variance.

Subsequently, analyzing the bivariate correlations between the indicators, I find that on one hand general orientations to a populist view of the government's role in the economy and society, and a libertarian view about political accountability on the other hand broadly underline most Africans' politico-economic ideas. These two orientations are weakly correlated implying a dualistic organization of the belief structure that is a politico-economic idea. Based on these results I speculate that low degrees of belief tightness characterize most of the respondents' belief structures. I do not think that this 'low tightness' is a concern with regard to the respondents' answers or a threat to how citizens evaluate politics and policies. In fact, far from being a weakness about how Africans evaluate policies and politics it actually is an opportunity for us to understand how such belief structures influence the anti-corruption reform process.

Although as DeCoster (2004) argues, low reliability only hurts chances of finding significant results; I opt to focus on the two dimensions of politico-economic ideas for the rest of the study. To reflect the dualistic nature of politico-economic ideas, I create two indices that identify the political and social-economic dimensions of a politico-economic idea, political accountability index and scope of state index, by averaging indicators of the political and social/economic dimensions respectively.

5.5 Distribution of Politico-Economic Ideas: Estimation Results

Having identified the content and measurement of politico-economic ideas, the next logical question is, ‘do citizens in African countries exhibit politico-economic ideas that may predispose them to legitimize anti-corruption reforms and set informal standards for political action that support the reforms’ goals’? I therefore turn my attention to the distribution of the political accountability index and scope of state index in the selected countries. As previously mentioned, I am mainly interested in finding out whether there is sufficient variation across countries to warrant investigating a role of ideas.

I therefore test whether the mean scores for each country are statistically different using an ANOVA test. The results show that there is a statistically significant effect at the $p < .05$ level for both political accountability ($f = 172.716$, $p = .000$ (2002 data); and $f = 97.533$, $p = .000$ (2005 data) and scope of state ($f = 51.983$, $p = .000$ (2002 data); and $f = 63.159$, $p = .000$ (2005 data)). The results therefore confirm that the mean values for the countries are statistically not the same or at least one mean is different from the rest. For instance, post hoc tests, specifically Tukey test, indicate that in 2002 the mean scores for nine of the 15 countries with regard to political accountability were statistically different from all other countries’ mean scores, and six countries’ scores were not statistically significant with one other country.

Figure 4 below shows the distribution of respondents’ values concerning political accountability and scope of state in each selected country. A glance at the graphs reveals that there is within-country variation: in none of the countries majority of the respondents cluster around a single point in both political accountability and scope of state indices.




Figure 4: Distribution of Responses for Political Accountability and Scope of State by Country (2002 Data)




Figure 4 Contd.

However, in some countries there is a higher level of societal consensus including Uganda, Kenya (political accountability), Nigeria, Tanzania and Mozambique (scope of state) in 2002. Overall, therefore, there is variation in the respondents' politico-economic ideas, as expressed in both political accountability and scope of state, both within and across the countries included in this study.

Paying close attention to the distribution of responses to each of the indicators of politico-economic ideas, we can identify the dualistic organization of politico-economic ideas among Africans. First, the results reveal that there is a strong though far from consensual expectation of accountability among most Africans. Concerning vertical accountability, there is fairly widespread support for the idea of a critical citizenry because 69% in 2002 and 66% in 2005 believe that citizens should question their leaders, with two in five (40%) saying they believe so very strongly (for both years). But cross country variations are sizeable (Figure 4).

Looking at Figure 5 below we can infer that Malawians show the greatest inclination to question their leaders: 65% (in 2005) and 68% (in 2002) stating that they strongly support questioning their leaders. Kenyans (55%) and Tanzanians (54%) (2005 data), and Ugandans (55%) and Zambians (52%) (2002 data) are not far behind. Conversely, in Namibia we see many citizens who are inclined towards deference to authority; over half the respondents state that they strongly or very strongly support respect for leaders (2002 data). Cape Verdeans too seem far more willing to refrain from being critical towards their leaders (65% in 2005).




Figure 5: Vertical Accountability

Strongly Agree, “As citizens we should be more active in questioning the action of our leaders” (2005 data)




Figure 6: Horizontal Accountability

Strongly Agree, “The members of parliament represent the people, therefore they should make laws of the country, even if the president does not agree” (2005 data)

The results for horizontal accountability show that there is also fairly widespread support in the core value of separation of power and limitations on presidential power: the median respondent believes that parliament rather than the president should make laws. Once again we see considerable cross-country variation (see Figure 6 above). Beninians (47%) and Ugandans (46%) are the most inclined to strongly believe in institutional checks, followed by Malawians (43%) and Tanzanians (41%). Compared to citizens in other African countries, we again see that fewer Namibians and Cape Verdeans strongly agree in separation of power. Interestingly a large percent of Malawians (34%) also prefer the president to make laws without reference to parliament. It is worth noting that unlike in other countries, most people in Malawi seem to hold views about institutional checks at both extremes.

Taken together, these results imply that on average the ideal of a critical citizenry and institutional limits on leaders infuses the public imagination and also that most respondents tend to support the underlying political ideals of the donor-initiated anti-corruption reforms, particularly in Uganda, Malawi and Tanzania. However, while these views are identical to donors' views, economic and social dimension indicators portray a lack of popular belief in market-based ideals. The data suggests that a considerable proportion of the respondents are not convinced on the idea of economic individualism that forms the basis of some reforms. The median respondent agrees that the government should bear the main responsibility for providing welfare and strongly disagrees with civil service retrenchment despite its costs on the government.

With regard to role of the state in society, the data indicates that there is an equal split between those who prefer individual responsibility and those inclined toward greater

government involvement (mean 2.9 in both 2002 and 2005). In 2005, 49% of the respondents believed that the government is responsible for people's well being while another 49% believed that individuals have a personal responsibility for their own well being (with generally similar patterns in 2002).




Figure 7: Role of the State

Strongly Agree, "the government should bear the main responsibility for the well being of the people" (2005 data)

Figure 7 above shows that in 2005, respondents in Lesotho and Uganda (both 48%), Malawi (44%), and Benin (43%) strongly favored the government bearing responsibility while those in Tanzania (50%) and Malawi (45%) strongly favored individual responsibility. In 2002, respondents in Uganda (40%), Malawi (36%), and Botswana (30%) strongly regarded the government as responsible while Malawians (42%), Basotho (37%), and Tanzanians (36%) were strongly favorable to believing in their own resources.

In both Uganda and Malawi the number of respondents strongly favoring the government not only remained the highest in the region but the number rose from 2002 to 2005.

Respondents in Lesotho too reported increasingly pro-government views.

As concerns civil service retrenchment, the respondents overwhelmingly favor retaining civil servants despite costs to the government (70% in both 2002 and 2005). Thus, there is widespread support for government involvement when people factor in the consequences of market-based economic reforms, especially in Benin, Lesotho, and Malawi where over 60 percent strongly oppose retrenchment (see Figure 8 below). In 2002, in Malawi (64%), Zambia, and Lesotho (50%) over half the respondents strongly oppose civil service retrenchments. It is worth noting that Tanzanians are the only exception with a quarter of the respondents strongly supporting retrenchment.




Figure 8: Civil Service Retrenchment

Strongly Agree, “all civil servants should keep their jobs, even if paying their salaries is costly to the country” (2005 data)

If we assume that individual responsibility is a core value for market oriented economic ideals, then when put to the test, even those Africans who believe in individual responsibility do not transfer that belief to economic reforms. One plausible interpretation of these results is that faced with negative consequences of reforms, most respondents envisage a centralized state rather than a market-oriented economy, particularly in Benin, Lesotho, and Malawi. Here we therefore see a marked reversal from the popular acceptance of the donors' political views. It is hardly surprising, then, that the donor community will struggle to initiate market-oriented reforms or the governments to receive wide support from the populace to pursue such reforms.⁵⁵

Overall, most respondents generally agree on libertarian-oriented political values but lean towards populist-oriented social/economic ideals. One interpretation of this state of affairs is that most people interviewed believe in an active state led by leaders accountable to the public though the degree of how active and how accountable differs within and across countries. This in turn has major implications on the effects of politico-economic ideas on anti-corruption reform outcomes. As I previously state, ideas are partly influential as a benchmark for political action and legitimating the reforms that guide citizens into coherent practices and social action. From the evidence shown here, there seems to be support for some aspects of the reforms but not others, and potential for collective action especially in societies with higher levels of societal consensus like Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Namibia, and Botswana.

⁵⁵ Recall I lamented about how neopatrimonial scholars tend to overlook alternative explanations on political leaders' actions other than self-interests. The lack of popular legitimating ideals for neoliberal reforms is a viable reason for political leaders (even in the idealized Western societies) to hesitate to implement such reforms.

One plausible reason for the observed low degree of belief tightness and variation in levels of societal consensus is that some Africans react rationally to changes in the society by accepting some ideas and not others. Africans may be engaged in selective embracing of governance values depending on different factors. Logically this leads to the question ‘what then influences variation in Africans’ ideas’?

5.6 Social Basis of Politico-Economic Idea

Two traditions, focused on sociality and individuality respectively, may explain Africans’ politico-economic ideas. The first tradition is the supposition that sociality especially socialization through elite-mass communication, cultural influences, position in the social structure, and historical developments influence Africans into favoring particular norms and values. This school of thought assumes that Africans’ ideas emanate from deeply embedded practices, norms, and values that especially promote communal values favoring group welfare. According to this view transmission of societal ideas takes place through stories and images (Hasty 2005), social practices (de Sardan 1999), social surroundings (LeBas 2010; Konold 2007) and elite meta-narratives (Opoku 2008) and practices (Booth et al 2005; Timamy 2005).

According to this strand of research among the influential variables that shape societal ideas are socio-demographic factors including age (Prazak 1999; Tessler, Konold and Reif 2004), location (Pereira, Davids and Mattes 2002), and gender (Prazak 1999, 108). Another set of influential variables include group identity especially members of ethnic groups who readily follow a communal narrative (Morrison 2007) and political party membership. Although Conroy-Krutz and Lewis (2011) do not find evidence to suggest find that party identification influences ideology in African countries, they

nevertheless find that incumbent party supporters are less likely to favor individual rights to question existing authority. Finally, many scholars focus on countries' distinctive legacies- colonial experiences, mode of governance, experimentation with different development strategies, varying cultural beliefs and practices- that influence societal ideas (for example Crutcher 1966; Timamy 2005).

In sharp contrast to the social and cultural explanations, another approach highlights individuality to demonstrate the impact of Africans' own assessments through cognitive abilities and access to information (Bratton, Mattes and Boadi 2005; Mattes and Bratton 2003, 2007), and appeals to alternative narratives about the state and society by CSOs and international organizations (Ohemeng 2005; Weaver and McGann 2000). This line of research predominately focuses on how Africans have reacted to political and economic reforms initiated in their countries since the early 1990s. For instance, in their groundbreaking work, Bratton, Mattes, and Boadi (2005) popularize a cognitive theory of adult learning to explain preferences and attitudes towards political and economic reforms among Africans. According to this strand of research, attitudes are constructed through cognitive engagement especially information from the media, everyday conversations, interest in public affairs and current events, and more importantly through education that provides individuals greater cognitive abilities (Bratton, Mattes, and Boadi 2005; Bratton 2010).⁵⁶

⁵⁶ We cannot beforehand determine the specific content of ideas that may result from these factors i.e. no apriori knowledge of the direction of relationship. Take the case of education. We do not know beforehand what an educated person thinks; we only know that education helps with reasoning capacity and the way one thinks. Thus to attribute particular ideas to educated people is premature without empirical evidence. Similarly, without knowledge of the message conveyed by media organizations, we cannot attribute certain ideas to the impact of media outlets.

Regardless of the reasoning, these two traditions are not necessarily competing. Sociality and individuality converge on each other and become twin concepts for understanding attitudinal formation in African societies. This is so because there are societal ideas but some people ponder, reflect, and change their ideas and values leading to heterogeneity of ideas within societies. I therefore expect that people develop their ideas through individual mental schemas and societal influences as they go through life.

To uncover the extent to which Africans' politico-economic ideas are a function of the identified factors, I employ multiple regression analyses to assess their relative impact. I therefore use accountability index and scope of state index (my dependent variables) to account for the factors' influence on the dualistic nature of politico-economic ideas. In the analysis, I also include country dummy variables to test for the extent to which country specific effects and other factors not controlled for predict politico-economic ideas.

It is also plausible that current political and economic experiences, like economic conditions, unemployment and the government's performance, give wide political resonance to condition various ideas. Similarly, poverty may influence ideas especially those ideas that link the state to provision of goods including private goods. This is because for the poor centrality of the state in the economy may be the only way to access goods such as education, health, water, housing, and energy. At the same time, we cannot deny that some people may overlook the effects of current conditions and therefore current living and societal conditions may not influence their politico-economic ideas. Table 4 (next page) shows measurement of the independent variables used in the regression models.

Table 4: Independent Variables

Variable	What measures	Measurement
<i>Social Structure</i>		
Age	How old were you at your last birthday	
Gender	Respondent's gender	1= male; 0= female
Location	Urban or rural	1= rural; 0= urban
Poverty	Composite variable that includes how often respondent or family have gone without food, water, medical care, cooking fuel and cash income	0= never; 1= just once or twice; 2= several times; 3= many times; 4= always
<i>Cognitive Awareness</i>		
Education	Highest level of education completed	0= no formal schooling; 1= informal schooling; 2= some primary schooling; 3= primary school completed; 4= some secondary/high school; 5= secondary/high school completed; 6= post-secondary qualifications not university; 7= some university/college; 8= university/college completed; 9= post graduate

Table 4 Contd.

Media exposure	Composite variable that includes how often respondent gets news from television, radio, and newspapers	0= never; 1= less than once a month; 2= a few times a month; 3= a few times a week; 4= everyday
Informal discussions	Respondent's assessment on how often he/she discusses politics with friends and neighbors	0= no, would never do this; 1= no, but would do if had the chance; 2= once or twice; 3= several times; 4= often
Interest in public affairs	Respondent's response to how interested he/she is to public affairs	0= not interested; 1= somewhat interested; 2= very interested
<i>Identity</i>		
Partisanship	Composite variable created from respondents identification with a political party and assessment of closeness to party	Recoded identified parties into -1= opposition; 1= ruling party. Then, multiplied with 1= not very close; 2= somewhat close; 3= very close
<i>Current Conditions</i>		
Economic conditions	Respondent's assessment of the country's present economic condition	1= very bad, 2= fairly bad, 3= neither good nor bad; 4= fairly good; 5= very good
Government Performance	Respondent's assessment of how the government is handling the economy	1= very badly; 2= fairly badly; 3= fairly well; 4= very well
Employment	Respondents response to having a job that pays cash income,	1= no job; 2= part time; 3= fulltime

If as speculated that people act rationally, we should find that cognitive factors have a significant effect even when we control for other influential factors. I however do not hypothesize the direction of relationship for the cognitive factors since I do not know the content of information accessed by the respondents.

Table 5: OLS Model

	Political Accountability Index		Scope of State Index	
	2002-03	2005-06	2002-03	2005-06
<i>Social Structure</i>				
Age	0.004			
Gender	-0.095	-0.145	-0.095	
Location		0.087	0.136	
Poverty	-0.032	0.048	-0.154	-0.147
<i>Cognitive Awareness</i>				
Education	0.098	0.11	0.04	0.050
Media exposure	0.021	0.023	0.011	0.037
Informal discussions	0.119	0.150	0.037	0.069
Interest in public affairs	0.166	0.060	-0.069	-0.039
<i>Identity</i>				
Partisanship	-0.011	-0.028	-0.019	
<i>Current Conditions</i>				
Economic conditions	-0.070	-0.051	0.035	0.061
Government Performance	-0.054	-0.046		

Table 5 Contd.

Employment		0.042		
Country				
Benin				-1.558
Botswana	-0.755	-0.722	-0.510	-1.045
Cape Verde	-0.731	-1.645	-0.474	-0.695
Ghana		-0.359	-0.870	-0.843
Lesotho	-0.216	-1.030	-0.223	-1.503
Kenya	0.35		-0.990	-0.938
Malawi		-0.943	-0.701	-0.635
Mali		-0.779	-0.244	-0.379
Madagascar		-1.102		-0.352
Mozambique		-0.832		-1.176
Namibia	-2.073	-1.798	-0.695	-1.121
Nigeria	-0.347	-0.733	-1.031	-1.039
South Africa	-0.559	-0.875	-0.188	-0.808
Senegal				-0.709
Uganda	0.690	-0.455	-1.036	-1.316
Zambia		-0.608	-0.779	-0.914
R sq.	0.123	0.089	0.045	0.064

Notes: All entries are significant at 0.05 level. Tanzania is the baseline country of comparison for country dummies. I performed diagnostics for multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, omitted variables bias, and simultaneity and found no issues that require attention.

Table 5 above presents the results of the OLS model for both 2002 and 2005.

Overall, the findings show signs and significance of cognitive awareness variables, fixed country effects, poverty, party identification, and gender are consistent in all the models.

The results indicate that cognitive awareness variables predictors of beliefs about

political accountability and role of state. The coefficients for these variables are significant and positive suggesting a strong effect of an individual's cognitive abilities and awareness on the ideas. Politically sophisticated individuals- citizens with higher levels of education (meaning greater cognitive abilities), exposed to media information, interested in politics, and engage in informal discussions about politics- appear to prefer libertarian-oriented politico-economic ideas. These results may suggest that Africans do not merely participate in cultural everyday action, as culturalists would like us to believe but go beyond cultural knowledge to critically assess the society especially given that in the data reported here, education is the main predictor of an individual's ideas on political accountability and role of state (standardized coefficients- not shown).

The significant effect of cognitive awareness factors also implies that people develop their ideas from the information they get from the media and in their informal discussions with other citizens especially among the politically active. This way, according to the coefficient sign, Africans are more likely to adopt libertarian-oriented politico-economic ideas. Interestingly, those who are politically active are likely to favor a bigger role for the state. Though scholars lament that the media in African countries is state controlled and underdeveloped which limits citizens' ability to monitor politicians' programmatic appeals (Keefer and Vlaicu 2008), such assertions tend to overlook the fact that people do not necessarily believe or accept information accessed through the media.

The empirical results also identify country specific effects as influential because all the country dummy variables achieve statistical significance (for 2005 data). One might reasonably argue that people rely on information cues including shared experiences shaped by the social world they inhabit (Konold 2007; LeBas 2010). Alternatively, it may

suggest that the legacies of the past weigh heavily on people's belief system. For instance, after independence most African leaders preached variants of African socialism by appealing to traditional culture and norms and pursuing socialist development policies that engrained an anti-capitalist sentiment in the region (Opoku 2008) and continue to be reflected in contemporary Africa (Booth et al 2005). In recent times, leaders have perpetuated these views through populist appeals.

The fact that cognitive awareness and country developments influence individuals' ideas augurs well for the explanatory model especially given that the respondents were interviewed during a period of ongoing political and economic reforms. It suggests that Africans engage in an evaluative cognitive process that pays attention to developments within their countries thus indicating rationality towards reforms. Reason is something that we live through and includes experience and culturally accepted knowledge but goes beyond them. Tanzania best exemplifies this point because socialist principles defined her politics since independence yet majority of her citizens now prefer libertarian-oriented values.

Nonetheless, the findings also indicate that people's economic and political position in the society has a bearing on their politico-economic ideas. Here, the significant effects of poverty and partisan support for the ruling party are especially noteworthy (though the relationship between partisanship and scope of state is not statistically significant in 2005). It is worth noting that even when we control for other factors both poverty and partisan support for the ruling party tend to influence the adoption of populist-oriented politico-economic ideas. Arguably, this signals an instrumental oriented thought process in which one's position in the society affects what he/she believes. The fact that the poor

are more likely to favor being dependent on the government suggests that they believe in a big government as a means of accessing their basic needs. Similarly, consistent with Conroy-Kurtz and Lewis' findings, I find that supporters of the ruling party are less likely to be supportive of political accountability. Presumably, they are more likely to angle for payoffs for their loyal support especially when we consider the finding that they are also more likely to support a bigger role for the government than non-partisans and opposition party supporters. At minimum, these results imply that partisan supporters of the ruling party and the poor are more likely to envisage a centralized state and deferential towards authority, especially the president.

Given traces of instrumental thinking among some respondents, it is hardly surprising then that those who positively evaluate current economic conditions are less likely to believe in political accountability and prefer a larger role for the state while those who favorably evaluate the government's performance are less likely to support political accountability. These findings suggest that those who perceive a positive outlook about the society are more willing to accept a state structure that controls much of their lives. Alternatively, these results may suggest that people reflect on current conditions as they ponder about their beliefs in ways that result in the observed low degrees of belief tightness.

Though the results are preliminary (the R square shows much remains to be explained) what may be happening is that Africans are searching for an 'alternative other' that is reflected in the low degrees of belief tightness and is not necessarily pegged on the liberal values championed by the donor community. Therefore, recent attempts to cast Africans' cognitive awareness as influential in the political process in African countries,

which I support, are a step in the right direction to explaining political and policy outcomes in the countries. As political liberalization opens political spaces, new ideas are likely to challenge old ideas even in the face of populist appeals by clientelistic leaders.

5.7 Conclusion

In the chapter, I argue that we can develop a quantified measure of politico-economic ideas using public opinion data by focusing on well-designed survey instruments, appropriate datasets, and paying attention to belief tightness rather than belief consistency. In doing so, I identified indicators using Afrobarometer series data to develop a measure for politico-economic ideas, which I conceive as a worldview (or belief system) organized around core values and beliefs.⁵⁷ The resulting index is not as reliable as desired, which I argue is a reflection of a dualistic organization of politico-economic worldviews.

Empirical analysis shows that many Africans think that leaders should be held accountable by questioning the leaders' actions and supporting institutional checks, and believe in an active state though there is within and across country variation. This may possibly be the result of people reacting to reforms and politics in their countries. It seems, as Bratton, Mattes and Boadi (2005) argue a sense of positionality has come to light as Africans rationally embrace different ideas rather than rely on deep socialization.

Based on some findings in this chapter, I further develop the explanatory model to include a more refined account about how ideas influence reform outcomes. First, as concerns legitimation, I find that the average respondent holds views that partially

⁵⁷ The core values also served as the predetermined schema to identify individuals' organization of their politico-economic ideas.

legitimize donor-initiated anti-corruption reforms. Thus, by including ideas about political accountability and scope of state separately as important components of ‘expectations’ I will address any potential partial legitimation effects of ideas. Second, I improve upon how ideas may influence reform outcomes. Here I have in mind the poor and partisan supporters of the ruling party who are likely to prefer politico-economic ideas that are incongruent to the underlying ideals of the reforms. Including these groups, especially partisan supporters, also entails focusing on the views of politically relevant groups in the society. It is important to include these views because after all, even dictators and authoritarian leaders would not invest resources to curb information and idea flows if ideas of such groups do not matter.

The empirical analysis clearly shows differences in Africans views about control of political behavior and role of government, which in turn affects the impact of ‘expectations’ in their countries, and by extension what political actors take into consideration as they proceed with anti-corruption reforms. If only for this reason, politico-economic ideas may have an important bearing on anti-corruption reform outcomes.

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CHAPTER 6. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

6.1 Introduction

Having identified the nature and distribution of politico-economic ideas in the selected African countries, I now turn my attention to an empirical analysis of the explanatory model described in chapter 4. To recap so far, in the study I have proposed an explanatory model that explains divergent anti-corruption reform outcomes among selected African countries. The model, designed as an alternative to the self-interest based neopatrimonial explanations, suggests that environmental considerations are central to explaining divergent anti-corruption reform outcomes in African countries.

First, I argue that the political economic structure ('real life' context) influences behavior related to anti-corruption. I suggest that through interactive rationality political actors take into consideration effects of structural features (including expectations, willingness, and ability) when deciding how to proceed with the reforms, and as part of the structure, politico-economic ideas (whether reforms- legitimating libertarian or populist) form an influential informal 'expectations' structure. In the previous chapter I further refined the role of 'expectations' to include the possibility of partial legitimation and impact of politically influential groups' collective politico-economic ideas as critical to explaining how 'expectations' influence reform outcomes. Second, that citizens' ideas influence the impact of the structure via their assessments of 'opportunities' and 'capacity'

features to create mutual expectations that political actors consider as they proceed in the reform process.

In this chapter I seek to empirically investigate whether this model is suitable or not for the specific purpose of explaining divergent anti-corruption reforms, and importantly whether politico-economic ideas are indeed influential. As I previously mention, my data analysis is influenced by the work of Clarke and Primo (2007). Clarke and Primo set out to debunk political scientists' overemphasis on using models to generate testable predictions for subsequent data analysis (or what they call hypothetico-deductivism). Models, according to Clarke and Primo (2007, 743), are neither true nor false rather "models in political science should be viewed as maps rather than statements, and we should be asking of our models whether they are similar enough to the world to be used for a specific purpose." They suggest that models are purpose-relative and therefore either suitable or not depending on their usefulness for the purposes intended, and not merely for the accuracy of their predictions.

Since my explanatory model serves as an alternative to neopatrimonialism explanations, the goal of data analysis is to assess its suitability for the specific purpose of explaining anti-corruption reform outcomes, and more specifically to account for the influence of politico-economic ideas as a structural feature. And its usefulness should be determined not only by its suitability but also whether it directs us to further explore structural effects (serves as a foundation for further exploration). The data analysis in this study therefore does not purport to prove whether the model is true or test whether empirical evidence confirms predictions derived from the literature. Rather, it serves as

an important way of telling us if the model is a statistically accurate description of why reform outcomes are different among the selected countries.

To do so I seek to find out whether the selected countries' levels of corruption reduced in a particular year (2002 and 2005) compared to the previous years (rather than trends) and whether these outcomes were influenced by differences in the countries' political economy structure and particularly the mediating effects of ideas. It is important to note that due to my research design and data limitations I do not test causal mechanisms, or test why for example ideas are influential. Rather I test the nature of relationships between the structural features and corruption control (reform outcomes). Hence, the results suggest rather than 'confirm the truth' about the implications of the structural features as theorized in chapter 4.

In the chapter, I begin with a discussion of the dependent and independent variables. Next, I present and discuss the results of the linear regression model, including the main finding that *ceteris paribus* the informal 'expectations' feature has a weak effect on anti-corruption reform outcomes. Regarding the other structural features I find that a country's 'capacity' has a strong and positive relationship with corruption control. 'Opportunities' too has an impact though different political and economic conditions have different effects on reform outcomes. In addition, I find that the meanings citizens attach to the structural features, via both societal confidence and economic assessments, are associated with corruption control. Finally, I discuss the implications of my findings.

6.2 Empirical Model

I begin the empirical analysis by estimating a structural model for anti-corruption reform outcomes in the selected countries. Because the obvious goal of anti-corruption

reforms is to reduce corruption in a country, I use a proxy measure of the extent to which government officials are prevented from using their positions to pursue petty, grand, or looting corruption in a country. Unfortunately, within the quantitative literature on corruption, “no ideal method for measuring corruption exists” (Kalnins 2005, 3). In particular given the nature of corruption- corruption is a complex phenomenon that cannot be observed empirically due to its clandestine nature and covers many practices and behavior- we can only develop more robust proxies and never true measures of corruption levels.

The most common approach of measuring corruption is perception indicators- determining the perceived level of corruption in a society through expert assessments and opinion surveys. Subjective assessments are popular over direct measurements of corruption because corruption rarely leaves a ‘paper trail’ and respondents are highly likely to underreport their involvement in corrupt transactions and practices. However in recent years a debate has emerged about the validity of the common perceptions based indicators, particularly Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and World Bank Institute’s Control of Corruption Index (CCI).

Some scholars question the validity of these measures (for example Andersson and Heywood 2009; Bardhan 1996; Chene 2008; June et al 2008; Kalnins 2005; Knack 2007; Soreide 2006; Thomas 2007) while students of corruption have responded to methodological concerns especially concerning systemic bias by arguing that the measures are highly correlated suggesting that they are measuring the same phenomenon (for example Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010; Xin and Rudel 2004; You and Khagram 2005). Since these indicators do not measure actual levels of corruption in a

country but rather perceptions of corruption and are composite measures, we are left with an imperfect estimate and therefore the results should be interpreted with a degree of caution. Until we develop better measures, the challenge for corruption students remains to identify measurement tools most appropriate for their study.

In this study I choose to use CCI for the following reasons. First, the measure adopts a similar definition of corruption to the one used in this study ('abuse of public power for private gain'). Second, the measure includes petty, grand, and looting types of corruption in both public and private sectors. Though critics of the measure argue that it does not demarcate between these types of corruption, this is not a major concern in this study because the reforms target all forms of corruption. Third, the measure focuses on outcome-based indicators that directly relate to my conceptualization of anti-corruption reform outcomes. Finally, as an aggregate indicator the index brings together information from various sources and therefore provides a more comprehensive picture of corruption in a country. In addition, as concerns over-time comparisons within and across countries, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010), authors of CCI, do not find systematic fluctuations in the data that limit meaningful cross-country and over time comparisons. This suggests that we can utilize the index for time-related comparisons albeit interpreting the results cautiously as the authors recommend.⁵⁸

The CCI is a standardized score with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one and the scores range from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher scores signifying better control of corruption in a country. The index takes into account up to 21 different data sources

⁵⁸ However, I do identify measurement error concerns about CCI, which suggests that we should treat the results cautiously.

including enterprise, citizen, and expert surveys as reported by international organizations, non-governmental organizations, commercial businesses, survey institutes, and public sector organizations. To measure my dependent variable I take into consideration the general lack of agreement of a duration baseline to assess progress or lack of progress of anti-corruption reforms (Chene 2008, 2).

Recall in chapter 3 I support Doig, Watt and Williams' view about corruption reduction in Ghana while opposing the neopatrimonialism scholars' view. I support the view that focuses on reducing corruption as a long term process (for example Chene 2008; June et al 2008; UN 2004; World Bank 2000) because anti-corruption reforms are an ongoing political process whereby effects of the reforms can take time before they are fully felt. Thus, I think of anti-corruption reforms as either succeeding or failing rather than a conclusive success or failure. As such, I focus on both longer-term reduction of corruption in a country as well as gains made in the short term, which we should take into account because however small, such gains are important.

I therefore take into consideration both long term and short term views about progress by estimating a continuous variable to represent anti-corruption reform outcomes. I create the continuous variable by taking the difference between a country's average CCI scores for the preceding two years and score for the year under review, and add the difference to the country's score. The score includes averages of the scores for the two preceding years to minimize the estimation inefficiency resulting from measurement error (see You and Khagram 2005). This measure takes into account both how well or poorly a country has performed over time and current levels of corruption

control (thus mitigating the problem of underestimating how well a country is currently performing if we concentrate on changes alone).

According to the CCI data, in six countries namely Botswana, Cape Verde, Mali, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia corruption control improved in both years. Four other countries- Lesotho, Ghana, Namibia, and South Africa- showed improvement in 2005 and not 2002, while in Kenya and Uganda corruption control reversed. Finally, the other countries- Benin, Malawi, Madagascar, Mozambique and Nigeria did not record any progress in controlling corruption.

Independent Variables

In order to test for structural effects, I include a number of measures to represent the ‘expectations’, ‘opportunities’, and ‘capacity’ components of the political economic structure discussed in chapter 4. Being primarily interested in identifying the role of politico-economic ideas, I include political accountability and role of state indices created in the previous chapter to represent ‘expectations’. In the empirical model, higher values of the indices indicate an orientation towards libertarian values. Libertarian values according to my explanatory model legitimate the underlying ideas guiding the reforms, and establish an informal benchmark of political action in conformity with the goals of the reforms.

The variables representing ‘opportunities’ capture prevailing political and economic conditions in the selected countries in 2002 and 2005 that may have influenced political actors’ willingness to facilitate or constrain anti-corruption reforms.⁵⁹ First, as concerns

⁵⁹ I exclude existing levels of corruption in a country from the empirical model. On one hand, it is theoretically important to include a variable that represents historical patterns of corruption in a country.

political timing I include a variable that takes into account a new regime or political events that potentially push corruption and anti-corruption to the national policy agenda and discourse. This includes whether a new government, especially one formed by a previous opposition party, has come into power within the past year or two, or other factors including constitutional reforms, public disclosure of a major corruption scandal, and appointment of a new anti-corruption czar. I use a dummy variable to indicate whether such conditions existed or not in the countries in both years (1= presence of conditions, 0= absence). Drawing from the Kenya and Ghana experiences, the presence of these factors has a positive influence on anti-corruption reform outcomes. I collect information from country studies including Freedom House Country Reports, US Department of State Country Reports, and Bertelsmann Foundation Country Reports.

Next, I include a variable representing regime stability. To estimate this factor, I have in mind the potential that current political events can destabilize the government (instability within the political regime) and not just in the form of outcomes but also threats like political wrangles in a weak coalition government. Thus the standard measures for political stability that specifically focus on outcomes like violent conflicts, coup d'état, wars and other forms of extra constitutional regime turnover (Arriola 2009; Londregan and Poole 1990; Ong'ayo 2008) are not applicable here.

Instead, I use the ruling party's parliamentary strength as a proxy variable because regimes are generally more stable when the ruling party has a majority in parliament to

This is because it is more difficult to fight corruption in countries experiencing systemic corruption (Doig, Watt, and Williams 2005b, Rothstein 2011; Shah and Huther 2002; Taylor 2006). On the other hand, including a variable for levels of corruption in the empirical model means dealing with problems of multicollinearity and endogeneity in the regression models. In the end, I think methodological concerns override the theoretical insights because of concerns about misspecification of the regression coefficients.

override opposition and democratically enact or oppose policies including the transformative anti-corruption reforms. To accommodate the view that electoral coalitions have become an increasingly popular feature in African countries but do not necessarily contribute to regime stability and may even have the opposite effect (Kapa 2008; Oyugi 2006; Resnick 2011), I use percent of seats in parliament for the president's party only to measure regime stability. I assume that higher percent of parliamentary seats represents a more stable regime and collect data from the African Elections Database. According to various scholars, reforms are more likely to succeed in countries with a stable political regime because leaders allow institutions to emerge and function when they are in a position of strength, can carry out the transformative interventions, and are more likely to take long term commitments required to implement the reforms (see Chapter 4).

With respect to economic conditions, the next variable representing 'opportunities', I use the government's fiscal balance (revenues and expenditure) as a proxy for prevailing economic conditions in a country. Here I follow Khan's argument that during economic downturns governments have fewer resources to maintain societal stability and may fear the risks associated with reforms. This is especially so because negative economic conditions may also fuel social discontent and heighten tensions in the society as people heap blame on the government for lack of access to tangible deliverables and thereby create uncertainties within the society. Accordingly, it's plausible that negative fiscal balances have a negative influence on corruption control. I collect data from the African Statistical Yearbook.

In the empirical model, I also control for ‘capacity’ features that focus on political actors’ ability to implement and enforce reforms. As I previously argue, rule of law is an important political institutional capacity that shapes anti-corruption reforms. Specifically that how people appreciate, use and understand the law is fundamental to the impact of political institutions on reform outcomes because it sets the parameters on the exercise of public power, and political resources available to political agents to engage in political action (including advancing the anti-corruption agenda). I am therefore interested in a measure that accommodates such a perspective. Here a few notes are in order since identifying rule of law is not straightforward because rule of law is another governance-related measure whose measurement attracts much debate (Skaaning 2010).

Academics, aid donors, and development practitioners identify different aspects of rule of law depending on whether they use a thin (minimalist) or thick (maximalist) definition (Albers 2011; Skaaning 2010). Thin definitions focus on enforcement of existing laws and limit to certain aspects of rule of law, while thick definitions emphasize content of the laws. Most measures of rule of law, though, tend to favor a minimalist definition because with a thin definition, it is easier to assign a clear and independent measure and it is of more practical and analytical use than a maximalist definition (Albers 2011; Skaaning 2010).

Because of these advantages, governance studies tend to use a thin definition of rule of law to develop measures that focus on the demand side (needs of the citizens). For instance, the World Bank Institute Rule of Law index measures the traditional law and order view by including crime rates, enforceability of contracts and fairness in judicial system. Logan and Mattes (2010) conceptualize a measure of rule of law to include trust

and corruption levels in key law enforcement institutions, degree to which these institutions victimize people, and extent to which government officials are subject to the law (however their measurement of rule of law is essentially a measure of corruption).

While the above measures of the concept focus on how the law is used, they overlook how people appreciate and understand the law in the society. In other words, what these measures lack is the substantive aspect of rule of law. In this regard, Dakolias (2006) correctly adds protection of citizens' aspirations to the list of core components of rule of law. I therefore favor a thick definition though I do not dwell on 'good' laws as maximalists usually do. Since my intention is to utilize rule of law to account for political resources, I agree with Carothers (2003) that how people appreciate and understand the law is equally as important as how the law is used.

Hence I create a three dimensional composite variable to measure rule of law using data from Afrobarometer. I use questions related to right of police, courts and tax agencies to require compliance (understand the law); whether constitution express the values and hopes of the people (appreciate the law); and extent to which people and government officials are subject to the law (use of the law).⁶⁰ I calculate the aggregate mean of citizens' assessments in each country to arrive at a score for the country with higher scores indicating more entrenched rule of law.

Conceptually, this composite variable enables me to measure how 'people understand, appreciate and use the law' without explicitly including corruption in the measure. Another important advantage of this measure is that it includes scenarios such as the ways existing institutions fail to reflect citizens' views and protect them, and their

⁶⁰ Reliability of the index is acceptable. Cronbach's Alpha .617 (2002 data) and .659 (2005 data)

tendency toward unproductive outcomes may bother people. I assume that where rule of law in a country reflects all these dimensions, political actors have the political resources to facilitate reforms, which the literature implies results in positive outcomes.

The other dimension of 'capacity' I include in the empirical model is economic capacity. As I previously mention, the anti-corruption literature contends that economic variables influence reform outcomes through their impact on state capacity (especially availability of financial and economic resources to support the reform agenda). Moreover, the literature implies that political actors in countries with higher levels of development are more likely to control corruption. I include a proxy measure for a country's wealth using natural logarithm of GDP per capita (in current US dollars) for the selected countries and collect data from the World Development Indicators.

In chapter 4 I also argue that the meanings citizens attach to structural features- how they interpret and judge political and economic conditions and their confidence in the governance institutions- strengthens or weakens the structural features' effects on reform outcomes. To shed light on the impact of individual level variables on the structural effects I include interaction terms for citizens' assessments of economic conditions (interpretations) and economic conditions, and institutional trust (societal confidence) and rule of law. I assume that these individual-level variables modify structural effects on corruption control, for instance the effects of rule of law on corruption control depend on citizens' trust levels.

First, I consider the mediating effects of institutional trust to reflect societal confidence. As I argue in chapter 4, societal confidence in institutions links agency to the impact of 'capacity' features on reform outcomes in a country. Because some studies

conceptualize institutional trust as a feature of rule of law, for example Mattes and Logan's study, I use an instrumental variable, social trust, to measure the impact of institutional trust. I use social trust because, according to Rothstein (2011), there is a correlation between social trust and institutional trust. Afrobarometer asks respondents 'would you say that most people can be trusted or you must be careful in dealing with people'. The responses reflect an evaluation of the moral standards in the society, and are coded as 0= you must be careful and 1= most people can be trusted.

Finally I include citizens' assessment of the prevailing economic conditions to test whether their views about the economic world around them influences how prevailing economic conditions affect anti-corruption reform outcomes. I create the variable using the following question from Afrobarometer 'how would you describe the present economic conditions of the country'. Responses range from 1= very bad to 5= very good. For both interaction terms, I create them using the centering method (center to the mean) to reduce multicollinearity.

Empirical Testing

I utilize multivariate regression to estimate the structural model. The empirical methodology employed in the study addresses some statistical concerns that potentially mis-specify the regression coefficients. First, I account for problems of mis-specification resulting from a non-constant error variance (heteroskedasticity) by utilizing heteroskedastic robust standard errors. Second, given the relatively small number of countries included in the study it is possible that the results maybe driven by a particular country. To account for this concern I estimate the empirical model excluding one country at a time (a jackknife analysis) and the results show no country drives the output.

Third, I address concerns about multicollinearity and endogeneity bias since there is a relationship between some of the measures (for example corruption and GDP per capita). Here the inter-related nature of the relationships between the various variables implies that signs of such endogeneity bias are difficult to establish. For instance, while some scholars argue that causation flows from corruption to low levels of economic income and growth (for example Gyimah-Brempong 2002; Hillman 2009; Kauffman and Kraay 2002), other scholars blame weak underlying economic conditions for the prevalence of high levels of corruption (for example Correani 2005; Ochonu 2008). Since endogeneity bias is not clear-cut in all relationships, I do not utilize instrumental variables.⁶¹ With regard to multicollinearity, I conducted bivariate correlations and found that the economic variables, government's fiscal balance and GDP per capita, correlate with the dependent variable control of corruption. However, diagnostics indicate that multicollinearity is not a problem in the regression model (tolerance is 0.7 and above for all variables).

I run two regressions for both 2002 and 2005, and the regression results are presented in Table 6.1 above. Model 1 reports the results for the regression model, and Model 2 reports the results after adding interaction effects into Model 1.

⁶¹ Since, as noted in chapter 1, analysts typically blame corruption for almost all political and economic ills in African countries, it is not surprising that scholars assume an endogeneity bias between corruption and various political and economic conditions. What is not clear though is whether corruption is actually a cause or effect, or even a symptom.

Table 6: Multivariate Model

	Model 1		Model 2	
	2002	2005	2002	2005
<i>Expectations</i>				
Political Accountability	0.012* (0.001)	0.027* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.0014)	0.027* (0.0016)
Scope of State	0.013* (0.0014)	0.0005 (0.001)	0.008* (0.0013)	0.002 (0.001)
<i>Opportunities</i>				
Political Timing	-0.529* (0.01)	0.248* (0.007)	-0.577* (0.014)	0.233* (0.007)
Regime Stability	-0.012*	0.008* (0.0003)	-0.011* (0.0002)	0.011* (0.002)
Government Revenue	0.0009* (5.49e-06)	-0.0005* (9.04e-7)	0.001* (5.63e-06)	-0.0001* (7.85e-07)
<i>Capacities</i>				
Rule of Law	0.367* (0.016)	0.185* (0.009)	0.007* (0.001)	0.118* (0.001)
Economic Development	3.207* (0.007)	1.673* (0.013)	3.292* (0.006)	1.651* (0.012)
<i>Interactions</i>				
Economic conditions assessment			-0.036* (0.002)	-0.037* (0.002)

Table 6 Contd.

Trust			0.013* (0.007)	0.024* (0.0007)
Economic conditions assessment* Government Revenue			-0.002* (2.49e-06)	-9.42e-06* (4.30e-07)
Rule of Law* Trust			0.126* (0.0002)	0.244* (0.0002)
R sq	0.454	0.543	0.457	0.544

NOTE: Dependent variable: Control of Corruption. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. All models are statistically significant at 0.001 level.

For my variables of interest, both measures of dimensions of politico-economic ideas, the results suggest that the informal ‘expectations’ structure has a weak effect on how political actors in the selected countries proceed with corruption control. The coefficient estimate for scope of state is positive and statistically significant for the 2002 data but does not achieve statistical significance for the 2005 data. Meanwhile, the coefficient for political accountability, as measured by people’s views about deference to authority- ideas about critical citizenry and balance of power, is positive and significant at 1% level in both 2002 and 2005. This may suggest that citizens’ partial support of the underlying ideals of the donor-initiated reforms, and popular expectation of political accountability is influential. However, the coefficient estimates show that these effects are weak. Hence, to answer the first part of my central question, the results suggest that succeeding or failing to reduce corruption levels in a country weakly depends on the

informal ideational structure that political actors collectively create in their minds in the form of ‘expectations’.

It could be that the independent effects of the ‘expectations’ structure are influenced by beliefs among certain groups within the society. Recall in chapter 5, I argue that ideas among politically relevant groups, in particular partisan supporters of the ruling party and the poor who are more prone to adopt populist politico-economic ideas, may influence the impact of ‘expectations’. However, I do not find sufficient evidence that the coefficient estimates for attitudes among the poor and partisan supporters have an effect on corruption control (negative relationship but not significant at the 5% level (results not shown)). If ‘who holds what ideas’ is not influential, then the weak effects may also have resulted from lack of agreement among citizens because as we saw in chapter 5, relative low levels of societal consensus characterize most of the selected countries. Malawi best exemplifies the agreement problem. In chapter 5, I find that Malawians’ views on political accountability tend to cluster on both extreme viewpoints hence, they lack societal consensus to coordinate their demands to their political leaders.

Alternatively, other features of the political economic structure neutralize the effects of ‘expectations’ on anti-corruption reforms. That is, political actors may emphasize the importance of other structural effects more than ‘expectations’ as they proceed with anti-corruption reforms. First, my explanatory model also posits that current political and economic conditions influence corruption control. The coefficient estimates of all variables representing ‘opportunities’ are significant at 1%. Interestingly, the directions of relationships differ between the two years for all variables. The coefficient estimate for

political timing, as measured by events that bring attention to corruption and anti-corruption in the national agenda, is negative in 2002, but positive in 2005.

It is possible that the effect of political timing on political actors depends on the nature of the political events. For instance, the appointment of a new anti-corruption czar (included in the variable) may not have the same impact on political actors' willingness to reform as the election of an opposition party into power. In this case, it is plausible that corrupt political actors may not feel the pressure to change their mutual expectations about fighting corruption in the society especially if they believe that the new anti-corruption czar will be weak, face daunting obstacles, or has political connections with corrupt ruling elite as in the case of Uganda among other countries (for example Robinson 2007).

Like timing, the coefficient estimates for parliamentary strength of the president's party, which is a proxy for regime stability, is negative in 2002 and positive in 2005. However, the regression coefficients indicate that this relationship is weak. On one hand, in 2002 political actors in countries with stronger ruling parties were associated with lower levels of corruption control. This finding is consistent with Haarhius and Torenlid (2006) who find similar results in Benin, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda. On the other hand, in 2005, political actors in more stable regimes were more likely to reverse their incentives and facilitate anti-corruption reforms (as is the case of Lesotho, Mozambique and Namibia).

Though some scholars contend that leaders allow institutions to function from a position of strength, the results suggest that even from weak positions, leaders can implement and sustain anti-corruption reforms (Kjaer reaches a similar conclusion in

relation to public sector reforms in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania). This contradictory nature of the influence of regime stability may explain its weak effects on corruption control. Plausibly, political actors do not highly emphasize regime stability relative to other considerations as they proceed with anti-corruption reforms.

Again, we see that the coefficients for prevailing economic conditions, as measured by the governments' fiscal balance, are positive in 2002 and negative in 2005. Based on my explanatory model, these results suggest that government struggles with fiscal deficits have different effects on political actors' willingness to fight corruption. Khan (2006) argues that when faced with a dwindling financial base, political actors will opt to defer reforms and maintain the imperative to sustain corruption as a non-budgetary resource transfer mechanism. However, I find that even when the financial base is stronger, political actors still defer reforms as in the case of Kenya where improved economic performance between 2003 and 2005 coincided with lower levels of corruption control. Hence, similar to regime stability, the impact of economic insecurities on how political actors proceed with anti-corruption reforms is not clear cut.

Taken together, the results for 'opportunities' suggest that existing political and economic conditions are not only influential, but the direction of relationship with corruption control is not clear. This is because independently political events, regime stability, and prevailing economic conditions have a positive relationship with corruption control in certain years and a negative relationship in other years. One important implication is that succeeding or failing to control corruption is likely to fluctuate depending on prevailing circumstances i.e. highly context-specific. This, in turn, suggests that it is unclear how political and economic insecurities influence political actors'

willingness as they proceed with anti-corruption reforms. Hence, for example, whereas some scholars argue that due to insecurities that undermine societal stability, political actors tend to take institutionalized shorter-term view of political commitments (Branch and Cheeseman 2008) that undermine the kinds of long term commitments required to fight corruption (Khan 2005, 2006), the effects of insecurities may flow on the opposite direction. Plausibly how insecurities affect the reforms partly depends on the meaning political actors, particularly citizens, attach to the prevailing political and economic conditions.

Whereas the ‘opportunities’ component of the political economic structure yields differing effects, state capacity has a strong and positive effect on corruption control. The coefficient estimates for both GDP per capita and rule of law are positive and significant at 1% in both years. This implies that increased state capacity is associated with better control of corruption. Since, according to my model, these variables represent a country’s ability to implement reforms, the results support Khan and Grindle’s observation that poorer governments lack the capacity to undertake many reforms and manage the conflicts that the reforms produce at the same time. Hence, it is plausible that political actors in higher political and economic resources-endowed countries like Botswana, Cape Verde, Namibia, and South Africa (where corruption control is higher than the other selected countries), are more likely to believe that the higher societal abilities will sustain the fight against corruption and subsequently take action to implement the reforms.

The empirical evidence presented so far can be summarized as follows: at the structural level ‘expectations’ weakly influence anti-corruption reform outcomes, ‘opportunities’ is influential but the direction of relationships is not clear cut, and

‘capacity’ has a strong and positive relationship with corruption control. Relating these findings to my model, we can deduce that prevailing political economic features influence how political actors proceed with anti-corruption reforms in their countries, and in turn explain the observed diverse reform outcomes. In chapter 4, I argued that how citizens understand the structural features too has an effect on reform outcomes. In this regard, Model 2 shows results for the regression models when I include the interaction terms for citizens’ assessments of prevailing economic conditions and government revenue, and rule of law and societal trust.

The coefficient estimate for both rule of law and social trust, and their interaction term are all positive and significant at 1% level. The coefficient estimate for the interaction variable shows that the effects of social trust on rule of law are ‘super additive’ (simultaneous fixed increases in both variables is more than the sum of the same variables separately). This implies that societal confidence adds to the positive effects of rule of law on corruption control. Intuitively, increased societal confidence forms mutual expectations that bolster anti-corruption agents’ efforts because they are more likely to believe in the government’s efforts to fight corruption and subsequently report corruption cases. This, in turn, influences political actors’ calculus on whether to proceed with reforms more likely believing that the reforms will succeed in reducing corruption. For instance, Ittner (2009) argues that where formal institutions reflect citizens’ views, are seen as functioning, and contribute to development in the society, the institutions enhance the effects of rule of law on corruption control. Citing the example of Botswana, he argues that Tswanas’ trust in the anti-corruption agency Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes (DCEC) facilitates Botswana’s good record in fighting corruption.

The coefficient for citizens' assessment of prevailing economic conditions reveals surprising results. Intuitively, we would expect citizens' negative assessment to have a negative impact because it would exacerbate uncertainties in the society resulting in further insecurities. However, the results show that all things equal, citizens' positive assessment of prevailing economic conditions is associated with lower levels of corruption control. The relationship is significant at the 1% level in both 2002 and 2005. As I earlier speculate, the effects of 'opportunities' partly depend on the meaning citizens attach to the 'opportunities' structure. When we add citizens' economic assessments, higher government revenues are associated with lower corruption control. Hence, higher government revenue negatively influences control of corruption via the interaction with citizens' assessments though the effects are weak. Plausibly, when citizens perceive fewer uncertainties in the society, political actors may become complacent with regard to anti-corruption reforms, or even deemphasize the importance of anti-corruption in the society.

Together, results for the individual level variables show that citizens influence the relationship between the political economic structure and corruption control through their assessment of the economy and societal confidence. Paradoxically, higher levels of societal confidence are associated with higher levels of corruption control while positive economic assessments are associated with lower levels of corruption control. These results suggest that the 'reality' citizens construct partly influences how political actors attend to anti-corruption reforms. Meaning that, as I previously argue, citizens in African countries define the influential environment even as the environment influences anti-corruption reform outcomes, and this way link agency to structural effects. Hence the

reforms are not only a structural issue, but also depend on citizens' cognitive ideas (ideas that tell them 'what is').

6.3 Discussion

In this study I partly set out to contribute to the PEA approach which I consider a valuable analytical framework for explaining anti-corruption reforms in African countries. Though PEA scholars are correct in focusing on the political economic environment, their turn to the neopatrimonialism paradigm for a theoretical foundation of their studies is limiting. PEA scholars are better off focusing on an alternative theoretical basis like the explanatory model developed in this study. The explanatory model is suitable for the purpose of explaining anti-corruption reform outcomes because the empirical results show that the model is similar to various empirical generalizations in the anti-corruption literature including neopatrimonialism critics like Kjaer and Taylor (reforms are context specific) and neopatrimonialism scholars like Khan (importance of state capacity- level of economic development). In addition, it is also suitable for the specific purpose of investigating the role of ideas (relative to other factors).

Furthermore, the empirical results support my main theoretical contentions that a country's political economic structure, including the ideational structure, is influential in accounting for anti-corruption reform outcomes. In addition, I find that citizens define the structure even as the structure influences reform outcomes (hence link agency to structure). As I previously mention, the empirical model results do not 'confirm' causal mechanisms but rather suggest implications of the structural features as theorized in chapter 4. Thus, the statistically significant relationships between the structural features and corruption control suggest that plausibly political actors take into consideration

complex political economic environments depending on the mix between variants of ‘expectations’, ‘opportunities’, and ‘capacity’ in their countries and that the ‘reality’ citizens create through their views, and the differences in these structural features explain divergent reform outcomes. That said, as Primo and Clarke argue, and I concur, a model not only seeks to provide a ‘map’ of observed reality but also makes other contributions to understanding the political world including providing insights that spur further modeling efforts.

The usefulness of my explanatory model and the subsequent data analysis stems not only from identifying the impact of the structural features, or confirming some insights in the prevailing literature but also from the additional insights especially- ‘expectations’ weak effects; unclear impact of political and economic conditions; and mediating effects of individual level variables- that spur further modeling efforts. This is especially important because the explanatory model is built on a different view of politics in African countries: interactive rationality based on the political economic environment rather than the self-interest driven neopatrimonialism explanations. Here I focus on two major implications: citizens’ indirect role in the reform process and the impact of the political economic context.

The first major insight is ‘expectations’ weak effects on anti-corruption reform outcomes. I think it is noteworthy that ‘expectations’ are somewhat influential because neopatrimonialism literature largely ignores the impact of citizens’ ideas due to perceived cynicism and elite dominance. As I speculate, ‘expectations’ weak effects may be due to partial legitimation, lack of societal consensus, or dominance of other structural features relative to ‘expectations’. Another plausible reason for the weak effects is that as citizens

in African countries experience living in more democratic societies, legitimating politico-economic ideas are evolving but yet to consolidate into a coherent standard of political action that influences political behavior in the societies.

Surprisingly, upon further probing of specific countries, I find that in better performing countries like Botswana, Cape Verde, and Namibia, citizens are on average more deferential towards authority than citizens in least performing countries like Kenya and Nigeria. In other words, whereas the legitimation argument suggests that in well performing societies the ‘expectations’ structure ought to lean towards libertarian pole, the opposite is also true. These observations imply that in countries with higher levels of corruption control, the ‘expectations’ structure must not be wholly congruent with the underlying ideals of the donor-initiated anti-corruption reforms. In other words, citizens in African countries do not have to adopt western values for the donor-initiated anti-corruption reforms to be successful.

Hence to answer the second part of my central question (how ideas are influential), I think Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston’s insights on patrimonialism provides a basis for further modeling. Recall they argue that how citizens understand their relationship with their leaders including how they give compliance and hold leaders accountable is important to understanding the nature of political authority in African countries (and by extension reform outcomes). It is plausible that for example in Botswana; expressing uncritical views towards authority may indicate a willingness to subsume to a group with an understanding that there is a mutually beneficial reciprocal relationship. Alternatively, deference to authority may also reflect trust towards the leaders because citizens in the better performing countries tend to on average express higher levels of societal

confidence than citizens in the other countries (data results not shown). In this case, citizens may defer to authority on the mutual expectation that the leaders will exercise authority to the benefit of the society.

In worse performing countries, including Kenya and Nigeria, it may be that people express critical views (less deference towards authority) in response to disappointments with their political leadership.⁶² (Citizens in these societies also tend to exhibit lower levels of societal confidence). As democracy, and the attendant view about importance of a critical citizenry, is promoted in the region these popular views may not necessarily translate into coherent expectations about how to hold leaders accountable or set an informal standard for political action as stipulated in my explanatory model. Hence, while it may be true that “Africa’s democratic experiments have helped foster a popular expectation of accountability and public awareness, at least, of how power might be exercised in the public interest, thereby laying the groundwork for a bona fide anti-corruption campaign” (Taylor 2006, 285), how citizens understand this expectation is equally important.

Plausibly, due to the absence of a coherent ‘expectations’ structure, political actors do not pay significant attention to societal expectation with regard to their actions related to anti-corruption reforms. In this case then, it is possible that through their politico-economic ideas citizens inadvertently collude with corrupt leaders and agents to frustrate anti-corruption reforms in their countries. Many studies assert that Africans morally disapprove and do not actively support corruption; instead they pragmatically embrace

⁶² Recall in the previous chapter I found that cognitive awareness and country experiences are the main predictors of citizens’ politico-economic ideas in the selected countries.

corruption as a reality of life in their societies and blame the system for engaging in corruption. The fact that citizens view corruption as morally wrong suggests openings for anti-corruption efforts to succeed. At the same time though, even as citizens blame the system for engaging in corruption, they partially create, through their 'expectations', the very system that they blame for perpetuating corruption.

The possibility that citizens may be, through their collective politico-economic ideas, unconsciously colluding with their leaders does not bode well for the anti-corruption reforms. However, the possibility that these views are evolving and the fact that there is a positive relationship between political accountability and anti-corruption reform outcomes offers a glimpse of hope that 'expectations' structure can have a stronger influence on positive on the reforms.

The second major insight that spurs further modeling on explaining anti-corruption reform outcomes in African countries is the observation that anti-corruption reform outcomes are likely to fluctuate depending on prevailing political and economic circumstances. In this regard, neopatrimonialism critics like Kjaer and Taylor are correct in asserting that institutional reform outcomes, including anti-corruption reforms, vary depending on the context within which political actors attend to the reforms. In particular, the empirical results show that the 'opportunities' structure is influential though through their independent effects, the component political and economic conditions appear to create a complex environment for attending to anti-corruption reforms.

This is because some aspects of the 'opportunities' structure have a positive relationship with corruption control while at the same time other aspects have a negative relationship. In addition, the political and economic conditions have a positive effect in a

given year and negative effect in another year. This means that corruption control seems to be partly determined by the nature of the political economic environment in a country at a given time and therefore by extension susceptible to short term conditions. In my view the differing relationships and time-related influences suggest that political actors in African countries must contend with a complex political economic environment that sends different signals to the actors as they proceed with the reforms in their respective countries.

Recall that in the explanatory model I treat immediate surroundings as critical to political actors' calculus, especially willingness to undertake reforms. In addition, I also argue that the environment influences how political actors engage in the political process including in ways not consistent with neopatrimonialism scholars' assertions. Exploring how political actors try to make sense of the complex environment potentially provides a more refined understanding about anti-corruption reform process in African countries. If we strip African countries of the neopatrimonialism label, we can theorize on political actors' reactions to the environment without confining ourselves to material self interest. In this case, Kurt Weyland (2008) provides a helpful review of insights from cognitive psychological explanations of human behavior and risk taking to explain institutional change that can be explored to improve our explanation of divergent anti-corruption reform outcomes in African countries.

Citing prospect theory, Weyland notes that due to loss aversion people are willing to risk the unknown to avoid known risks to the point they are willing to keep to the current path despite rising problems in the society. On the other hand, people proceed with caution when facing positive prospects or mixed domains offering both benefits and costs.

This implies that political actors do not always choose to exploit failure in the system because of perceived risks. That is, due to caution people are only willing to make limited efforts at improvement for long periods before they overshoot to make radical changes (risk the unknown) when problems get out of hand (Weyland 2008, 287).

Anti-corruption reform is a mixed domain that offers both benefits and costs to various political actors in the society, and furthermore as Lawson (2009) argues have unintended consequences. It is plausible that as political actors decide on how to proceed with anti-corruption reforms in their countries they take into consideration environmental concerns (lower order information) that inform their assessment of the risks associated with reforms and the losses and benefits. Based on prospect theory we can reasonably expect political actors to move cautiously and avoid known risks by at best implementing incremental anti-corruption changes. The empirical results show that the nature of the effect of prevailing political and economic conditions is not clear cut- whether political events that amplify the need for anti-corruption or not, the regime is stable or not, and government fiscal balances are positive or not does not tell us exactly how corruption control plays out . Plausibly, since these conditions arguably reflect the objective reality in a country, their impact on reforms is related to the third insight gleaned from the empirical model- the impact of individual level factor. In other words, the objective reality has an impact on reform outcomes through subjective assessments of the reality.

The third major insight is that individual level factors, societal confidence and assessments of prevailing economic conditions which connect agency to structure, are influential in accounting for corruption control. The results however show differing relationships: higher levels of societal confidence are associated with higher levels of

corruption control while positive economic assessments have a negative association with corruption control. Extrapolating from these results, I suggest that whether political actors move cautiously towards reforms (incremental changes) or keep the current path (corruption) may depend on citizens' interpretations of current conditions and societal confidence reinforced by state capacity respectively.

Positive assessments of current economic conditions may influence political actors to keep the current path. This can be seen by the fact that where citizens have a positive assessment on economic conditions, corruption control is less likely though the effect is weak. Hence, when facing positive economic prospects strong loss aversion makes people run risks. Plausibly, a positive interpretation may provide political actors with an incentive to be willing to risk the unknown by keeping to current path, and subsequently less willing to reform. And where the current path is corruption, political actors will move cautiously to reform and expect others to remain corrupt hence corruption will continue unabated.

Positive societal confidence, on the other hand, influences political actors to move cautiously and adopt incremental changes. Considering, as Koene (2006) argues, societal confidence is the difference between what citizens expect and institutional goals, higher levels of societal confidence indicate a closer match between expectations and institutional goals. In this case when faced with expected positive reform gains political actors will tend to proceed with caution since losses weigh more heavily on political actors than gains (Weyland 2008, 287). It is plausible that where expected gains, due to societal confidence, are reinforced by higher state capacity to implement the reforms (meaning political actors have the ability to move forward with reforms), political actors

are likely to be more willing to take risks. Put this way, Khan is correct in emphasizing higher levels of economic development as the most sustainable means of reducing corruption in African countries. Hence, depending on how citizens' assessments of the political economic structure inform political actors' risk assessment, citizens play a decisive role in accounting for how the structural features impact anti-corruption reform outcomes.

Overall, the insights gleaned from the empirical results and the discussion above suggests that citizens in the African countries have an important role in the fight against corruption via their impact on the influential structural features. Broadly speaking, citizens are influential through the 'expectations' structure (especially how citizens understand their relationship with their leaders) and what they think about the society (influence risk assessment among political actors) that connects agency to structure. Hence, anti-corruption scholars should pay more attention on citizens' indirect role when explaining anti-corruption reform outcomes. In addition, the results also lead to further modeling on why anti-corruption reforms have played out differently in the selected African countries. In this case I have suggested that exploring emerging politico-economic ideas among citizens, factoring in political actors' risk assessment, and paying closer attention to the role of citizens particularly how they influence structural effects potentially leads to a more refined explanation of the divergent anti-corruption reform outcomes.

Though useful, the explanatory model requires further modeling efforts because it is also dissimilar to reality (does not fully reflect the reality of politics in African countries). This is particularly because it overlooks the impact of key factors like existing corruption

in a society on reform outcomes. In addition, while PEA scholars focus on the interplay between institutional reforms, political power and institutional structures, the explanatory model does not explicitly incorporate political power. (Though a case can be made that political power is included in the rule of law measure, such a measure ignores raw politics- how power is used and distributed in the society). The model also overlooks patron-client relationships that are deemed critical to politics in the region.

In addition, the model focuses on independent effects of the structural features yet these features are not mutually exclusive: the structural features interact with each other to form the political economy in each particular country. Thus, future research should focus on how these features interact to form the complex environment that shapes political actors' thoughts and actions with regard to anti-corruption. Rather than diminish the explanatory power of the model, these limitations highlight the need for further development and elaboration because given the complexity of anti-corruption reforms the model is necessarily incomplete. As I previously note in Chapter 5, the explanatory model should be viewed as a foundation for future organized and detailed investigations into factors that influence anti-corruption reforms in African countries.

6.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I set out to empirically determine the explanatory model described in chapter 4 by estimating multivariate regression models. This allowed me to establish a) whether politico-economic ideas are a significant determinant of anticorruption reform outcomes, and b) whether the explanatory model explains a substantial proportion of the country-level variance. However instead of adopting the conventional hypothesis testing method of inquiry, I adopted Clarke and Primo's view on testing theoretical models in

political science. Obviously the empirical testing does not tell us whether or not ‘opportunities’ and ‘capacity’ influence whether political actors ‘will or will not’ and ‘can or cannot’ act against corruption as stipulated in the explanatory model proposed in chapter4. Such assertions are simply borne of logical necessity from the explanatory model. The empirical results however show that these structural features, including the informal ideational structure (‘expectations’) are statistically associated with levels of corruption control in the selected countries (anti-corruption reform outcomes).

Hence, based on the empirical results I suggest that we can improve our explanations about anti-corruption reform outcomes in African countries by paying attention to the prevailing political economic structure, particularly ‘expectations’, ‘opportunities’, and ‘capacity’. I suggest that political actors in African countries attend to anti-corruption reforms in complex political economic structures, and within these structures individual factors condition the impact of formal structural features meaning that people define the influential political economic structure even as the structure constrains their behavior. Quite possibly, pressure for change can likely come from changing structural features, including changing ideational basis.

Though necessarily incomplete, my explanatory model provides a better basis for explaining anti-corruption reform outcomes in African countries than neopatrimonialism paradigm mainly because it avoids the paradigm’s deterministic conception of politics in the region while offering an alternative view of politics in the region. The model is advantageous because rather than limit to self-interest it includes the ‘real life’ context within which the reforms are implemented that boundedly rational actors take into

consideration in their decision making (and by extension influence their behavior to facilitate or constrain anti-corruption reforms).

By adopting the possibility of a different view of politics in the region like this study, scholars can utilize insights from comparative studies of other regions of the world to understand the political process in African countries. For example, I utilize Weyland's theory of institutional changes to further explore more precisely how the context influences reform outcomes (Pitcher, Moran and Johnston argue that by relying on neopatrimonialism to understand politics in Africa, scholars overlook theoretical insights gleaned from other regions of the world).

Finally with regard to the role of citizens and ideas, the fact that variation in 'expectations' is related with divergent reform outcomes illustrates a side of African politics often ignored. Though I find that politico-economic ideas as a structural feature have a relatively weak relationship with anti-corruption reform outcomes, I think it remains important that citizens are attitudinally predisposed towards creating a contextual feature that is conducive or not for anti-corruption reforms in their countries. Furthermore, depending on the subjective reality they create, citizens are influential in the reform process. Consequently, a key challenge for anti-corruption reformists is to find ways to mobilize citizens to form an influential 'expectations' structure. In the next chapter, I propose how social entrepreneurs may embark on such an endeavor.

CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION

7.1 Introduction

The fact that donor-initiated anti-corruption reforms have had varied outcomes in African countries suggests it is an important and puzzling issue worth explaining. In this study, I have sought to advance an explanatory model that addresses this puzzle in selected African nations by pointing out the pivotal role of ideas. To the best of my knowledge, this study offers the first comprehensive cross-national statistical study of the effects of ideas on anti-corruption reform outcomes in African countries. The results of this study, I think, help to provide an improved basis for explaining why despite implementing similar donor-initiated anti-corruption reforms some countries have performed better than other countries.

Through donor-initiated anti-corruption reforms, most African countries have put in place the legal and institutional framework that fully implemented and enforced can pave the way for successfully reducing corruption in the countries. However, as Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell (2010, 3) correctly note, researchers now agree that an implementation problem characterizes anti-corruption reforms in the region. Subsequently, the implementation and enforcement of donor-initiated anti-corruption reforms has generated much debate especially with regard to how the reforms' underlying

logics fit to the realities of African politics. The dominance of the neopatrimonial understanding of African politics largely shapes this debate even to the extent of influencing development scholars' turn to PEA approach, which I argue is counterproductive. Therefore this study is set up against a background of existing neopatrimonialism explanations.

Neopatrimonialism scholars are correct in their endeavors to argue that the realities of African countries do not exactly fit a state and market logic derived from western experience as envisioned in the anti-corruption reforms. However, these scholars' primary attention on instrumentality, material self-interest and political survival at all costs makes their perspective warped and limit's their explanations to focusing on reform failures rather than accounting for reform variations as exemplified in the Kenyan and Ghanaian cases in Chapter 3.

Neopatrimonialism paradigm has thrived mainly because it influences attitudes and beliefs about politics in African countries. This paradigm generally appeals to scholars who believe that 'personalized and clientelistic' African states need to be transformed to be like western states, which supposedly epitomize the legal-rational Weberian state. These discursive constructs about the region in turn solidify negative connotations about the region, especially how self-serving leaders and a pre-modern culture consistently block African nations' march towards modernity (meaning like Western states). "Such arguments not only condemn those societies for failing to live up to idealized visions of life idealized in developed states and markets- visions rarely, if ever, realized anywhere- but also imply that something fundamental in African society prevents them from ever doing so" (Pitcher, Moran and Johnston 2009, 127).

Rather than focus on neopatrimonialism, I have argued and shown that we can develop an alternative theoretical model to explain divergent anti-corruption reform outcomes in African countries. In this regard, I utilized the Political Economic Analysis perspective as my analytical framework and expanded the theoretical basis of existing explanations by investigating the role of politico-economic ideas. To do so I adopted a comparative approach that allowed me to bring together and make sense of the various influential factors identified in the anti-corruption literature. I grouped the factors into three organizing concepts namely ‘expectations’, ‘opportunities’, and ‘capacity’ and reformulated the first one to encompass politico-economic ideas. In doing so I placed ideas as central to explanations about anti-corruption reform outcomes and sought to answer the question ‘do politico-economic ideas among Africans influence reform outcomes and how?’

The basis of the explanatory model I developed in Chapter 4 signals reducing corruption as the product of political actors’ thinking and the political economic environment within which they operate including how political actors also perceive the environment. The model, partly based on interactive rationality, assumes that political actors take into consideration environmental factors (as lower order information) as they attend to anti-corruption reforms in their societies: the environment not only conditions political agents’ willingness but also influences their ability to institute and sustain successful reforms. As part of the environment, what people think serves as an informal structural feature. By constructing an explanatory model that includes ideas as both a structural feature and micro-level variable, I provide a distinctive explanation to the existing neopatrimonial depiction of politics in the region.

Of course, instrumentality and self-interests influence political action, but what political actors believe is equally important as what they want. Moreover, the basis of what political actors believe, as I argued, is their core values rather than ‘neopatrimonial incentives’. As implicitly emphasized by scholars like Pitcher (2004), Pitcher, Moran and Johnston (2009), Kjaer (2004), and Taylor (2006), abandoning instrumental views about African politics yields better explanations about politics and institutional reforms in African countries. Whether cognitive ideas influence anti-corruption reforms is an open question because of lack of studies in the anti-corruption in Africa literature that empirically address the issue.

Given the paucity of formal ideational studies, to answer the question whether ideas matter I began with a formal comparative study of politico-economic ideas among Africans. I made a case for quantitatively measuring ideas in Chapter 5 by noting that we can use appropriate survey instruments and data, distinguish between ideas and opinions, and focus on belief tightness. Viewing politico-economic ideas as a worldview based on core values, I developed an index of politico-economic ideas using public opinion data from the Afrobarometer series. The empirical evidence suggests low belief tightness characterizes Africans’ politico-economic ideas- a dualistic organization that includes political accountability and role of state dimensions. I subsequently developed indices for both dimensions that, as I argued, are appropriate for the study.

The statistical tests in Chapter 5 provided some useful insights into how Africans think about their societies and variation of thoughts within and across the selected countries. I found that there is a lack of overwhelming societal consensus in people’s ideas, which plausibly affects how Africans react to anti-corruption reforms. Further

statistical analyses indicated that cognitive awareness, unique country experiences, and individuals' economic and political position in society (poverty and partisan support for the ruling party respectively) influence Africans' politico-economic ideas. These results offered a basis for investigating the role of ideas, and suggest that contrary to popular depictions; neither cultural embeddedness nor limitations to instrumentality define Africans ideational positions. In fact, Africans engage in an evaluative cognitive process reflected in the low belief tightness that characterizes their politico-economic ideas.

I discuss the operationalization of the dependent and independent variables in detail in Chapter 6. As concerns testing the explanatory model, the study adopts a different view from the conventional hypothesis testing. Drawing from Clarke and Primo's work I focus on testing whether the explanatory model reflects reality and is suitable for the purpose of explaining anti-corruption reforms rather than testing whether predictions derived from the explanatory model are true or false. Hence, data analysis in this study tests whether the model is statistically accurate in explaining divergent anti-corruption reform outcomes, measured by level of corruption control, in the selected African countries.

Some of the empirical findings in the study, including the impact of levels of economic development and the generalization that institutional reforms are context specific, support empirical generalizations about anti-corruption reforms in the region. This implies that the explanatory model reflects reality and is suitable for the purpose of explaining anti-corruption reform outcomes among African countries. In addition, since my explanatory model serves as an alternative to neopatrimonialism explanations I argue that the usefulness of the explanatory model is supported by the fact that insights from

the empirical analysis directs us to further explore structural effects. Simply put, the model serves as a foundation for further exploration about reform outcomes.

7.2 Summary of Findings

The three major findings in this study relate to the role of ideas and the prevailing environment in explaining divergent anti-corruption reform outcomes among the selected African countries. First, I find that citizens' politico-economic ideas, as 'expectations' are indeed influential though their impact is weak relative to other structural features. That is, citizens through their understanding of their relationship with their leaders, especially deference to authority, create a contextual feature that influences reform outcomes (levels of corruption control).

Second, I find that in African countries, anti-corruption reform outcomes are context specific. That is, a complex political economic context including the reality that citizens create in their minds and the reality created by environmental possibilities and institutional constraints in a country underpins the anti-corruption reforms and partly determines outcomes. I also find that it does not matter whether political and economic conditions are ideal or not, their relationship with corruption control is either positive or negative in different years. On the other hand, state capacity, as reflected through higher levels of economic development and rule of law, has a strong and positive relationship with corruption control.

Finally I find that how citizens view their society, as expressed through their assessments of the economic conditions and societal confidence, influences how the structural features impact corruption control. Higher levels of societal confidence are related with higher levels of corruption control (positive anti-corruption reform outcomes)

while more positive assessments of the economic conditions are associated with lower levels of corruption control.

What implications for explaining anti-corruption reform outcomes can be derived from these findings? Since this study is an attempt that theoretical model building, the empirical results ideally serve as a basis for further elaboration and development of the model. One avenue for future development is uncovering how political actors factor in beliefs about the environment into their decision-making about anti-corruption reforms in their countries. In this case, paying particular attention to political actors' risk assessment as they proceed with institutional reforms (derived from the cognitive psychological basis of Weyland's theory of institution reforms) is a valuable direction to explore.

Interestingly, extrapolating from the results I suggest that subjective rather than objective reality matters in accounting for divergent outcomes. Much remains to be done in terms of theoretical development, and as I previously state the explanatory model should be viewed as a beginning for future ideational studies.

7.3 Theoretical Contributions

The study makes several important theoretical contributions including raising different research questions, challenging the fundamental basis of the neopatrimonialism paradigm by highlighting a role for ideas, implicitly disaggregating the effects of ideas to explain the impact of cultural factors, and proposing an alternative theoretical basis for PEA studies. First, the study shows that scholars of anti-corruption reforms in Africa can avoid deterministic explanations by asking more insightful research questions. In particular, the starting point for studying anti-corruption reforms should focus on 'why anti-corruption reforms are succeeding in some African countries and failing to reduce

corruption in other countries despite these countries implementing similar reforms' instead of 'why anti-corruption reforms fail to reduce corruption in African countries.' This question guides researchers to explain both successes and failures and in the process gain additional insights into the anti-corruption reform process. By doing so, researchers essentially take the first step towards avoiding to engage in the kind of deterministic explanations that characterize neopatrimonialism explanations.

Second, the study contributes to the anti-corruption literature by challenging the fundamental basis of neopatrimonialism paradigm while concurrently contributing to the emerging literature critical of the paradigm. In this regard, the study provides empirical support for the emerging view that casts Africans as cognitively engaged in the political process. Thus contributing to the literature critical to neopatrimonialism paradigm I argue that the ideational context shapes politics in African countries and partly accounts for different political and policy processes among African countries.

Third, the study's theoretical attention to the role of cognitive ideas offers a new way to confront problems of broad cultural shifts. Cultural studies typically focus on a monolithic national culture to identify cultural influences on corruption and anti-corruption. In particular, these studies typically contend that certain cultural profiles, precisely a particularistic culture, are not conducive to good governance (Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz 2003; Mungiu-Pippidi 2006). As Rothstein (2011, 238) notes, "the implication is that to effectively curb corruption and establish 'good governance', the whole political culture has to move from a particularistic equilibrium to a very different equilibrium characterized by 'impersonal' and/or 'universal' forms of exchange." The problem with such views is that they depict reforms as a daunting task that requires a

radical transformation of the society and lead to pessimistic views about chances of reducing corruption especially where external agencies institute the reforms (for example Medard 2002; Lough 2008).

What such studies overlook is that people's ideas within a society vary. As this study implies, by disaggregating ideas to the individual level and focusing on individuals' belief structures rather than culturally embedded action we can better explain how cultural factors influence the fight against corruption. To rephrase Chwiero (2007, 8), "ideas- whether they are shared or not- ultimately reside in individual minds and thus cultural inferences should begin there." Hence, the answer to social transformations (and by extension how societies move from high to low corruption) lies in the plurality of citizens' ideas and belief structures. In the case of African countries, scholars can particularly heed Harrison's (2006) call to pay closer attention to how Africans assimilate western notions of anti-corruption because as we saw in Chapter 4, Africans have reacted to reforms in their countries by adopting varied politico-economic ideas about their ideal societies.

In addition to contributions to the anti-corruption literature, this study contributes to the PEA approach. PEA scholars strive to identify the conditions under which change is likely to occur by focusing on political and economic factors and institutions. Rather than focusing on ideal conditions to implement and enforce anti-corruption reforms; it is more insightful to focus on how political actors take into consideration the various structural features as they attend to institutional reforms via the concept of interactive rationality. Hence, not only does the study suggest an alternative theoretical basis for PEA studies,

but also highlights an alternative approach to examining how political and economic factors and institutions impact institutional change.

7.4 Policy Implications: Fighting Corruption in African Countries

In addition to the theoretical contributions, the study also contributes practical policy recommendations on how political actors in African countries can potentially succeed in the fight against corruption. As I argue, the possibility that citizens' politico-economic ideas are evolving and the fact that there is a positive relationship between political accountability and anti-corruption reform outcomes offers a glimpse of hope that citizens can have a positive influence on anti-corruption reforms. This, in my view, entails social entrepreneurs including CSOs, media, and anti-corruption agents engaging in a social engineering program based on creating an 'expectations' structure that at the minimum compels political leaders and bureaucrats to behave in productive ways with regard to governance (and not focusing exclusively on corruption). In the program, the social entrepreneurs should focus on influencing citizens to support some underlying values of the anti-corruption reforms because after all, the 'expectations' structure is open to the imagination and creativity of political actors.

For various reasons, there is an environment for such an enterprise in the selected countries. First, the study indicates that Africans are neither culturally embedded nor limited to instrumentality but rather engage in cognitive reflections of their societies. Second, the empirical results in Chapter5 show that low levels of belief tightness characterize most Africans politico-economic ideas. This is an important observation because Martin (2002) argues that the tighter the structure of belief system the more difficult it is to change peoples' ideas. Therefore, low belief tightness implies that

citizens in the selected countries are malleable to ideational change. In addition, as I mentioned in chapter 5, it seems that Africans are willing to review their politico-economic ideas based on events taking place in their countries. Third, as political liberalization entrenches in these countries, and political space opens up, new ideas are more likely to freely flow.

Considering the fact that social engineering does not require attempting wholesale cultural changes, rather targeting some specific core values means that such the current environment is conducive for encouraging ideational changes to support anti-corruption. Social entrepreneurs, as carriers of communicative discourse, should focus on influencing local and national political discourse to entrench a suitable 'expectations' structure. What I have in mind goes beyond the typical approach among CSOs involved in anti-corruption that includes exposing corruption cases and scandals, putting pressure on the government to fight corruption, and building demands for greater accountability. It is about altering the way people think about the government and their leaders through political messages. However, focusing on value reasoning in a broader sense (like in this study) is not sufficient to explain exactly how to achieve such an appropriate informal structure. A finer evaluation of the politico-economic ideas is necessary to identify precise mechanisms about how ideas support an informal structure that facilitates successful anti-corruption reforms.

Failure to do so means varied ideas and lack of societal consensus. This in turn implies that people's ideational formation does not refract them into coherent practices, and in the process, ideas may lose their capacity for steering social action. In such a scenario what emerges, for example, is a turbulent anti-corruption movement that

potentially directs away from the designed anti-corruption reforms. This is an important point to bear in mind because people usually express strong anti-corruption views. The contradiction is that people may overwhelmingly reject corruption but at the same time inadvertently support perpetuation of corruption. Therefore, people through their ideas, may willingly or unwillingly collude with their leaders to preserve the corrupt status quo. The social engineering program should therefore be context specific and designed to take belief structures more squarely into account.

Though I promote local CSOs as likely entrepreneurs for such a program, I also recognize criticism that CSOs in Africa are weak, lack organizational resources, and are susceptible to political machinations by the political elites. For instance, some scholars argue that usefulness of civil society in Africa depends on the structure of patron-client networks (Khan 1999) and are ineffective as long as citizens have a stake in the distribution of resources (Haarhuis and Leeuw 2004). It is evident that patron client relations are important, but as I have argued in this study, the nature of these relations also depends on the ideational context that underpins these relations. It is precisely this ideational context that I believe if changed will also alter the nature of relations and result in productive outcomes.

To address resource limitations, the donor community can support the social engineering program. As mentioned in chapter 2, one the central aims of donor community's current three-prong reform strategies is supposedly to assist civil society to represent an anti-corruption front. To achieve these aims, donor community technocrats can fundamentally alter their approach to anti-corruption reforms by supporting a social engineering program run by local CSOs and abandon ineffective strategies like workshop

participation (Haarhuis and Leeuw 2004). As Doig, Watt, and Williams (2005b) argue, the most effective strategy for the donor community is to establish reasonable expectations about reform outcomes and adopt a ‘hands off’ approach.

Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell (2010) correctly suggest that the best way to fight corruption is to adopt an indirect approach. What better indirect approach than for citizens to adopt an ‘expectations’ structure that creates a constraining informal structure for public officials. Speaking of an indirect approach, Rothstein (2010) suggests an indirect ‘big bang’ approach whereby reforms are implemented within a short period of time and not focused specifically on corruption. Illustrating his argument using the case of Sweden, Rothstein argues that this is the optimal anti-corruption strategy including in countries experiencing systemic corruption. Rothstein’s account of the Swedish success story relates to two observations in this study: the importance of a complementary informal ‘expectations’ structure, and a long-term perspective of reforms’ success.

With regard to the ideational context, in Rothstein’s account there is a lagged effect of school reforms and establishment of a popular free press in the 1840s. This means that the ‘big bang’ that took place in Sweden in the 1860s was partly made possible by the ideational foundations initiated in the 1840s. Second, though Rothstein claims a 15-year span (1860-1875) as the critical period of reforms, his account of Sweden’s shift from a very corrupt society begins in 1840 and ends in 1878, 38 years. This is not to say that African countries require that much time, it simply suggests that we should focus on a longer term view of succeeding. In Africa the pace can be accelerated but expecting too much too soon, as scholars like Khan (2005, 2006), Grindle (2004), and Doig, Watt and Williams (2006) argue, is not an optimal strategy and undermines anti-corruption reforms.

There is power in ideas; the challenge is to harness this power in a productive way. The ultimate challenge is to generate a collective vision that influences people's beliefs about the state and leaders to complement institutional reforms. Thus even Mbaku's (2008) suggestion about instituting constitutional reforms to fight corruption is not effective without a supportive 'expectations' structure.

7.5 Study Limitations and Future Research

Although I contribute to the anti-corruption reforms literature, I also acknowledge some shortcomings. In this study, I have established that particular ideational attributes are important for successful implementation of reforms. What is not completely clear though from the empirical findings is the precise mechanism how these politico-economic ideas influence reform outcomes. Future studies should for example focus on political discourse especially how ideas are communicated and translated into practice and the influential actors who make it possible. Where scholars such studies, it is imperative to avoid the common conception of Africans as trapped in cultural thinking, or where rationality is concerned, limited to instrumental thinking. Studies, like the present study, that go beyond cultural thinking to explain and identify Africans' ideas and attitudes in terms of cognitive assessments are a step in the right direction, and one that future studies should embrace.

The general lack of cross-national statistical work in the existing literature is not surprising. There are numerous methodological challenges to overcome especially with regard to developing a quantitative measure of ideas, and measurement bias of corruption and anti-corruption measures. In particular, I developed a theoretically useful though not reliable measure index of politico-economic ideas. Clearly better measures of ideas to

improve reliability can be developed in future studies though “a problem with trying to assess highly complex phenomena like culture is that experts rarely agree on which of the essential dimensions to measure” (Scott et al 2003, 938). However, administrators of the Afrobarometer series can consider including the use of vignettes in future survey designs.

A further limitation emanates from the design of the explanatory model. Obviously to retain a parsimonious model means overlooking some influential factors. While my analysis focused on readily observable indicators, it does not speak directly to other factors considered influential. For instance, given the centrality of political commitment in the literature, quality of political leadership also plays an important role. In addition, other potentially important/influential factors omitted include the donors’ agenda (Doig, Watt, and Williams 2005b), intensity of reform implementation, historical circumstances, and influence of other international actors besides technocrats within the donor community. Here I particularly have in mind the role of private international actors like multinational corporations because various studies show the complicity of these organizations in the bribery of officials in developing countries and the continued perpetuation of corruption in these countries (Ribadu 2010).

Finally, while I show that structural features are influential, it is the interaction of ‘expectations’, ‘opportunity’ and ‘capacity’ that potentially provides a more refined explanation of anti-corruption reform outcomes. In other words, it is when explanations about anti-corruption reforms are located at the intersection between these component parts of the political economy that the dynamic interactions among structure, agency, and ideas are further revealed. Such an enterprise requires a review of a country’s institutional framework, political and economic contingencies, and discursive framing and how these

are embedded on one another. Scholarly works such as Yang (2009) and Misangyi, Weaver, and Elms (2008) point to this direction.

7.6 Concluding Remarks

Going back to the hypothetical conference, if I were to address the panel, I would begin by reframing the discussion then suggest that there is a domestic constituency for anti-corruption reforms; it just needs to be cultivated. Furthermore, succeeding does not require wholesale changes, and positive change does not depend on ideal conditions and institutions, so fighting corruption in African countries, even those experiencing systemic corruption, is surmountable. It is in understanding how political actors navigate through the complex political economic environment that we can advance our knowledge of anti-corruption reforms.

The study raises awareness on the need to seriously include ideas in analysis of institutional reforms in African countries and illustrates that scholars need to develop a better understanding about the impact of people's ideas on the fight against corruption. I hope that this will inspire scholarly efforts to engage in a research agenda that highlights the role of ideas in African politics and pays more attention to people's belief structures as integral to explaining the politics of institutional reforms in the region. A lot more about African politics needs to be explored and more so without confining ourselves to the limitations of the neopatrimonial paradigm.

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- Zaller, John. *The Nature and Origin of Mass Opinion*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

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EDUCATION

Ph.D., Political Science, Purdue University, August 2012

Dissertation Title: "Succeeding or Failing to Reform: A Comparative Political Economic Analysis of Anti-Corruption Reforms in Selected Sub-Sahara African Countries"

Dissertation Committee: Dwayne Woods (Chair), James McCann, Leigh Raymond, Harry Targ

Fields of Study: Comparative Politics (major), International Relations, and Public Policy

M.A., Policy Analysis and Administration, Duquesne University, December 2004

Thesis: "The Role of Political Behavior and Socio-Economic Development on the Transition and Consolidation of Democracy in Sub-Sahara Africa"

B.A., Government and Philosophy, University of Nairobi (Kenya), December 1996

TEACHING EXPERIENCE**Independent Instructor, Department of Political Science, Purdue University:**

- POL 235, IR: Relations Between Rich and Poor Nations (Spring 2007, Fall 2008 and Spring 2009)
- POL 141, Governments of the World (Maymester 2006)
- POL 121, Introduction to Public Policy and Administration (Fall 2006, Fall 2008)

Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science, Purdue University

- POL 130, Introduction to International Relations (Berenice Carroll; Spring 2008)
- POL 235, IR: Relations Between Rich and Poor Nations (Dwayne Woods; Spring 2006)
- POL 141, Governments of the World (Dwayne Woods; Spring 2006)
- POL 345, Western European Politics (Dwayne Woods; Fall 2005)

Pedagogical Training

- POL 603, Pro-Seminar: Teaching Political Science (Spring 2006)

- Purdue University Center for Instructional Excellence: College Teaching Workshop Series (12 hours) - including “Classroom Teaching and Learning Strategies”, “Designing Instruction”, and “Creating the Engaged Classroom: Discussion Technique”.

Teaching Interests: Comparative Politics; International Relations; Public Policy and administration; International Political Economy; International Relations Theory; African Politics; Politics of Developing Countries; Democratization; and Policy Analysis

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Manuscripts in Progress

Wachira, Godfrey. “Charismatic Linkages in African Politics: Partisanship and Perceptions Towards Levels of Corruption in Selected Sub-Saharan Africa Countries” (under review)

Wachira, Godfrey. “The Politics of Economic Policy Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa: Domestic Elites’ Ideas, and Policy Variance in Public Sector Reforms in Kenya (1995-2008)” (under review)

Wachira, Godfrey. “Policy Space and Institutional Development: IFIs, Ideas, and Democratic Consolidation in Africa” (under review)

Wachira, Godfrey. “Rethinking Neopatrimonialism Explanations of Anti-Corruption Reform Outcomes Among African Countries: The Case of Kenya and Ghana” (work in progress)

Published Book Reviews

Wachira, Godfrey. 2007. *Corruption and Misuse of Public Office*. Nicholls, C., Daniel, T., Polaine, M., & Hatchard, J. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006: Pp. 822 *International Criminal Justice Review* 17, 2 (June)

Research Honors and Awards

- CIC Traveling Scholar- University of Michigan (Summer 2006)
- Travel Grant, NCOBPS, 2009; Department of Political Science 2008, 2009
- Second Class Honors (Upper Division) - University of Nairobi 1996

Conference Presentations

Wachira, Godfrey 2010. “Social Influence and Political Opinion: Citizens Attitudes towards Anti-Corruption in Africa” Presented at Midwest Political Science Association 2010 Annual Conference, April 2010, Chicago, IL.

Wachira, Godfrey. 2010. Policy Space and Economic Development: A Comparison of Investment Policies in Africa and Asia.” Presented at the 41st Annual National Conference for Black Political Scientists, March 2010, Atlanta, GA.

Wachira, Godfrey. 2009. “The Politics of Economic Policy Changes in sub-Saharan Africa: Domestic Elites’ Ideas and the Shift to Neoliberal Economic Reforms in

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- Wachira, Godfrey. 2009. "Why do They Fail? Anti-Corruption Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa." Presented at the 40th Annual National Conference for Black Political Scientists, March 2009, Houston, TX.
- Wachira, Godfrey. 2007. "It Aint that Extensive! Partisanship and Perceptions towards Official Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa." Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Conference, April 2007, Chicago, IL
- Wachira, Godfrey. 2004. "The Role of Economic Development and Political Behavior in the Consolidation of Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa." Presented at the First Annual Conference on Social and Public Policy Duquesne University, March 2004, Pittsburgh, PA.

Research Assistant

P.I. Dr Joseph Yenerall, Center for Social Public Policy, Duquesne University: 2003-2004

- This project focused on suicide rates among the elderly in rural America. My responsibilities included writing the literature review, assembling the database, and regression analysis.

Research Interests

Corruption; Institutional Reforms- Anti-Corruption Reforms; Role of ideas in the institutional reform process; African political and economic processes; International Development Agencies and Third World Development; and Democratization

Methodological Skills:

- Quantitative Methods: Multivariate Analysis, Regression
- Statistical Software: STATA, SPSS, Clarify

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Graduate Assistant, Office of Multicultural Programs at the Graduate School
Fall 2009- Spring 2012

- Grant writer: NIH-IMSD Grant and Alfred Sloan Foundation Grant for increasing enrollment and retention of underrepresented minorities in biomedical sciences and Chemistry respectively
- Principal Contributor: Joint AGEP-Graduate School recruitment strategic plan, "Recruiting URM Students in STEM Disciplines", for AY 2010/11
- Principal Contributor: Retention program for underrepresented minorities graduate students, Sloan Chemistry program

- Principal Contributor: “Challenges of Recruiting Underrepresented Minorities into STEM graduate programs at Purdue”; “Statistics and Trends in the Recruitment of Underrepresented Minorities from Historically Black Institutions at Purdue University”
- Key contributor: “Strategic Action 5e- Diversity Recruitment, Retention, and Partnership Development”, for Committee on Diversity, Purdue College of Engineering, 2009
- Contributor: Graduate School Strategic Action Plan 2010-2015 (Diversity Section)
- Designed and administered satisfaction surveys for HBI program participants
- Represented the Director in various diversity-related institutional meetings

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

- American Political Science Association
- Midwest Political Science Association
- National Conference of Black Political Scientists
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